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ABSTRACT   
It is widely believed that the slow socio-economic development of resource rich countries may 
be curbed by the promotion of transparency and accountability in resource governance. There 
is a universal consensus among politicians, multilateral institutions, corporations, and civil 
societies that the ‘paradox of plenty’ and its associated social ills of corruption, poverty and 
conflict are mainly due to the lack of transparent and accountable resource governance. Nations 
have thus adopted policies and legal frameworks on resource governance that seek to codify 
and implement the principles of transparency and accountability. Even so, transparency and 
accountability are still far from being in most developing nations. This thesis argues that 
transparency and accountability may only be realized in practice if their key aspects are duly 
incorporated in the law.  
 
Using the conceptual foundations on the governance principles of transparency and 
accountability, the thesis identifies four components that a legal framework ought to 
incorporate to foster transparency and accountability in practice. First, there has to be clear 
provisions establishing accountability relationships in the legal framework. Questions on who 
the actors are, who is to be called to account, who is entitled to hold another to account, and 
for what could one be held accountable have to be made very clear in the law. Even within the 
framework of multiple accountability mechanisms clarity of the circumstance the various 
mechanisms function is key. Equally, transparency relationships have to be clear on the kind 
and nature of the information to be disclosed, to whom it may be disclosed, at what time and 
in which manner such information may be disclosed.  
 
Second, the legal framework must provide for suitable accountability implementation 
mechanisms that give the accountor the required independence and mandate to inquire, render 
judgement and have the capacity to put its decisions to effect. Third, the legal framework ought 
to be able to create a well-coordinated web of accountability structures to provide for checks 
and balances. The legal framework should be able to ensure that actors given authority to fulfil 
their obligations are able to answer and face vigorous scrutiny and verification processes by 
independent actors. Lastly, the legal framework has to facilitate access to clear, reliable and 
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The thesis uses these components to conduct an appraisal of the legal and institutional 
framework governing hydrocarbons in Tanzania. It establishes whether the governance aspects 
of transparency and accountability are duly incorporated in the legal framework to ensure their 
implementation in practice. It concludes that Tanzania’s legal framework on hydrocarbons 
recognizes on paper the value of transparency and accountability, but it largely fails to 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 THE HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY PROMISE IN TANZANIA  
Tanzania has gained a place on the world’s hydrocarbons map with the discovery of large 
quantities of commercially viable gas reserves, estimated to be in the region of 55.08 trillion 
cubic feet (tcf) of recoverable natural gas.1 This discovery has raised expectations among all 
Tanzanians.2 For the elite and common citizen, rich or poor, Tanzania’s oil and gas resource is 
regarded as the ‘ace’. These expectations have also left the nation in anxiety.3 While some see 
the industry as promising an end to ‘perennial poverty’ and aid dependency, others see it as 
providing an opportunity to ‘get rich quickly’. For the local Tanzanian, the predominant wish 
is to have a share in the benefits ripped from their land.  
 
Much of the debate on the newly discovered hydrocarbons has centred on how to steer the new 
sector towards realizing the nation’s dream of becoming the next big oil and gas producer.4 To 
that end, Tanzania has put in place a new legal framework to regulate the industry. These laws 
were passed in a rush under a ‘certificate of urgency’.5 This accelerated process inured those 
                                               
1  Budgetary speech of the Ministry of Energy and Minerals by former minister George Simbachawene in 
parliament. Parliamentary 20th session /22nd sitting of 6 June 2015 (parliamentary Hansard), available at 
http://parliament.go.tz/polis/uploads/documents/1446554222-6%20JUNI%202015.pdf, accessed in September 
2018 at 20.   
2 A. Ambroz & E. Mushi, ‘Great Expectations: Citizens’ Views about the Gas Sector’, (Sep 2015) (25) Sauti za 
Wananchi 1 at 6. 
3 It is worth noting that the enthusiasm in receiving the gas discovery in Tanzania is a matter of the country’s last 
regime (2005-2015). Currently the hydrocarbon industry is almost history and has been totally ignored by the 
regime. Focus is now on electricity for industrialization from Stigler’s Gorge Dam being built on the Rufiji river.   
4 Speech by his Excellency Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania during 
launching of the fourth Tanzania deep offshore and north Lake Tanganyika licensing round 25 October 2013, Dar 
es Salaam, available at http://www.ikulu.go.tz/index.php/media/speech/135, accessed in September 2018. 
5 According to the parliamentary rules and regulations (Kanuni za Bunge za Kudumu 2016), a certificate of 
urgency is a document obtain by government (minister or attorney general) when in need of urgent passing of a 
bill by bypassing all necessary procedures. The certificate is issued by a permanent committee responsible for 
addressing issues covered by the tabled bill. K.80 (5) and (6) of Kanuni za Bunge za Kudumu 2016. 
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laws from public scrutiny.6  It led political opposition leaders – indeed the entire nation –to 
ask: ‘why the rush?’ and ‘is the legislation appropriate for the industry?’ These are the 
questions that the public is also asking our leaders and legislators.7 Everyone is asking whether 
Tanzania’s hydrocarbon sector will ultimately be the game changer or become the country’s 
curse. 
 
Tanzania has a history of mining gold, diamond, and tanzanite. The history of poor governance 
of mining these minerals remains in the minds of Tanzanians.8 For long, they have witnessed 
a poorly managed extractive industry that has failed to improve their welfare.9 The prospect of 
history repeating itself is a genuine concern, and it is thus understandable that there is 
heightened public interest in the new discoveries of hydrocarbons. On 23 May 2013, the 
Mtwara community vehemently opposed the construction of a 532 km natural gas pipeline 
from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam.10 This was a reminder that Tanzania is also prone to resource-
based conflicts if adequate conflict prevention and resolution measures are not in place. 
 
The new legal framework is the subject of investigation in this study. The central concern lies 
in the governance aspects of the new legal framework, especially the elements of accountability 
and transparency. The governance questions relating to transparency and accountability are not 
peculiar to Tanzania. Indeed, they are crucial to any state exploiting natural resources. How 
Tanzania’s hydrocarbon resources are governed will determine whether the country derives 
                                               
6 Press statement of 9 July 2015 by the Tanzania Coalition of Civil Societies contesting the move, available at 
http://business-humanrights.org/en/tanzania-civil-society-groups-decry-lack-of-consultation-in-enacting-key-oil-
gas-revenue-management-laws, accessed in September 2018.  
7 B. Lugongo, ‘Civil Society Organizations’ Fault Rushing of Key Legislation without Adequate Consultation’, 
The Citizen, Monday, 6 July 2015 at 2. 
8 F. Lugoe, ‘Governance in Mining Areas in Tanzania With Special Reference to Land Issues’, (2012) (41) ESFR 
1 at 8-9; S. P. Sanga, ‘The Role of Poor Governance in the Tanzanite-Al Qaeda Link Controversy, and Policy 
Options for Tanzania Enabling it to Escape from ‘Curses’ in the Mining Industry’, (2006-2007) Centre For Policy 
Studies Central European University International Policy Fellowship 5-6. 
9 Sanga, ibid. 
10  A. Ihucha, ‘Mtwara Protests Expose Gaps in Oil, Gas, Mineral Laws Management’, The East African,2 
February 2013,  available at http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Mtwara-protests-expose-gaps-in-oil-gas-
mineral-laws-management/-/2558/1682724/-/ws8pasz/-/index.html, accessed in September 2018. See also, BBC 
News ‘Tanzania Mtwara Gas Riots’, BBC News, 24 May 2013, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-22652809, accessed in September 2018. 
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maximum benefits from these resources and uses them for their intended public good such 
poverty alleviation, or throw the country into the abyss of the well-known resource curse. 
 
1.2   THE PARADOX OF PLENTY  
Possession of natural wealth is no guarantee of development. It is therefore not surprising that 
poverty, inequality, and deprivation are also found in countries with the greatest natural 
resource endowments.11 In some countries, rich deposits of non-renewable natural resources 
such as hydrocarbons and minerals have often helped to nurture and sustain autocracy, despair 
and insecurity.12 This mystery is what scholars have dubbed the ‘resource curse’ paradox.13  
 
                                               
11 B. C. Roy et al, ‘Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Performance—A Literature Review’, (2013)1(4) 
Current Urban Studies 148 at 148-149; R. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 3; M. L. Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, (1999) 51(2) 
World Politics 297; M. Badia-Miró et al, Natural Resources and Economic Growth: Learning from History 
(London: Routledge, 2015) 2-3. 
12 P. Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be done about It (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 38-50; Badia-Miró et al, supra note 10; I. Gary & T. L. Karl Bottom of the 
Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor (Maryland: Catholic Relief Services, 2003). 
13  The resource curse, also known as the paradox of plenty, describes the negative development outcomes 
associated with non-renewable extractive resources. It raises the following paradox: How are countries with an 
abundance of non-renewable natural resources, like minerals and fuels, tend to have less economic growth and 
worse development outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources? See African Development Bank and 
the African Union, Oil and Gas in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press 2009) at 79; J. Sachs et al, Escaping 
the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 1-4; R. M. Auty, Sustaining Development in 
Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis (London: Routledge, 2003)1-6. 
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Scholars have attributed the resource curse to a wide range of causes: the Dutch disease,14 price 
volatility,15 armed conflict,16 authoritarian rule,17 among others, but contemporary studies have 
dismissed these explanations. 18  Critics have drawn attention to the methodology used to 
establish the conventional curse theories as well as the period of study chosen.19 Ross, for 
example, seems to believe that most of the conventional explanations were made at the time 
when ‘the oil producing states were indeed economically troubled’.20 In his work, Ross shows 
that the GDP of hydrocarbon economies grew around 40% faster than those of other economies 
during a boom in the price of hydrocarbons.21 Luciani, on the other hand, while appreciating 
the arguments on price volatility, remarks that in recent years ‘relevant actors are capable of 
riding through the waves unscathed’.22 This is because countries are said to have adopted 
                                               
14The term was coined in 1977 by The Economist to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the 
Netherlands after the discovery of the large Groningen natural gas field in 1959 see; E. Christine, ‘Back to Basics 
– Dutch Disease: Too Much Wealth Managed Unwisely’, (2003) 40(1) IMF Finance and Development 2. In the 
1950s and 1960s, the strand of argument for the resource curse was mainly the concern of lack of diversification 
or the impact of foreign currency appreciation on the non-hydrocarbon trade sector of the economy. See P. 
Stevens, ‘The Resource Curse Revisited (Appendix: A Literature Review)’, (2015) Energy, Environment and 
Resources 1 at 4. 
15 Studies argue that high price periods would trigger a borrowing boom creating debt problems which would in 
the long run impact on national budgets and expenditure as well as hinder the adaptation of long term fiscal policie. 
See M. Basedau & A. Mehle, Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (Humberg: GIGA, 2005) 328-331; Stevens, 
supra note 13; G. Luciani, ‘Price and Revenue Volatility: What Policy Options and role for the State?’, (2011) 
17(2) Global Governance 213-228.   
16I. Bannon & P .Collier, ‘Natural Resources and Conflict: What We Can Do’, in I. Bannon & P. Collier (eds), 
Natural Resources and Violent Conflict Options and Actions (Washington: World Bank, 2003)1-17 at 4. 
17 Studies noted that hydrocarbon abundance appeared to change government behaviour resulting to limited 
prospects of development. The resources were then the cause or accelerator of conflict, poverty, and inequality 
and in turn hindered any prospects of economic progress. See R. Auty & A. Gelb, ‘The Political Economy of 
Resource Abundant States’, in R. Auty (ed), Resource Abundance and Economic Development (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001) 126-44. 
18 C. N. Brunnschweiler & E. H. Bulte, ‘The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and 
Red Herrings’, (May 2008) 55 (3) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248-264. 
19 Stevens, supra note 13, at 6-7. 
20  M. Ross, The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations (Oxford: Prinston 
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policies that render the volatility argument void.23 Similarly, the armed conflicts explanation 
of the curse has been criticized on the ground that it accounts for ‘a limited number of 
catastrophes’ and says ‘very little about the economic performance of oil rich states’.24 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been a central subject of analysis by scholars in the context of the 
resource curse phenomenon. 25  Despite its abundant natural resource wealth, sub-Saharan 
Africa remains impoverished, with high levels of illiteracy as well as low life expectancy due 
to civil conflicts, preventable waterborne diseases, malaria, HIV, and malnutrition, just to 
mention a few problems.26 Tanzania is no exception to this predicament, as its mining industry 
has proven.27 The discovery of commercially viable hydrocarbon carbon resources in Tanzania 
raises the question whether Tanzania can enjoy its blessings of oil and gas and avoid the 
resource curse.  
 
                                               
23 G. Luciani, ‘Price and Revenue Volatility: What Policy Options and Role for the State?’, (2011) 17(2): Global 
Governance, 213–28 at 214. 
24 Supra note 53, at 202. 
25 Generally see; M. Basedau & A. Mehler, Resource Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa (Hamberg: Institute of 
African Affairs, 2005), N. Shaxson, ‘New Approaches to Volatility: Dealing With the ‘Resource Curse’, in Sub-
Saharan Africa’, (2005) 18 (2) International Affairs 311–324; M. Basedau, ‘Context Matters - Rethinking the 
Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa’, 1 May 2005, GIGA Working Paper No 1; S. B. Blomberga et al, ‘New 
Wine in Old Wineskins? Growth, Terrorism and the Resource Curse in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (2011) 27(1) 
European Journal of Political Economy, 50–63; O. Jan-Peter, ‘Old Curses, New Approaches? Fiscal Benchmarks 
for Oil-Producing Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (May 2007) 1 IMF Working Papers, 1-42. 
26 M. L. Ross, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse’, (1999) 51(2) World Politics, 297-322; Basedau, 
supra note 24 at 3; G. Strange, ‘Political Economy: Failed’ States and Failed Regionalism?’, (2011) Working 
Paper No. 6, School of Social Science, University of Lincoln. Available at 
https://ulincoln.academia.edu/GerryStrange, accessed in September 2018; M. Brückner & A. Ciccone, 
‘International Commodity Prices, Growth and the Outbreak of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa’, (2010) 120 
(544) the Economic Journal, 519–534; G. Handley et al, ‘Poverty and Poverty Reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
An Overview of Key Issues’, (2009) Working Paper 299, Overseas Development Institute 1. 
27 P. Butler, ‘Tanzania: Liberalisation of Investment and the Mining Sector Analysis of the Content and Certain 
Implications of the Tanzanian 1998 Mining Act’, in B. Campbell (ed) Regulating Mining in Africa: For whose 
Benefits?  (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute 2004) 67-80. 
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As noted above, recent studies have tended to dismiss the resource curse phenomenon.28 As 
Stevens has argued, there is a prima facie case for dropping the ‘automatic use of the term 
resource “curse” in favour of the term resource “impact” and then consider whether the 
outcome is a curse or a blessing’.29  This raises the question: what then is the difference between 
the ‘blessed’ and the ‘cursed’ hydrocarbon producing nations? How do the likes of Norway 
escape the curse and likes of Nigeria do not? 
 
1.3   THE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY APPROACH 
TO THE PARADOX OF PLENTY 
Whether one believes in the existence of the resource curse or not, a truth one may not escape 
is that the difference between the ‘cursed’ and the ‘blessed’ nations lies in the administration 
and regulatory framework of their hydrocarbon resources. Studies indicate that by successfully 
improving the quality of administrative and regulatory institutions, enforcing the rule of law 
and ensuring transparency and accountability, a nation can escape from the resource curse.30 
On this account, the manner in which regulatory structures interact with each other and with 
all the stakeholders and the public and the existence of appropriate processes, policies and laws 
concerning the distribution of power and responsibilities in the hydrocarbon industry are of 
critical importance. How decisions are taken and how citizens or other stakeholders are 
involved in the making of those decisions play an important part in maximizing the social-
economic benefits from the hydrocarbon resources. Overlaying all these questions are the 
fundamental principles of transparency and accountability.  
 
                                               
28 C. N. Brunnschweiler & E. H. Bulte, ‘The Resource Curse Revisited and Revised: A Tale of Paradoxes and 
Red Herrings’, (2008) 55(3) Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 248–264 at 261; K.W. 
Ramsay ‘Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy’, (2011) 65 
International Organization 507-529 at 526; D. Lederman & W. F. Maloney; Natural Resources, Neither Curse 
Nor Destiny (Washington DC: Stanford University Press, 2007); P. J. Luong & E. Weintha, Oil is not a Curse: 
Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010). 
29 Stevens, supra note 13, at 11. 
30 T. L. Karl, ‘Ensuring Fairness: The Case for a Transparent Fiscal Social Contract’ in Sachs et al, supra note 12, 
at 257-8.  
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The global trend for the hydrocarbon industry has been to champion transparency and 
accountability in the upstream hydrocarbon actives.31  Given the increase of both the demand 
for oil and gas, and new discoveries of hydrocarbon resources in developing countries, the 
secrecy of the hydrocarbon industry and boundaries between hydrocarbon industry sectors are 
said to have faded dramatically. 32  This change has also been noted across the extractive 
industry, due in part to the international initiative for transparency and accountability 
undertaken by key actors within the extractive industry.33 Foreign investors, who are the major 
actors for resource exploitation, are also drawn to reliable and better-regulated state resources 
as they are seen to be more predictable and hence provide assurance for their massive capital 
investments.34 The level and manner in which hydrocarbon regulatory organs of a state are held 
answerable for their decisions and operations is crucial in ensuring effective management of 
the resources for development.35  
 
As noted earlier, Tanzania’s extractive industry has a history of poor regulation. Against this 
backdrop, a new set of laws on oil and gas was adopted in a hurry and without public 
participation. This by itself has raised significant public concern. The nature of these legal 
reforms, the regulatory mechanisms they have introduced and the extent to which they foster 
transparency and accountability in the regulation of Tanzania’s hydrocarbon resources are thus 
explored in this study.   
                                               
31  World Bank, ‘Towards Transparency in Oil, Gas, and Mining’, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/05/23/towards-transparency-in-oil-gas-and-mining, accessed in 
September 2018; I. Gary, ‘Global Progress Continues on Oil, Mining Transparency Laws’. Available at 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/222385-global-progress-continues-on-oil-mining-
transparency, accessed on September 2018. 
32 Speech of Abdalla S. El-Badri OPEC Secretary General, at the Executive Plenary Session of the Kuwait Oil 
and Gas Conference, Kuwait, 7 October 2013(The Power of Collaboration, People and Technology in the Oil and 
Gas Industry), available at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/2624.htm, accessed in September 2018. 
33 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global Standard to promote open and accountable 
management of natural resources. It seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate, 
and enhance trust. In each implementing country, it is supported by a coalition of governments, companies, and 
civil society working together. See more on https://eiti.org/eiti. 
34  PWC, Report on Africa’s Oil and Gas Industry; ‘From Fragile to Agile’ (2015), available at 
https://www.pwc.co.za/en/assets/pdf/oil-and-gas-review-2015.pdf, accessed in September 2018 at 10-11. 
35 F. Hameed, ‘Fiscal Transparency and Economic Outcomes’, (2005) IMF Working Paper 37, 05/225 at 30. 
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1.4  RESEARCH QUESTION AND THE PURPOSE AND 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to conduct an appraisal of the legal and institutional framework 
governing the upstream hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania. The appraisal aims at establishing 
the extent to which and how well the governance aspects of transparency and accountability 
are incorporated in the legal framework to ensure their effective implementation in practice.  
In investigating whether the new legal framework sufficiently incorporates transparency and 
accountability in the governance of Tanzania’s hydrocarbons, the study addresses the following 
questions that are more specific: 
 
i. What is the role of transparency and accountability in the regulation of the hydrocarbon 
sector?  
ii. What are the philosophical or conceptual foundations for transparency and 
accountability and indices for measuring these concepts?  
iii. What transparency and accountability-related challenges exist in the regulatory 
framework of the hydrocarbon sector?  
iv. How does the Tanzanian regulatory framework fare with regard to established and 
emerging transparency and accountability requirements for the sector?  
v. How could Tanzania’s hydrocarbon regulatory framework be improved in order to 
enhance transparency and accountability in the sector? 
 
Enhanced transparency and accountability in the governance of the hydrocarbon resources is 
likely to increase management efficiency, reduce opportunities for self-dealing and diversion 
of revenues for personal gain, raise the level of public trust, and reduce the risk of social 
conflict.36 On that premise, the thesis seeks to contribute to efforts made in improving the 
regulation of the hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania so that the country can avoid the resource 
curse. By undertaking an extensive study on transparency and accountability in the governance 
of Tanzania’s hydrocarbons, the thesis addresses key legal and policy challenges to the 
effective regulation of the industry. There is an ongoing debate on the laws governing the 
                                               
36 EITI, ‘Extractive Industries: A Guide to Best Practice in Transparency, Accountability, and Civic Engagement 
across the Public Sector’, available at http://transparencyinitiative.theideabureau.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/8-Extractive-industries1.pdf, accessed in September 2018. 
CHAPTER 3 
-9 -  
 
extractive industry including hydrocarbons in Tanzania. Much as this debate is occurring in the 
public and among policy makers, there is a dearth of research-based interventions in the debate, 
especially at the policy level. In this respect, the thesis contributes something more concrete to 
the debate that could inform further policy and legal reforms.   
 
Additionally, Uganda and Kenya have also announced similar hydrocarbon discoveries.37 As 
in Tanzania, there is also a raging debate in these countries about the accountability and 
transparency problems arising from their respective regulatory framework.38 This study is 
therefore significant beyond Tanzania. The whole of East Africa is grappling with these issues.  
 
Tanzania’s Constitution expressly requires that there should be transparency and accountability 
in the management of non-renewable natural resources.39 In accordance with the Constitution 
and land laws,40 all land and natural resources are vested in the President as the trustee of the 
people of Tanzania. While citizens are guaranteed the right to occupy land, the right of 
occupancy excludes the use or exploitation of minerals or petroleum forming part of or below 
the surface of the respective land.41 Minerals and hydrocarbons are governed by the state on 
behalf of the people of Tanzania.42 Thus, the nature of resource ownership itself dictates a need 
for transparency and accountability in the regulation of resources. These laws give the citizens 
the right to question and vet the regulation of their natural resources. With this very clear 
stipulation of the law, the interrogation of transparency and accountability of the hydrocarbon 
regulatory framework in Tanzania, done by this study, is consistent with what Constitution 
mandates.  
                                               
37  National Oil Cooperation of Kenya, ‘Oil and Gas Exploration History in Kenya’, available at 
http://nationaloil.co.ke/site/3.php?id=1, accessed in May 2016; Uganda Oil and Gas Info Ltd, ‘History And 
Development’, available at http://www.ugandaoilandgas.com/ugandaoilandgas_003.htm,accessed in September 
2018. 
38 East African Legislative Assembly Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources, ‘Report on 
Governance of Natural Resources in the EAC Region December 2012’, available at 
http://www.eala.org/uploads/FINAL%20REPORT%202013_JAN_08%20RECOMMENDATIONS%20AND%
20RESOLUTONS%20OF%20THE%20WORKSHOP%20ON%20GOVERNANCE%20OF%20NATURAL%2
0RESOURCES%20_FIN_%20.pdf,  accessed in September 2018. 
39 Article 24 of the Tanzania Constitution 1977. 
40 Section 2 the Land Act Cap113 of 1999 and Article 24 of the Tanzania Constitution 1977. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid and S. 4 of the Petroleum Act No. 21 of 2015.   
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Besides, Tanzania is a signatory to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)43 . 
Though the status of the country’s participation in the EITI is commendable,44 the country was 
suspended in September 2015 due to its failure to publish its reports punctually and for not 
meeting the EITI standards. 45  This only further stresses the importance of the study in 
identifying and addressing key transparency and accountability challenges and gaps in the 
hydrocarbon regulatory framework in Tanzania.    
 
1.5   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The thesis uses the resource-curse theory to contextualize the governance challenge of natural 
resources.46 It also makes use of the governance tools of transparency and accountability in 
evaluating the governance of the hydrocarbon industry in general and specifically in the legal 
framework governing hydrocarbons in Tanzania.47  
 
The study first identifies the structure of the hydrocarbon industry that includes ownership and 
access rights of the resources and the regulatory structures and involved stakeholders including 
oil companies and regulatory authorities. 48  It maps out the various transparency and 
accountability relationships forged by the industry structure. The study then uses the identified 
industry structure and the transparency and accountability relationships in evaluating the legal 
framework put in place for their governance.  
 
                                               
43 It also obtained a complaint status in December 2012. A country is designated as Compliant when the EITI 
Board considers that it has met all of the EITI Requirements. ‘Compliant countries must undergo Validation every 
three years or upon the request from the EITI Board’. Compliance with the EITI Requirements does not 
necessarily mean that a country's extractive sector is fully transparent, but that there are ‘satisfactory levels of 
disclosure and openness in the management of the natural resources, as well as a functioning process to oversee 
and improve disclosure’. See https://eiti.org/glossary#EITI_compliant, accessed in September 2018. 
44 EITI, ‘Implementation Status’, available at https://eiti.org/countries, accessed in September 2018.  
45 TEITI ‘Sixth Report of the Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for the Year Ended 30 June 
2014’, available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/TEITI-6th_2014_Report-TEITI-12-
Final.pdf, accessed in September 2018 at 130. 
46 See subsection 2 above. 
47 Chapter 3. 
48 Chapter 2. 
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In addressing the question of transparency and accountability in Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal 
framework, the study conceptualizes the governance aspects of transparency and accountability 
and identifies the elements needed for effective regulation of this industry.49    
 
The first is that there has to be provisions clearly establishing accountability relationships and 
their implementation mechanisms. Questions on who are the actors, who is to be called to 
account, by whom and for what, have to be stated very clearly in the law. Even within the 
framework of multiple accountability mechanisms, clarity about the circumstances the various 
mechanisms function is key. In the same vein, there has to be clarity on information disclosed, 
by whom, at what time and in which manner. This clarity of the law is helpful in creating a 
roadmap to effective accountability and transparency practices.  
 
The second element is that the legal framework must provide for accountability implementation 
mechanisms that are sufficiently independent, have adequate mandate to inquire and render 
judgement, and have the capacity enforce their decisions. These bodies must be able to affect 
change on the behavior of the accountee.  
 
The third element is that the legal framework should be able to create a well-coordinated web 
of accountability structures that provides for a check and balance system. The legal framework 
should be able to ensure that actors given authority to fulfil their obligations are able to answer 
and face vigorous scrutiny and verification processes by independent actors. Here the legal 
framework ought to employ vertical and horizontal accountability mechanisms. 
The last element is that the legal frame must facilitate access to clear, reliable and complete 
information by interested stakeholders and the public. In terms of form and substance, the 
information given must be capable of being comprehended by its users. 
 
1.6   SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
As is well known, Tanzania is a union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Accordingly, Tanzania has 
union and non-union matters that are administered by separate government administrations 
either concurrently or exclusively. While management of hydrocarbons forms part of union 
matters, each party to the union also regulates it separately. This study is limited to Tanzania 
                                               
49 Chapter 3.  
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Mainland (formerly Tanganyika). Any subsequent reference to Tanzania in this study therefore 
refers, unless otherwise stated, to Mainland Tanzania. 
 
By the same token, while the hydrocarbon industry has three segments - upstream, midstream 
and downstream, this study focuses on the upstream segment. As explained further in chapter 
2, for hydrocarbon resource owners, it is the governance of the upstream activities that 
determines whether the hydrocarbon resources will enhance social economic development or 
not. Another reason for focusing on the upstream sector has to do with feasibility of the study 
and the fact that the law in Tanzania provides for separate regulatory and institutional 
frameworks for upstream operations from midstream and downstream operations as is further 
elaborated in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
In limiting its enquiry to the legal framework governing upstream operations, the study has 
excluded the interrogation of laws pertaining to tax collection and distribution. While it would 
be worthwhile to review the tax regime in terms of accountability and transparency, it would 
have unduly expanded the scope of the thesis to include that theme. An interrogation of the tax 
regime and fiscal accountability requires a different set of analytical tools warranting an entire 
thesis of its own. Fortunately, another candidate has already completed a doctoral thesis 
interrogating tax leakages in the upstream hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania.50  
 
1.7   COURSE OF INQUIRY 
As is clear by now, the overall aim of this thesis is to address transparency and accountability 
gaps in the legal framework of Tanzania’s hydrocarbon sector. In so doing, this introductory 
chapter has contextualised the problem and identified areas of interrogation. The remainder of 
the thesis is divided into seven chapters.  
 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the hydrocarbon industry. It looks at how the industry is 
structured, and identifies the key industry players. Looking at recent history and development 
of the hydrocarbon industry, the chapter identifies driving forces behind the industry and its 
structure while tracing their implications for transparency and accountability. The chapter also 
                                               
50 B. Luhende, ‘Towards a Legal Framework for Preventing Tax Revenue Leakage in the Upstream Oil and Gas 
Industry in Tanzania: An Analysis of the Concepts, Methods and Options available in a Public Trusteeship Model 
of Natural Resource Holding’, PHD Thesis University of Cape Town, 2017. 
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discusses hydrocarbons as the major source of energy and the impact of such importance in its 
governance and regulation.  
 
Chapter 3 identifies and analyses the conceptual foundations of transparency and accountability 
as they relate to governance in general and the governance of natural resources in particular, 
focusing in particular on the elements of effective transparency and accountability systems and 
mechanisms. This discussion sets the foundation for reviewing the legal framework governing 
hydrocarbons in Tanzania.  
 
Chapter 4 focuses on transparency and accountability trends and challenges presented by the 
hydrocarbon industry. It concentrates on general transparency and accountability practices of 
the key industrial players, identifying ‘common practices’, regional and international policies 
and initiatives that have been adopted by the hydrocarbon industry. In identify key industrial 
trends on transparency and accountability, the chapter looks at how the various industrial 
players interact and highlight the challenges involved in ensuring the use of transparency and 
accountability in the hydrocarbon industry. It uses the adopted industry structure in chapter two 
and looks at how the various key players advance transparency and accountability in the 
industry. The chapter also looks at other factors and policies that influence transparency and 
accountability practices in the hydrocarbon industry such as environmental policies, 
intellectual property rights and human rights policies. 
 
Chapter 5 gives an account of the development of the legal framework governing hydrocarbons 
in Tanzania and describes the current legal and institutional framework. The chapter traces the 
development of the extractive industry and the discovery of the hydrocarbon resources from 
the pre-colonial era, the colonial era, and independence era. The chapter then looks at the post-
independence era discussing the era of economic liberalisation and foreign investment policies. 
Throughout the discussion, the chapter analyses various legal and constitutional developments 
that have a bearing on the regulation of the hydrocarbon industry particularly on aspects of 
transparency and accountability. Finally, the chapter describes the current legal framework and 
identifies the corresponding institutional framework for the governance of Tanzania’s 
hydrocarbon industry, laying the foundation for the analysis in later chapters. 
 
Chapters 6 and 7 answer the question whether the legal framework governing the hydrocarbon 
industry in Tanzania fully recognises the principles of accountability and transparency and 
CHAPTER 3 
-14 -  
 
establishes sufficient mechanisms to ensure that those principles are respected in practice. The 
answer to this question are obtained by using the four analytical tools identified in Chapter 
three for determining whether a legal framework establishes adequate accountability and 
transparency frameworks. Chapter 6 focuses on the analytical tools on transparency. It 
interrogates whether the Tanzanian legal framework makes adequate provision for access to 
clear, reliable and complete information by industry players, interested stakeholders and the 
public. Furthermore, it assesses the measures taken, if any, to facilitate access to 
comprehensible and user-friendly information held by the state and other players. The various 
transparency relationships in the governance of upstream hydrocarbon industry provided for 
under the law are analyzed and outlined, bearing in mind the question whether the law makes 
sufficient provision for transparency in these relationships as far as  the upstream hydrocarbon 
activities are concerned.    
 
Chapter 7, on the other hand, deals with accountability. It asks whether the law provides clarity 
in every established accountability relationship. It considers at how the law addresses the 
fundamental questions of who is to be called to account, by whom, how, where and for what. 
The chapter also addresses the question whether the legal framework provides for 
accountability implementation mechanisms that give the accountor the required independence 
and mandate to inquire, render judgement, and have the capacity to put its decisions to effect. 
The chapter also looks at whether the legal framework creates a well-coordinated web of 
accountability structures to provide for sufficient and efficient checks and balances in the 
governance of Tanzania’s hydrocarbons. 
 
Chapter 8 sums up the central issues raised and addressed in the course of study and provide 
conclusions thereon. More specifically, it offers the findings of the study on the main question 
whether Tanzania’s hydrocarbons legal framework adequately incorporates key aspects of 
transparency and accountability. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION AND INDUSTRY 
ACTORS 
 
2.1   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter seeks to provide an insight on the hydrocarbon industry, its structure, complexities 
and identifying the key industry players. Understanding the hydrocarbon industry and its 
related complexities and structure provides a foundation for the analysis of transparency and 
accountability as tools of resource governance in the industry. The main aim of this chapter is 
to identify the main industry players and their role in the industry. The thesis uses the adopted 
upstream hydrocarbon industry structure in this chapter in the assessment of transparency and 
accountability in the industry.   
 
The chapter starts by defining the hydrocarbon industry and what the industry involves. It then 
makes a brief discussion on modern history and development of the hydrocarbon industry as it 
relates to transparency and accountability. The chapter also discusses the prominence of 
hydrocarbons as the major source of energy and the impact of such importance in its 
governance and regulation.  It identifies key industrial players and their role in the structure 
and operation of the industry.  This over view of the hydrocarbon industry provides a 
foundation for analysis of transparency and accountability in Tanzania’s hydrocarbon 
regulation. 
 
2.2  DEFINITION OF THE HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
Hydrocarbons are organic compounds comprising of carbon and hydrogen. The majority of 
hydrocarbons are found buried underneath the sedimentary rock of the earth where 
decomposed organic matter undergoes heating and compression over a long period. 1 
Hydrocarbons can combine in numerous ways to form various compounds.2 The different 
                                               
1 U. R. Chaudhuri, Fundamentals of Petroleum and Petrochemical Engineering (Florida: CRC Press, 2016) 7-8; 
J. Hilyard, The Oil & Gas Industry: A Nontechnical Guide (Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2012) 3-6. 
2 R. C. Selley & S. A. Sonnenberg, Elements of Petroleum Geology (ed3) (London: Academic Press, 2014) 13; 
A. Fagan, An Introduction to the Petroleum Industry (Brampton: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
CHAPTER 3 
-16 -  
 
properties of hydrocarbon compounds are determined by variances in the number and 
arrangement of hydrogen and carbon atoms they contain.3 They can form liquids such as 
petroleum, gases such as natural gas and solids, such as the asphalt that is used to pave roads 
among others.4  
 
The hydrocarbon industry comprises the global processes of exploration, extraction, 
transporting, refining and marketing of the various hydrocarbon products. 5  Currently, 
petroleum and natural gas are the major hydrocarbon products of the industry.6 The industry is 
habitually separated into three major components: upstream, midstream and downstream.  The 
upstream segment of the industry involves the finding of the hydrocarbon sites and bringing 
the respective hydrocarbon products from the ground. 7  Upstream activities consist of 
exploratory work involving the hunt for underground (or underwater) hydrocarbon reservoirs, 
the initial drilling, followed by the production phase, which is the actual extraction of 
hydrocarbons from the ground. 8  The midstream and downstream segments involve the 
purification of the hydrocarbons and refining them into different products.9 They also involve 
the gathering, transportation and marketing of hydrocarbons and its products.10 The focus of 
                                               
Dept. of Mines and Energy, 1991) 1-3; D. Havard, Oil and Gas Production Handbook: An Introduction to Oil 
and Gas Production (North Carolina: Lulu Publishing, 2013) 17-19. 
3Havard, ibid; J.G. Speight, Handbook of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations (Oxford: Elsevier, 2015) 14-16; C. 
Termeer, Fundamentals of Investing in Oil and Gas (Florida: Chris-Termeer Publishing, 2013) 51-56; P.A. 
Clennel, Introduction to Petroleum Exploration and Engineering (London: World Scientific, 2016) 15 -17. 
4 Ibid. 
5 A. C. Inkpen & M. H. Moffett, The Global Oil & Gas Industry: Management, Strategy & Finance (Oklahoma: 
Penn Well Books, 2011) 20; F. Jahn et al, Hydrocarbon Exploration and Production (ed 2) (Amsterdam: Elsevier 
2008) at 1. 
6 M. S. Vassiliou, The A to Z of the Petroleum Industry (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2009) 1; J.G. Speight, 
Handbook of Industrial Hydrocarbon Processes (Oxford: Gulf Professional Publishing, 2011) 46. 
7 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 21; M. A. Al-Sahlawi, ‘Structure of the Oil and Gas Industry’, in H. K. Abdel-
Aal, & M. A. Al-sahlawi, Petroleum Economics and Engineering (London: CRC Press 2014) 21; R. Clews, 
Project Finance for the International Petroleum Industry (London: Academic Press, 2016)Vii. 
8 Jahn et al, supra note 5 at 1-6; S. Werner et al, Managing Human Resources in the Oil & Gas Industry 
(Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2016) 58-59; B. Beyazay, The Nature of the Firm in the Oil Industry: International 
Oil Companies in Global Business (Vol. 62) (New York: Routledge, 2016) 13- 14. 
9  Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 26-31; J. R. Fanchi, & R. L. Christiansen, Introduction to Petroleum 
Engineering (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2016) 291-294. 
10 Ibid. 
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this study is on upstream activities of the hydrocarbon industry. The governance of the 
upstream activities determines whether the hydrocarbon resources will provide social 
economic development for its owners or not.  
 
2.3  TRANSPARENCY IN THE DEVEOPMENT HISTORY OF THE 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
In the early years of the hydrocarbon industry, there was little attention from state regulation 
of its exploration.11 In the 1850s in America where the modern hydrocarbon industry was born, 
hydrocarbons were just another commodity in the trade market.12 Hydrocarbons were regulated 
by nothing more than the laws of trade and agreements on land leases and other forms of 
business contracts.13 The early years of the industry were characterized by the dominance of 
monopolistic private enterprises, which developed and controlled the infrastructure and 
technology of the industry.14 Operations of the industry were characterized by secrecy and 
business tricks given the fierce competition of private enterprises.15 Setting off on this footing, 
there was little to be told of transparency and accountability on the exploration of hydrocarbons 
beyond the boardrooms of private companies. 
 
In the early 1990s, with the discovery of the internal combustion engine powered by petroleum, 
hydrocarbons ceased being just another commodity in the market and quickly became the 
engine of global politics and economics. Oil powered the submarine, the airplane, the tank, and 
                                               
11 D. Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012) 32-34; 
N. Malavis, Bless the Pure and Humble: Texas Lawyers and Oil Regulation, 1919-1936(Texas: Texas A&M 
University Press, 1996) IV and Chapter One; J.A. Pratt, ‘The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Antitrust and the 
Decline of Monopoly Control in Oil’, (1980) 40(4) The Journal of Economic History 815–837; G. D. Nash, United 
States Oil Policy, 1890-1964: Business and Government in Twentieth Century America (Pennsylvania: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 1968) 11. 
12 Yergin, supra note 11 at 33, T. Daintith, Finders Keepers?: How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil 
Industry (London: Earth scan, 2010)3; Malavis, supra note 11. 
13 Ibid. 
14 N. Antill & R. Arnott, Valuing Oil and Gas Companies: A Guide to the Assessment and Evaluation of Assets, 
Performance and Prospects (Cambridge: Woodhead Publishing, 2000) 8-11; T. C. Winegard, The First World 
Oil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 52. 
15I. M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company: Briefer version (New York: Courier Corporation, 2012) 
14; Yergin, supra note 11 at 42-7.  
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motorized transport, which was the key military innovations of World War I.16 Nations, saw 
hydrocarbons as primary in asserting and maintaining their political and economic dominance 
and control.17 These developments marked the beginning of the quest for possession, control, 
and regulation of hydrocarbons by states.18  
 
By this time, the private industry had well established dominance in the exploration of 
hydrocarbons and was inevitably used by states to advance national hydrocarbon interests.19 
As a result, states had limited direct control in the management and affairs of the oil 
companies.20 The reliance on the oil companies as vehicles of national interest in hydrocarbons 
enhanced and facilitated control of the world hydrocarbon economy by the most powerful 
private interests.21 The major oil companies controlled 85 percent of the world's oil reserves 
and were popularly labeled the ‘seven sisters’ cartel consisting of Anglo-Persian Oil Company 
(Now BP); Standard Oil of California (now Chevron); Texaco (which later merged with 
Chevron); Royal Dutch Shell; Standard Oil of New Jersey (ESSO/Exxon); and Standard Oil 
Company of New York (SOCONY) (now Mobil and part of ExxonMobil). 22  The use of 
competitive private companies coupled with the significance of hydrocarbons in politics and 
economics made it difficult for the industry to function in a transparent manner.  
                                               
16 Yergin, supra note 11 chapter 9; W. G. Jensen, ‘The Importance of Energy in the First and Second World Wars,’ 
(1968) 11 Historical Journal 538-45, as cited in D. S. Painter, ‘International Oil and National Security’, (fall, 
1991) 120(4) Searching for Security in a Global Economy 183-206 at 184. 
17 B. C. Black, Crude Reality: Petroleum in World History (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014) 11. 
18  Yergin, supra note 11 chapter 10; L. Fischer, Oil imperialism: The International Struggle for Petroleum 
(London & New York: Routledge, 2016) 19-20. 
19 Yergin, supra note 11 chapter 28; K. Crane et al, Imported Oil National Security and U.S (California: Rand 
Corporation, 2009) 25. 
20 Yergin, supra note 11 chapter 28; S. J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits 
and Security (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP, 2005)15-42; M. Kent, Moguls and Mandarins: Oil, 
Imperialism and the Middle East in British Foreign Policy 1900-1940 (London & New York: Routledge, 2013) 
34-68. 
21 A. Mahdi, Energy and US foreign policy: The quest for resource security after the Cold War (New York: IB 
Tauris, 2012) 8-9; Encyclopedia of the New American Nation ‘Oil - The Origins of U.S. Foreign Oil Policy’ 
available at http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Oil-The-origins-of-u-s-foreign-oil-
policy.html#ixzz4YUA17IZU accessed in September 2018. 
22 A. Sampson, The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped (New York: Viking 
Press, 1975) chapter 9 available at https://journeytoforever.org/biofuel_library/sevensisters/7sisters9.html 
accessed in September 2018. 
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In the first half of the 19th century, oil concessions were obtained by way of imperialism and 
skullduggery of corrupt leaders and intermediaries in the various countries.23 Hydrocarbon 
concessions were mostly a deal between the ruling government of the respective producing 
nations and the oil companies advancing national interests of their home countries.24 The 
scramble by imperialist states for oil resources across the globe led to high secrecy in 
negotiations, terms, and awarding of hydrocarbon concessions.25 There were no specific laws 
or rules governing the negotiations or awarding of hydrocarbon concessions and every 
concession was likely to be different from the other dependent on the lobbyists (oil fixers)26 
and the needs of the ruler of the producing country.27 Such environment facilitated very little 
accountability and transparency in the oil concessions. 
 
The years following the 1960s shaped the modern development of the hydrocarbon industry 
through the nationalization of hydrocarbon resources by countries in possession of the 
resource.28 Through nationalization, the hydrocarbon industry was integrated into national 
economies and thus required strategic control by the producing countries over pricing, the rate 
of production and other regulation aspects.29 This meant the creation of competent legal and 
                                               
23 Yergin, supra note 11 at 281-98 & 410-21; C. More, Black Gold: Britain and Oil in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009) 1-10; L. Fischer, Oil imperialism: The International Struggle for 
Petroleum (London & New York: Routledge, 2016) at 13-15. 
24 Yergin, supra note 11 at 289-98; M. Kent, Oil and Empire (Berlin: Springer, 2016) 9, 15-16. 
25 Yergin, supra note 11at 263. 
26 The oil fixers and lobbyists are individuals who facilitate the conclusion of hydrocarbon deals. They do not 
have any tangible monetary input but usually have excellent networks of political contacts. They use their contacts 
as leverage for legal protection. Fixers have been central to the effective conclusion of hydrocarbon deals ever 
since the beginning of the industry to date. See. K. Silverstein, The Secret World of Oil (New York: Verso Books, 
2014) for a detailed discussion on the Oil fixers and their role and position in the industry. 
27 Silverstein, ibid at 7-9; F. Parra, Oil politics: A modern history of petroleum (New York: IB Tauris, 2004) 7-
14. 
28 The first front in this epic contest was opened in Venezuela. Nationalization of the oil industry in numerous 
countries, including Libya, Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.  See T. Falola &A. Genova, 
The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An Introduction (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005) 49-
64; D. Babusiaux, Oil and Gas Exploration and Production: Reserves, Costs, Contracts (Paris: Editions Technip, 
2007) at 28-9. 
29 V. Marcel et al, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution 
press, 2006)28-9 &34-36. 
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regulatory frameworks for the governance of hydrocarbons by the respective countries. 30  
Accordingly, this implied the increased requirement of accountability and transparency in 
regulation of hydrocarbons at the national level.  Notwithstanding increased involvement of 
states in the regulation of hydrocarbons, given the role of the industry in geopolitics as well as 
corrupt and rent seeking behaviour in most hydrocarbon producing countries, there remained 
very little to show for in as far as transparency was concerned. For many years, the lack of 
transparency was considered one of the traits of the hydrocarbon industry. 31 
 
In the modern day hydrocarbon industry, states remain in control of the industry with 
ownership of over 90% of the world's hydrocarbon reserves. 32  National oil companies 
(particularly in developed countries) have also grown to be competitors of the major 
international oil companies with both the technology and the financial capacity to invest and 
develop oil reserves outside their borders.33 While the hydrocarbon industry is well advanced 
technologically, environmental34  and energy security concerns remain a burning problem. 
Increased poverty, conflict, corruption among other social challenges have also become a norm 
in developing hydrocarbon resource countries.35 These and other challenges in the industry 
have created a web of multiple stakeholders at different levels who demand for more 
transparency and accountability in the governance of hydrocarbons. These stakeholders make 
                                               
30 Ibid, L. Atsegbua, ‘Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and Its Contribution to Modern 
Petroleum Development Agreements’, (January –June 1993) 35(1/2) Journal of the Indian Law Institute, pp. 115-
126. 
31 M. Andrade et al, ‘Transparency in Petroleum Contracts: A Comparative Study of Ecuador and Bolivia: What 
are the Strengths, the Weaknesses, the Opportunities, and the Threats?’, (2010) 11 TRACE Briefings  1-19 at 
32 S. Werner et al, Managing Human Resources in the Oil & Gas Industry (Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2016) 
319. 
33 C. Nakhle, ‘Petroleum Fiscal regimes Evolution and Challenges’, in P. Daniel et al, The Taxation of Petroleum 
and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice (London: Routledge, 2010) 91; J. R. Heilbrunn, Oil, Democracy, 
And Development in Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014)92. 
34The Hydrocarbon industry’s carbon emissions are said to be the major cause of ‘havoc in the planet’s climate, 
bringing closer the specter of rising sea levels, shifting vegetation zones, and more frequent storms, floods, and 
droughts’. M. Renner, ‘The New Geopolitics of Oil’, (2006) 49(3) Development, 56-63 at 61-62; D. Yergin, The 
Quest: Energy, Security, And the Remaking of the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2011) 997. Generally see 
chapter 25 and 6 on the global agenda on environmental challenges.  
35 N. Shaxson, ‘Oil Corruption and the Resource Curse’, (2007) 83(6) International Affairs (Royal Institute of 
International Affairs 1944) 1123-1140; M. L. Ross, ‘Blood Barrels-Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict’, (2008)87 
Foreign Affairs 2-8; M. Renner, ‘The New Geopolitics of Oil’, (2006) 49(3) Development, 56-63 at 57-58. 
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up the key players in the industry and influence policies and regulation of the industry.  How 
these players are held accountable and the manner in which the legal framework for the 
industry’s regulation facilities such accountability and transparency is of particular interest to 
this study. The section below identifies the main industry players and outlines the hydrocarbon 
industry structure that will help to highlight the focal points for transparency and 
accountability.  
 
2.4  INDUSTRY PLAYERS AND STRUCTURE OF THE 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
Academic literature seems to define better the structure of the hydrocarbon industry when 
referring to particular jurisdictions.36 In the global context, the literature is not clear on exactly 
what the structure of the hydrocarbon industry is.  Some scholars adopt a value chain model to 
represent the structure of the industry,37 while others concentrate on the industry’s players.38  
Most of the literature in the industry discusses various aspects of the industry without referring 
                                               
36 See for example: S. Martin, ‘Petroleum’, in J. W. Brock, The Structure of American Industry: Thirteenth Edition 
(Illinois: Waveland Press, 2015) 34, U. Ibp Usa, Russia Oil and Gas Exploration Laws and Regulation Handbook 
(Washington DC: International Business Publications 2010) 66-96; M. Olorunfemi et al, Nigerian Oil and Gas: 
A Mixed Blessing? (Lagos: Kachifo Limited 2014) Chapter one among other Jurisdiction specific literature. 
37  F. Hoshdar & S. F. Fassihi, ‘Technology Development in Iranian Petroleum Industry: Approaches, 
Achievements, and Challenges’, in   A. S. Soofi & M. Goodarzi, (eds) The Development of Science and 
Technology in Iran (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 91; B. Beyazay, The Nature of the Firm in the Oil 
Industry: International Oil Companies in Global Business (Vol. 62) (New York: Routledge, 2016) 13; S. Tordo, 
National Oil Companies and Value Creation (Washington D.C: World Bank Publications, 2011) Chapter 2. 
38 N. Selley et al, The New Economy of Oil: Impacts on Business, Geopolitics and Society (London: Routledge 
2013)86; S. Van Vactor, Introduction to the Global Oil & Gas Business (Oklahoma: PennWell Books 2010)6; J. 
Hilyard, The Oil & Gas Industry: A Nontechnical Guide (Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2012) 255; E. Penrose, 
‘The Structure of the International Oil Industry: Multinationals, Governments and OPEC’, in J. Rees & P. R. 
O'Dell, The International Oil Industry (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1987) 9. 
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to the industry’s structure.39 Other scholars refer to pricing and market structures40 while others 
identify the industries structure based on resource ownership and control.41  
 
This thesis adopts the use of industrial players to define the industries structure, as they are the 
focus of study.  This approach is best suited to form a foundation for evaluating the industry’s 
governance with particular interest in the use of transparency and accountability as governance 
tools.  Here, we divide the players into four groups according to ownership and regulation, 
exploration and production of the resources, hydrocarbon trade and market and third party 
actors or stakeholders.  
 
2.4.1  Ownership and Access Regulators of Hydrocarbons 
Like many nonrenewable valuable natural resources, the ownership regime of the hydrocarbon 
resource in most countries is centred on the notion of state sovereignty.42 The concept of 
sovereignty seeks to respect the principle of permanent control of peoples and nations over 
                                               
39See for example; Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5; C. Stabell, ‘Competitive Strategy and Industry Structure: A 
Value Configuration Interpretation’, in J. D. Davis, The Changing World of Oil: An Analysis of Corporate Change 
and Adaptation (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing 2006) 89; D. G. Victor Hults et al, Oil and Governance: State-
Owned Enterprises and the World Energy Supply (London: Cambridge University Press, 2011) among others.  
40 M. A. Al-Sahlawi, ‘Structure of the Oil and Gas Industry’, in H. K. Abdel-Aal, & M. A. Al-sahlawi, Petroleum 
Economics and Engineering (London: CRC Press 2014) 21; R. Clews, Project Finance for the International 
Petroleum Industry (London: Academic Press, 2016) 93-99. 
41 P. J. Luong & E. Weinthal, Oil Is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States 
(Cambridge: University Press 2010) chapter 3 and 6. They identify structures with state ownership with control, 
State ownership without control, private domestic ownership and private foreign ownership. Also see; B. Sarbu, 
Ownership and Control of Oil: Explaining Policy Choices across Producing Countries (London: Routledge, 
2014). 
42The USA is one exception were they also have private ownership of hydrocarbon resources. Private Ownership 
is the dominate regime of hydrocarbon industry with the federal government owning only about 25% of domestic 
resources and the majority of which are offshore. See:  J. Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell, 6th. (Minnesota: 
West Academic ,2014)12; also see H. L. Lax, Political Risk in the International Oil and Gas Industry (Berlin: 
Springer Science & Business Media, 1983) 32-33; B. Taverne, Petroleum, Industry And Governments: A Study of 
the Involvement of Industry and Governments in Exploring for and Producing Petroleum (ed 3) (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2013)126-127. 
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their natural resources.43 Constitutions across the world tend to recognize the idea that the 
people own natural resources.44  Ownership by the sovereign state thus refers to resource 
interests that are entrusted in the state on behalf of its people. 45  States in possession of 
hydrocarbon resources have the obligation of putting governance and regulatory frameworks 
to ensure that the resources are exploited to meet the social-economic development interests of 
their people.46 In that context, the state is bound to act in conformity with the principles of 
equality and public trust,47 which in essence demand for transparency and accountability. The 
extent to which states uphold these principles in practice varies widely.48  
 
States in possession of hydrocarbon resources are the first key players of the industry. They set 
the scene for the rest of the industry’s players and structure. 49  Through regulatory and 
governance frameworks, host governments determine the nature of hydrocarbon exploration 
                                               
43 UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the “Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources” of 
1962 at 1; H, Steinberger, ‘Sovereignty’, in R. Bernhardt, (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Public International Law Vol. IV 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000) 501; Sarbu, supra note 41 at 1.  
44S. Tordo, Fiscal Systems for Hydrocarbons: Design Issues (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2007)7; 
W. Hickey, Energy and Human Resource Development in Developing Countries: Towards Effective Localization 
(New York: Springer, 2016) 151. 
45 Hickey, Ibid. 
46 Sarbu, supra note 41 at 23. 
47 K. H. Gupta, Sustainable Development Law: The Law for the Future (Gurugram: Partridge Publishing, 2016) 
32. See more in chapter 3 of thesis on governance. Also see, A. B. Klass, ‘Modern Public Trust Principles: 
Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards’, (2006-2007) 82 Notre Dame Law Review 699 -754 at 701&754; 
P. D. Smith & M. H. McDonough, ‘Beyond Public Participation: Fairness in Natural Resource Decision Making’, 
(2001) 14(3) Society & Natural Resources 239-249 at 40-41; S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & R. C. Bishop, ‘Common 
property as a concept in natural resources policy’, (1975) 15 Natural Resources Journal 713-728 at 714-15 & 
725-27. 
48 The question of governance and management of resources is quite controversial. Different jurisdictions have 
different modes of government and national values which determine the nature of policies and principles they 
adopt. Authoritarian regimes would be different from democratic regimes. Even in democratic regimes a number 
of factors determine how governments operate. See. P. Hirst, ‘Democracy and Governance. Debating 
Governance’, in J. Pierre, Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000)13-35; B. G. Peters, ‘Governance and Comparative Politics’, in J. Pierre, Debating Governance: 
Authority, Steering, and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)36-53. 
49 A. Clo, Oil Economics and Policy (New York: Springer Science & Business Media 2013) 46-47. 
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and the role and responsibilities for actors involved.50 These frameworks vary from one state 
to another.51 However, they all function as interaction drivers of the industry players.52  
 
In setting up governance systems, governments enact legislation and formulate policies to 
ensure that access of the hydrocarbon resource is controlled in an orderly and acceptable 
manner in the broader context of public interest.53 This involves the question of security and 
safety, environmental protection, revenue systems among other benefit sharing mechanisms.54 
In the majority of countries in possession of hydrocarbons, governance structure is regulated 
by statute. 55  The respective legislation generally establishes the specific authorities and 
governance institutions of the industry ranging from ministries, licensing agencies, and 
environmental assessors to revenue collectors and arbitration bodies.56 The thesis focuses on 
these legislation and the established institutions when analyzing transparency and 
accountability in the Tanzanian legal framework. It accesses how such legislation provides for 
transparency and accountability of the established governance institutions and the industry 
players in general.  
 
2.4.2  Resource Explorers and Developers 
The producers and explorers of the hydrocarbon resource are oil companies. A state explores 
and produces its hydrocarbons by its self through its oil company or by entering into various 
types of agreements with commercial hydrocarbon producing enterprises. 57  Given the 
                                               
50 H. Le Leuch, ‘Recent Trends in Upstream Petroleum Agreements: Policy, Contractual, Fiscal, and Legal 
Issues’, in A. Goldthau, The Handbook of Global Energy Policy (West Sussex, John Wiley & Sons, 2013)127; 
Clo, ibid.  
51 N. Bret-Rouzaut & J. Favennec, Oil and Gas Exploration and Production: Reserves, Costs, Contracts, (Paris: 
Editions TECHNIP, 2011) 175-176. 
52 A. Goldthau, ‘Challenges in Global Oil Governance’, in R. E. Looney, Handbook of Oil Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2012)350-51. 
53  J. Easo, ‘Licences, Concessions, Production Sharing Agreements and Service Contracts’, in G. Picton-
Turbervill, Oil and Gas: A Practical Handbook (London: Globe Business Publishing, 2009)27-8. 
54 Inkpen & Moffett, Supra note 5 at 51; F. Al-Kasim et al, ‘Grand Corruption in the Regulation of Oil’, (2008) 
2008(2) U4 Anticorruption Resource Centre 1 at 15. 
55 B. Taverne, Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A Study of the Involvement of Industry and Governments in 
Exploring for and Producing Petroleum (ed 3) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2013) 123. 
56 Taverne, supra note 55 at 125. 
57 Babusiaux, supra note 28 at 182. 
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sophistication and the need of intensive capital and technology required for the exploration and 
production of hydrocarbon resources, states usually engage private or other national companies 
in the development of the resources.58 The oil companies may be divided into two groups:  
national oil companies and multinational or international oil companies. The literature on the 
industry refers to a range of terms used to define various types of oil companies based on their 
maturity, fiscal capacity and profile, area of specialization, ownership and so on.59 These terms 
include integrated oil companies, international oil companies, independents, oil majors and 
super majors.60 For purposes of this study, all foreign companies operating in a state will be 
defined as a multinational company.  The choice of this definition is made within the context 
of a developing country’s structure in mind where most of the hydrocarbon companies 
operating in those countries are usually multinational companies.  
 
2.4.2.1 National Oil Companies 
Customarily, national oil companies enter hydrocarbon-producing agreements on behalf of 
their governments. 61  They act as the link between the government and the multinational 
companies. 62  The majority of countries with hydrocarbons have established national oil 
companies   to represent their economic interests.63 While a few national oil companies   have 
met such expectations over the years, the majority of national oil companies  are yet to live up 
to their economic potential.64 National oil companies   are habitually limited from strictly 
functioning as business entities especially in developing countries.65 They are operated as an 
extended arm of government addressing social, political, economic and even regulatory 
                                               
58 P. Park, International Law for Energy and the Environment (New York: CRC Press, 2013) 75. 
59 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 11-13 ; T. Falola & A. Genova, The Politics of the Global Oil Industry: An 
Introduction (Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2005) 24-25; T. R. Twyman, ‘US Petroleum Supply 
Changing: Roles of the Majors and Non-Major Producers’, in V. C. Mtsiva, Oil and Natural Gas: Issues and 
Policies (New York: Nova Science Publishers 2003)1-2. 
60 See Inkpen for an exhaustive list of the terminologies used and the various classifications: Inkpen & Moffett, 
supra note 5 at 11-13. 
61 N. Ghorban, ‘National Oil Companies with Reference to the Middle East 1900-73’, in R. W. Ferrier & A. 
Fursenko, Oil in the World Economy (London: Routledge, 2016)20. 
62 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 55. 
63 S. Tordo, National Oil Companies and Value Creation (Washington D.C: World Bank Publications, 2011) 23. 
64 R. L. Nersesian, Energy Economics: Markets, History and Policy (London: Routledge, 2016)220. 
65 Nersesian. ibid; Tordo, supra note 63 at 26-7. 
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obligations.66 Their objectives go beyond revenue generation to include job creation, wealth 
re-distribution and are in many cases operated as the de facto treasury for the country.67 Such 
operation of national oil companies is likely to impair transparent and accountable governance 
of the oil companies.  
 
Being the link between the oil execrators and the owners situates national oil companies at the 
focal point of the hydrocarbon industry.  They are the traders of the world’s hydrocarbons on 
behalf of their states.68  Roughly, two-thirds of global hydrocarbon sales happen through 
contracts with national oil companies.69 Notwithstanding their importance in the industry, 
national oil companies vary tremendously, and how each operates and behaves depends on the 
economic, political, social and policy climate of its state.70 The thesis therefore will particularly 
focus on how the legal framework provides for transparency and accountability of Tanzania’s 
National Oil Company. It will also seek to see whether Tanzania’s company falls in the trap of 
being an extended arm of government or it is indeed and economic entity capable of realizing 
the nation’s hydrocarbons economic potential.  
 
2.4.2.2 Multinational Oil Companies  
In the context of developing countries, multinational companies are indispensable to their 
hydrocarbon industry at least for the time being.71 Developing countries’ oil companies lack 
the required monetary capital, technology and or managerial skills needed to develop profitable 
hydrocarbon projects. 72  As a result, they rely on multinational companies with financial 
                                               
66 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 17. 
67 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 15; R L. Nersesian, Energy Economics: Markets, History and Policy (London: 
Routledge, 2016) 221; C. Nakhle, ‘Petroleum fiscal regimes Evolution and challenges’, in P. Daniel et al, The 
Taxation of Petroleum and Minerals: Principles, Problems and Practice (London: Routledge, 2010) 91. 
68 A. Gillies, ‘Selling the Citizens’ Oil: The Case for Transparency in National Oil Company Crude Sales’, (2012) 
available at http://www.resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/OilSales-Transparency.pdf accessed in 
October 2016 at 2. 
69 Ibid. 
70 A. M Jaffe & R. Soligo, ‘State-Backed Financing in Oil and Gas Projects’, in A.Goldthau & J. M. Witte, Global 
Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 110. 
71  R. F. Mikesell, Petroleum Company Operations and Agreements in the Developing Countries (London: 
Routledge, 2016)25-6. 
72 S. Tordo, Petroleum Exploration and Production Rights: Allocation Strategies and Design Issues (Washington 
Dc: World Bank Publications, 2010)2-3. 
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muscle, experience and a technological advantage in the exploration and extraction of 
hydrocarbons.73  Multinational oil companies are profit-oriented organizations. State owned 
multinational oil companies also have political and security agendas in their foreign 
hydrocarbon investments.74 All multinational oil companies are respondent to the demands and 
expectations of their private shareholders or their government interests.75 They have minimal 
public policy goals towards the host governments and their operations and decisions are based 
on profit maximization or their political agendas (for the case of state owned companies) if 
any. 76  These interests of multinational companies do have a baring of transparency and 
accountability in hydrocarbon governance in host governments. The thesis explores how 
Tanzania’s legal framework balances such interests in providing for transparency and 
accountability of multinational companies in its hydrocarbon sector. 
 
2.4.3  Trade and Market Influencers 
Once oil companies have produced hydrocarbon resources the question of trade comes up, 
which brings to mind other players who are fundamental to the hydrocarbon industry, such as 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization for 
Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). OPEC and OECD harbour major 
hydrocarbon producers, the major consumers, and own the major multinational oil companies. 
OECD in particular is at a pivotal position to influence trade, policies, governance, and 
regulation of the hydrocarbon industry. This is mainly because OECD countries are not only 
major industry players but also development partners in a majority of developing hydrocarbon-
producing countries including Tanzania.  
 
How these market influencers affect global transparency and accountability trends is explored 
further in Chapter 4. Such policy influence is also highlighted in the context of the involvement 
of multinational companies. OECD countries have adopted transparency policies and 
legislation that govern their multinational companies some of which operate in Africa 
exploiting hydrocarbons. 
 
                                               
73 Ibid.  
74 O. Noreng, Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market (Vol. 21) (London: IB Tauris, 2006) 54-55. 
75 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 17. 
76 Ibid. 
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2.4.4  Third Party Actors 
Though the trade of and regulation of the hydrocarbon industry involves decisions of great 
importance to government revenues and company profits, there are a number of players with 
an interest in influencing such decisions. Decisions on hydrocarbons do not only affect the 
deciding parties but the entire global economy.77 Resolutions on hydrocarbons go beyond the 
shaping of the energy demand and supply curve, which is in itself crucial to global 
development.78 Extraction of hydrocarbons affect broad concerns on the disruption of the 
climate system and environmental degradation, critical poverty eradication issues, among other 
global agendas.79  Moreover, hydrocarbons are finite in nature, they are found in and produced 
by a few countries yet their consumption is global and at an ever increasing demand. 80  
Accordingly, these aspects bring about the recognition of third party industrial actors.  These 
include multinational organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, global CSOs among 
other plays who in one way or another have influenced certain traits of policy development in 
the hydrocarbon industry.    
 
2.4.4.1 World Bank and IMF 
The World Bank and the IMF are key players of the hydrocarbon industry.  It is estimated that 
the World Bank Group provides an annual average of over $US1 billion to extractive 
industries. 81  This has consequentially made these monetary institutions influential in the 
governance and regulation of resources they fund.82 It is approximated that over a hundred 
countries have reformed their hydrocarbon and/or mining sectors over the past two decades 
                                               
77 T. Van de Graaf, The Politics and Institutions of Global Energy Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013) 35-38. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid at 37. 
80 T. Shelley, Oil: Politics, Poverty and the Planet (London: Zed Books, 2005)1-2. 
81 World Bank , ‘The World Bank Group in Extractive Industries 2010 ANNUAL REVIEW’ (2010) available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/e3d34f8044d640c589f38dc66d9c728b/WBG_Extractive_Industries_Annu
al_Review_2010.pdf?MOD=AJPERES accessed in September 2018 at 13-15; Global witness, ‘IMF and World 
Bank Need to Bolster :Transparency Measures in the Extractive Industries’ (2008) available 
athttps://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/676/en/assessment_of_international_monetary 
accessed in September 2018. 
82 Inkpen & Moffett, supra note 5 at 290; R. J. Heffron, Energy Law: An Introduction (New York: Springer 2015) 
15-16. 
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following the directives of the World Bank and/or IMF programs.83 One example of industry 
specific policies is the local content policy guidelines for the hydrocarbon industry by the 
World Bank. 84   The IMF has also conducted surveys and made recommendation on the 
formulation and implementation of fiscal policy in oil-producing countries.85 Both the World 
Bank and IMF have influenced good governance policies,86 they have made commitments in 
fighting corruption87 and have influenced corporate standards that affect the major players of 
the hydrocarbon industry.88 How these actors affect transparency trends in the industry is 
explored in Chapter 4 while their influential policies such as anti-corruption policies are also 
discussed in analyzing Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry.  
 
2.4.4.2 Civil Society Organisations 
The continued skullduggery associated with the hydrocarbon industry ever since its 
establishment has necessitated the intervention of civil societies.89 This intervention has made 
them a key player in influencing governance polices and regulation of the industry.90 CSOs 
                                               
83Global witness, ‘IMF and World Bank Need to Bolster: Transparency Measures in the Extractive Industries’ 
(2008) available at 
https://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/676/en/assessment_of_international_monetary 
accessed in September 2018. 
84S. Tordo et al, Local Content Policies in the Oil and Gas Sector (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 
2013). 
85 M. J. M Davis et al, Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries (Washington 
DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003). 
86V. P. Nanda, ‘The “Good Governance” Concept Revisited’, (2006) 603(1) The ANNALS of the American 
academy of political and social science 269-283 at 272-279. 
87 N. Kofele-Kale, The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding State Officials 
Individually Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment (London: Routledge, 2016) 396-397; D. Schmidt-Pfister 
& H. Moroff, Fighting Corruption in Eastern Europe: A Multilevel Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2013) 75-
76. 
88G. H. Uriz, ‘The Application of the World Bank Standards to the Oil Industry: Can the World Bank Group 
Promote Corporate Responsibility’, (2002)28 Brook Journal of International Law 77- 122 at 199. 
89C. A. Williams, ‘Civil Society Initiatives and Soft Law in the Oil and Gas Industry’, (2003-2004) 36 N.Y.U. 
Journal of International Law and Politics 457- 502 at 461; P. Eigen, ‘Fighting Corruption in A Global Economy: 
Transparency Initiatives in the Oil and Gas Industry’, (2006) 29 Houston Journal of International Law, 327-354 
at 332. 
90 P. R. Heller, ‘Civil Society and the Evolution of Accountability in the Petroleum Sector’, in K. Appiah-Adu, 
Governance of the Petroleum Sector in an Emerging Developing Economy (London: Routledge, 2016)89. 
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intervention is under the premise that, poor governance and political decisions in the regulation 
of hydrocarbons (and other natural resources) is the main cause of the resource curse.91 CSOs 
have built transnational networks advocating for solutions for the escalating political 
instability, corruption, authoritarianism, civil war, indebtedness and poverty in resource rich 
countries. 92  The past two decades have seen these networks successfully institutionalize 
transparency and good governance agendas in the global extractive industries.93 The CSOs’ 
advocacy initiatives have gained unprecedented support from western governments, 
international financial institutions and multinational companies at least in theory.94 The CSOs 
initiatives have come to mark current resource governance trends in the extractive industry in 
general.95  
 
These initiatives, which have evolved, to being multi-stakeholder initiatives in the extractive 
industry include the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and Publish What You 
Pay (PWYP) campaign.96 These initiatives seek to institutionalize transparency in governance 
                                               
91 M. J. Calder, Administering Fiscal Regimes for Extractive Industries (Washington DC: International Monetary 
Fund 2015) 51; A. Bauer & J. C. Quiroz, ‘Resource Governance’, in A Goldthau, The Handbook of Global Energy 
Policy (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2013) 245. 
92 R. Price, ‘Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics’, (2003) 55(4) World Politics, 579-606; 
A. Rosser, ‘The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey’, (2006) IDS Working Paper 268; 
Institute of Development Studies at 7-8; J. D. Clark, ‘Introduction: Civil Society and Transnational Action’, in J. 
D. Clark, Globalizing Civic Engagement: Civil Society and Transnational Action (London: Earth Scan, 2012) 
chapter one. 
93 C. Cater, ‘The Recourse Curse and Transparency’, in B. Currie-Alder et al, (eds) International Development: 
Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 402; R. J. Heffron, Energy Law: An 
Introduction (New York: Springer 2015) 15-16. 
94  The majority of OCED countries are not compliant to the EITI initiatives yet many have incorporated 
transparency into the extractive industry regulation. Deutsche EITI, Implementation of the EITI in G7, EU and 
OECD countries: Facts & Figures (Bonne: Deutsche Gesellschaft für, 2016) 2 & 29-30; A. Ravat, & S. P. Kannan, 
Implementing EITI for Impact: A Handbook for Policy Makers and Stakeholders (Washington DC: World Bank 
Publications, 2012)2-3. 
95 T. Benner et al, ‘The Good/Bad Nexus in Global Energy Governance’, in A.Goldthau & J. M. Witte, Global 
Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2010) 297. 
96 C. McPherson, ‘National Oil Companies: Ensuring Benefits and Avoiding Systemic Risks’, in A.Goldthau, The 
Handbook of Global Energy Policy, supra note 92 at 152. 
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and regulation of natural resource.97 PWYP is a coalition of more than 800 organizations that 
campaigns for transparency and accountability all along the value chain of extractive industries 
with the aim of achieving resource-led development. 98  The PWYP campaigns helped to 
establish the EITI.99 The EITI has evolved to being a voluntary global standard to promote 
transparent administration of extractive resources by governments and companies through the 
disclosure of government revenues and company payments, 100  the premise being that 
‘increasing transparency in the extractive sector will enable citizens to hold governments and 
companies to account for the ways in which natural resources are managed’.101 The EITI 
Standards obligates the disclosure of information throughout the activities of the extractive 
industry value chain. 102  It requires disclosure on licences and contracts allocation and 
registration, field operations and company transactions, information on production, revenue 
and company payments as well as revenue allocation and distribution.103  In the implementation 
of the EITI, compliant countries have their own state secretariat and multi-stakeholder 
supervision group, comprising of government actors, extractive companies and civil society.104 
At the global arena, the EITI is developed and overseen by a Multi-stakeholder Board, 
comprising of state representatives, civil society organizations, extractives companies, 
financial institutions, and international organizations.105 
 
                                               
97 C. Cater, ‘The Recourse Curse and Transparency’, in B. Currie-Alder et al, (eds) International Development: 
Ideas, Experience, and Prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 402. 
98  Publish What You Pay, Proud past, bright future: PWYP activities report 2012-2015 available at 
http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/pwyp_ar2016.pdf accessed in September 2018 
at 2. 
99 V. Haufler, ‘Mncs and the International Community: Conflict, Conflict Prevention and the Privatization of 
Diplomacy’, in V. Rittberger et al, Authority in the Global Political Economy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008)228. 
100 A. Bauer & J.C. Quiroz, ‘Resource Governance’, in Goldthau, supra note 92 at 255. 
101  Publish What You Pay, ‘Objectives’ available at http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/about/objectives/ 
accessed in September 2018. 
102  EITI, THE EITI STANDARD 2016 available at https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/english-eiti-
standard_0.pdf accessed in September 2018 at 9. 
103 Ibid.  
104 T. P. Gormley, ‘Transparency and International’, in Energy in K. Talus, Research Handbook on International 
Energy Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. Talus, 2014) 524-525. 
105 A. Ravat, & S. P. Kannan, Implementing EITI for Impact: A Handbook for Policy Makers and Stakeholders 
(Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2012) 290.  
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Tanzania has ratified and domesticated the EITI guidelines. The thesis explores how 
Tanzania’s EITI legislation provides for transparency and accountability and whether it could 
be improved by borrowing from other EITI participating countries or the EITI guidelines. The 
thesis also studies the role of CSOs as stakeholders in as far as transparency and accountability 
is concerned in the legal framework.  
 
2.5  THE QUESTION OF THE APPLICABLE LAW 
While hydrocarbons are predominantly regulated by respective producing countries, their 
transnational nature necessitates an application of a broader regulatory regime.106 This broader 
regulatory regime is entangled through a complex web of international and regional treaties, 
industry specific standards, and other applicable standards. 107  This regime involves an 
interaction among various fields such as environmental concerns, political concerns of energy 
security and economic power, finance and investment, health and human rights among 
others.108 Though the existence of ‘lex petrolea’ or the international petroleum law is contested, 
at least a body of various international laws affecting the industry is not disputed.109 This 
includes various environmental treaties, investment promotion and protection treaties, 
international treaties and conventions on intellectual property, treaties on taxation just to 
mention few.110 The thesis analyse how these treaties and conventions provide for transparency 
and accountability and are compatible with national legislation to the extent in which they form 
part of Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal framework.  
 
The involvement of MOCs and the interaction among states naturally necessitates the use of 
neutral dispute resolution bodies. 111  Given the investments involved in the industry, the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) among other international 
                                               
106 A. Wawryk, ‘Petroleum Regulation in an International Context: The Universality of Petroleum Regulation and 
the Concept of Lex Petrolea’, in T. Hunter, (ed) Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative 
Study of Licensing and Concession Systems (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 35. 
107 Heffron, supra note 94 at 15-18. 
108 Heffron, supra note 94 at 3-4. 
109 Wawryk, supra note 107 at 8. 
110  See Zedalis on environmental treaties; R. Zedalis, International Energy Law: Rules Governing Future 
Exploration, Exploitation, and Use of Renewable Resources (New York: Routledge, 2016) chapters 6 &7. 
111  C. O. García-Castrillón, ‘Reflections on the Law Applicable to International Oil Contracts’, (2013) 6(3) 
Journal of World Energy Law and Business, 1-34 at at 5. 
CHAPTER 3 
-33 -  
 
arbitration bodies are central to the hydrocarbon industry.112 They are responsible for the 
formulation of the contested ‘lex petrolea’.113 The hydrocarbon industry has been considered 
the major source of international case law.114 The ICSID alone had energy disputes making up 
37% of the claims before it.115 Tanzania has entered bilateral trade agreements with various 
countries that demand the use of international dispute resolution bodies. In accessing 
accountability, the thesis also evaluates how such bodies are provided for in the legal 
framework especially in as far as multinational companies’ accountability is concerned. 
 
2.6  CONCLUSION 
As the major source of energy, the hydrocarbon industry is unique and complex. While it is the 
cornerstone of our global development, it is also a major catalyst of global distraction. As 
humans enjoy the benefits of mobility and other technological advancements, they are also 
rightly concerned about our climate, war and other social ills attributed to the hydrocarbon 
industry. Its resources are located and produced by a few countries yet consumed by the global 
community. Their extraction requires heavy investment, technical knowledge, and technology 
that a majority of its producers do not possess, individually. All these characteristics underline 
the complex nature of the hydrocarbon industry that involves several private, national, and 
international players, not to mention the various fields involved ranging from engineering, 
economics, and politics among others. When looked at through the lenses of regulation and 
governance, this complexity explains the reluctance of adopting an explicit international legal 
and regulatory framework of the industry. Regulation of hydrocarbons therefore depends on 
effective domestic regulation that is in many cases faced with broader transnational challenges. 
 
                                               
112 A. Sabatar & M. Stadnyk, ‘International Arbitration and Energy: How Energy Dispute Shape International 
Investment Dispute Resolution’, in K. Talus, Research Handbook on International Energy Law (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing. Talus, 2014) 200. 
113  T. C. Childs, ‘Update on Lex Petrolea: The Continuing Development of Customary Law Relating to 
International Oil and Gas Exploration and Production’, (2011) 4(3) The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 
214-259 at 214. 
114  Sabatar & Stadnyk, supra note 112 at 199; K.Talus et al, ‘Lex Petrolea and the Internationalization of 
Petroleum Agreements: Focus on Host Government Contracts’, (2012) 5(3) Journal of World Energy, Law & 
Business 181-193 at 182 . 
115 K.Talus, ‘Oil and Gas: International Petroleum Regulation’, in E. Morgera & K. Kulovesi, (eds) Research 
Handbook on International Law and Natural Resources (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016) 248. 
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Understanding the hydrocarbon industry and its related complexities provides a clear 
foundation for the analysis of transparency and accountability as tools of resource governance 
in Tanzania’s hydrocarbons industry. The identification of the industry’s structure, the players 
involved, and the applicable laws is essential to the analysis of how the various laws and 
industrial players interact in the governance of the industry particularly in the aspects of 
transparency and accountability.  
  
Having provided the overview of the hydrocarbon industry, Chapter 3 investigates the concepts 
of transparency and accountability as they relate to resource governance. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CONCEPTS OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Chapter one and two showed that there is a growing demand for accountability and 
transparency in the governance of the extractive industry. This is because transparency and 
accountability are indispensable to the good governance of natural resources as long as 
ownership of natural resource is based on the doctrine of public trust and the principle of state 
sovereignty. For a nation to control its resources in a manner that ensures development and 
wellbeing of its people, the people are obliged to demand good governance of their resources 
by holding those they trusted with the obligation of governance to account.  
 
In a majority of today’s democracies, people’s control over their resources is exercised through 
national policies and legislation. In different spheres of governance, policies and laws create 
the foundation of transparency and accountability relations and their implementation 
mechanisms. These policies and laws do not guarantee implementation. However, they create 
a road map for effective transparency and accountability relationships and implementation in 
governance. The question however remains what constitutes adequate legislation for the 
promotion of effective accountability and transparency practices. Answering this question is 
critical to determining, in chapters six and seven, whether the concepts of transparency and 
accountability are sufficiently incorporated in Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry legal 
framework. 
 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to identify and analyse the concepts of transparency and 
accountability as they relate to governance. The argument it seeks to advance is that for there 
to be effective transparency and accountability, legislation must make provision for certain 
core elements of transparency and accountability systems and mechanisms of ensuring their 
implementation. The chapter starts by defining the concepts of transparency and accountability 
and drawing the respective concept elements. Then it looks at the various classifications or 
forms of transparency and accountability as well as their implementation mechanisms. The 
chapter ends with an evaluation of the relationship between transparency and accountability 
and the limitations involved.   
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3.2  ACCOUNTABILITY 
As a concept, accountability is ambiguous.1 It means different things to different people.2 
Academic literature on accountability is also conceptually disintegrated, incoherent, and 
nebulous.3  This is partly because many scholars approach and define accountability from 
different contexts producing their own specific definition of accountability. Is accountability, 
answerability,4 responsibility,5 democracy,6 punishment,7 controllability,8 or responsiveness?9 
Is accountability a mechanism of evaluation or analysis?10 Are there different, forms, modes, 
                                               
1 A. Sinclair, ‘The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses consider this comma, consistency,’ 
(1995) 20(2-3) Accounting, Organizations and Society 219-237 at 224; R. D. Behn, Rethinking Democratic 
Accountability (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001) 3. Olsen discusses the ambiguity of 
Accountability beyond the definition of the term but also its practical operation. J. P. Olsen, ‘Accountability and 
Ambiguity,’ in M. Bovens et al, The Oxford Handbook Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) Chapter 7. 
2 M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, (2007)13(4) European law 
journal 447-468 at 448-9; M. Bovens et al, ‘Public Accountability’ in M. Bovens et al, The Oxford Handbook 
Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 2. 
3 P. Newell, ‘Taking Accountability into Account: The Debate so Far’, in P. Newell & J. Wheeler, Rights, 
Resources and the Politics of Accountability (London: Zed Books, 2006)39; H. Bergsteiner, Accountability Theory 
Meets Accountability Practice (West Yorkshire: Emerald Group Publishing, 2012) 4.  
4 C. D. Kenny, ‘Horizontal Accountability, Conflicts and Concepts’, in S. Mainwaring & C. Welna, (eds) 
Democratic Accountability in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)63; K. Auel, ‘Democratic 
Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs’, (2007) 
13(4) European Law Journal 13.487-504 at 495. 
5 M. Bemelmans-Videc, ‘Accountability, A Classic Concept in Modern Contexts: Implications for Evaluation and 
Auditing Roles’, in B. Perrin et al, (eds) Making Accountability Work: Dilemmas for Evaluation and for Audit 
(New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2011) 21. 
6 M. E. Warren, ‘Accountability and Democracy’, in Bovens et al, supra note 2 at 39. 
7 Behn, supra note 1 at 3. 
8 A. Lupia, ‘Delegation and its Perils’, in K. Strom et al, (eds) Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary 
Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2003) 34-5; J. Koppell, ‘Pathologies of Accountability: ICANN 
and the Challenge of “Multiple Accountabilities Disorder’, (2005) 65 (1) Public Administration Review 94-108 at 
97. 
9 D. Bright, ‘Responsible Work Executive Excellence: The Magazine of Leadership Development, Managerial 
Effectiveness, and Organizational Productivity’, (2001) cited in H. Bergsteiner, Accountability Theory Meets 
Accountability Practice (West Yorkshire: Emerald Group Publishing, 2012) 26. 
10 M. Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a Mechanism’, (2010) 33(5) 
West European Politics 946-967. 
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and types, of accountability? Would the term ‘accountability’ change meaning in an 
authoritarian government as opposed to a democratic government? Would it be different in 
profession as opposed to political context? The list of potential questions one would ask oneself 
upon reading the literature on accountability is endless. Varied definitions, classifications, and 
interpretations from all fields of study give overlapping and multidimensional answers to such 
questions. Bearing in mind that the study involves public governance of a multi-stakeholder 
industry involving a range of players and actors, this chapter seeks to come up with a general 
definition of accountability by narrowing down what the literature considers the core attributes 
of the concept particularly as relates to public governance.  
 
3.2.1     Defining Accountability 
Accountability involves relationships between parties.11 The term ‘relationship’ refers to a 
connection formed between parties based on collective interactions and mutual goals, interests 
or feelings. 12  It involves expectations that require the fulfilment of rights, duties, and 
responsibilities.13 How the relationship unfolds and the rights, duties, and responsibilities are 
executed towards achieving mutual goals, interests and feelings is where we find accountability 
coming up.  
 
                                               
11 Some scholar’s dispute that identifying accountability to involve relations is wrong as it neglects what they call 
individual, personal, or self-accountability that does not involve any interaction with another party. See, B. R 
Schlenker & M. F. Weigold, ‘Self-Identification and Accountability’, in R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld, (eds) 
Impression Management in the Organization (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989) 21-43; 
Bergsteiner supra note 3 at 25. For a detailed analysis on self-accountability see: V. Argyou, ‘Self-Accountability, 
Ethics and the Problem of Meaning’, in M. Strathern, (ed) Audit Cultures: Anthropological Studies in 
Accountability, Ethics, and the Academy (London and New York: Routledge 2000) 196-211; H. Willmott, 
‘Thinking Accountability: Accounting for the Disciplined Production of Self’, in R. Munro & J. Mouritsen, (ed) 
Power, Ethics & The Technologies of Managing (London: International Thompson Business Press, 1996)23-39. 
12 Oxford English Dictionary Online, available at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/relationship, 
accessed in January 2017. These relations could be legal, ethical, corporate, national, personal, educational, or 
whatever possible relations possible for human organization and association.  
13 D. D. Frink & R. J. Klimoski, ‘Advancing Accountability Theory and Practice: Introduction to the Human 
Resource Management Review Special Edition’, (2004) 14(1) Human resource management review 1-17 at 2. 
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For some accountability refers to the keeping of record and account of how an actor in a 
relationship plays his/her role in achieving the expected relationship goals or interest.14 The 
mere keeping of record and account however fails to cater for the roles of both parties in a 
relationship. The record keeper ought to be able to give an account and justification of the 
manner in which he or she exercised and fulfilled relevant rights, duties, and responsibilities. 
The duty to give justification is what others have referred to as answerability.15 However, 
answerability has not only been associated with the giving of an account or justification, but 
also with liability for the consequences of failure to provide a justification.16  
 
Advocates of answerability as ‘a component of accountability’ argue that the person who 
demands an explanation must be in a position to exact punish on the person who fails to provide 
the explanation.17 They call this the enforcement dimension of accountability.18 This element 
                                               
14 This group of scholars is considered to relate accountability to its original sense of bookkeeping. See M. 
Dubnick, ‘Accountability and the Promise of Performance: In Search of the Mechanisms’, (2005) 28(3) Public 
Performance & Management Review 376-417 at 379; R. Mulgan, ‘Accountability: An Ever‐Expanding 
Concept?’, (2000) 78(3) Public administration 555-573 at 556. Dubnick traces the history of accountability from 
1085 England under the reign of King William who ordered the compilation of a survey of the landholdings. 
Requiring Landholders to ‘render a count of what they possessed. M. Dubnick, Seeking Salvation for 
Accountability, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2002), p 
7–9 available at http://mjdubnick.dubnick.net/papersrw/2002/salv2002.pdf accessed in November 2016. 
15 A. Schedler et al, The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999) 14-15; Behn supra note 3 at 3. 
16Schedler et al ibid; K. Auel, ‘Democratic Accountability and National Parliaments: Redefining the Impact of 
Parliamentary Scrutiny in EU Affairs’, (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 13.487-504 at 495; B. Romzek & M. 
Dubnick, ‘Accountability’, in J. M. Shafritz, (ed) International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration 
Volume 1 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998)6-7. 
17 R. Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies (Hamphshire, 
PalgraveMacmillan 2003) 18-19; P. Burnell, ‘The Relationship of Accountable Governance and Constitutional 
Implementation, With Reference to Africa’, (2008)1 (3) Journal of Politics and Law 10-24 at 11-12; J. S. Lerner 
& P. E. Tetlock, ‘Accountability and Social Cognition’, (1994)1 Encyclopedia of Human Behavior 1-10 at 2;  
Koppell supra note 8 at 97; I. Thynne & J. Goldring, Accountability and Control: Government Officials and the 
Exercise of Power (Sydney: Law Book Company, 1987) 8 quoted in A Sinclair, supra note 1 at 221; B. Romzek 
& M. Dubnick, supra note 16 at 6. 
18 Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 15-16; A. M. Goetz & R. Jenkins ‘Accountability’, in A. Kuper, (ed) The Social 
Science Encyclopedia (London &New York: Routledge 2004) 1; N. Garvey & P. Newell, ‘Corporate 
Accountability to the Poor? Assessing the Effectiveness of Community-Based Strategies’, (2005) 15(3-4) 
Development in Practice, 389-404 at 391.  
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of accountability has, however, raised the question whether accountability enforcement is only 
triggered when a party fails to fulfil an expected relationship obligation and whether the 
consequence that follow have  to be negative in nature. These concerns have led other scholars 
to argue that accountability should take place regardless of the failure or success in fulfilling 
relationship obligations.19 Accountability consequences do not have to be negative: they could 
also involve rewarding of actors who have fulfilled their obligations.20  
 
Other scholars define accountability as the giving of an account and justification by a 
subordinate.21  Such a definition implies that accountability exists in only those relationships 
that involve authority and hierarchy and hence make it possible for the ‘enforcement 
dimension’ of accountability to occur.22  Such a definition is misleading especially in the 
context of public administration where accountability relationships may involve parties with 
equal constitutional powers such as the executive and the legislative branches of government. 
Additionally, accountability relationships often involve mutual rights, duties and responsibility 
such that even those in authority can be called to account for their actions.23  
 
In view of these accounts of accountability, accountability is the act of giving account 
(informing, explaining and justifying) by one, or group of, actor(s) to another  or other actors 
for the manner in which he/she has exercised his/her rights, duties and responsibilities in order 
to achieve specific expectations.  
 
3.2.2     Elements of Accountability 
In accordance with the above definition, accountability entails several elements. The first is the 
existence of the actor giving the account (accountee) and the actor to whom the account is 
                                               
19 Bergsteiner, supra note 3 at 161; J. S. Lerner & P. E. Tetlock ‘Accounting for the Effects of Accountability’, 
(1999) 125(2) Psychological Bulletin 255-275 at 255. 
20 Ibid. 
21  Romzek & Dubnick, supra note 16 at 6; K. Strøm, ‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary 
Democracies’, (2000) 37(3) European Journal of Political Research 261-290; A. Lupia & M.D. McCubbins, 
‘Representation or Abdication?  How Citizens Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed’, (2000) 37 European 
Journal of Political Research 291–307. 
22  M. Samuel & B. Novak, The Accountability Revolution: Achieve Breakthrough Results in Half the Time 
(Tempe, Facts on Demand Press. 2001) cited in Bergsteiner, supra note 3 at 27. 
23 Bergsteiner, supra note 3 at 27. 
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given (the accountor).24 In the governance of hydrocarbons, the accountee could be a licensing 
authority, relevant ministry, or a public or private corporation. The accountor could be a senior 
civil servant, an auditing, monitoring and evaluation agent, parliament or civil society 
organisations or the public.  
 
The second element is the existence of guiding principles (formal or informal)25 to govern the 
process of accountability. These guidelines could be derived from prescribed laws or adopted 
norms, customs and even societal moral standards guiding the respective accountability 
relationship. The guiding principles in a relationship obligates the actor to acknowledge 
ownership of his actions or inactions and the acceptance of being put to task for such action or 
inaction.26    
 
The third element of accountability relates to the access to information by the accountor.27 This 
is the process of account giving itself. The accountee is expected to provide the accountor with 
information about the manner in which he/she has conducted himself/herself. Such information 
might include facts, records, statistics, communications, and reports.28 This element involves 
the transparency dimension of accountability.29  
 
                                               
24 Various terms have been used to refer to the actor giving account and the actors demanding account. Bovens 
for example refers to the actor demanding account as the ‘accountability forum’ and the accounting party as 
‘actor’, others use terms depicting their understanding and definition of accountability for instance principle and 
agent, role sender and responder, among others. Others have also used the term accountor and accountee as 
preferred in this study.  See, Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework.’, supra 
note 28 at 452. Bergsteiner analyses the different terms as used by various scholars. Bergsteiner, supra note 3 at 
27.  
25 Where prescribed by law or codes of conduct or practice they are referred to as formal and informal where it is 
part of custom, generally accepted moral values and norms.  
26 Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’, supra note 2 at 451. 
27 G. C. Avery & H. Bergsteiner, ‘Responsibility and Accountability: Towards an Integrative Process Model’, 
(2011) 2 (2) International Business & Economics Research Journal 31-40 at 32-34. 
28 Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 14-15. 
29 Koppell, supra note 8 at 96. 
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The fourth element relates to the legitimacy of the accountor’s interrogative capacity to seek 
explanations and justifications on the information provided by the accountee.30 This is what is 
called the answerability dimension of accountability as has been noted earlier. Answerability 
entails the ‘argumentative dimension of accountability’.31 In other words, the interrogation of 
“why” the accountee acted in the particular manner.   
 
The fifth element of accountability is about evaluation and rendering judgement based on the 
guiding principles of the respective relationship.32 This is what is called the controllability 
dimension of accountability. 33  For instance, where a minister submits a report on the 
hydrocarbon sector to parliament, the latter may approve the report or censure the ministry for 
poor performance or underperformance. While accountability machineries do provide control 
over actions of the other actor, other control measures may occur ex ante or ex post that do not 
amount to accountability. 34  These measures include preemptive endeavours of directing 
conduct such as through straight orders or laws and regulations.35  
 
The sixth element relates to the adequacy of the mandate and the independence of the 
accountability agency. This goes hand in hand with the fifth element discussed above. The 
accountor ought to be free from any influence from the accountee and must have sufficient 
mandate to enforce accountability and influence the accountee’s behavior.   
 
                                               
30  H. Slim, ‘By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountability of Non-Governmental Organisations’, 
(2002) 10 (1) The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance 1-12 at 5-8; T. Risse, ‘Transnational Governance and 
Legitimacy’, in A. Benz and Y. Papadopoulos, Governance and Democracy: Com-paring National, European 
and International Experiences (London, Routledge 2006)187-9. 
31 Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 15,  
32 Bergsteiner, supra note 2 at 193 and 115; B. R Schlenker et al, ‘The Triangle Model of Responsibility’, (1994) 
101(4) Psychological review, 632-652 at 641; Mulgan, supra note 17 at 555-6 
33 Koppell, supra note 8 at 97-8. 
34  M. Busuioc, ‘Accountability, Control and Independence: The Case of European Agencies’, (2009) 15(5) 
European Law Journal 599-615 at 606; C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, (2000) 27 (1) Journal 
of Law and Society 38-60 at 39; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework,’supra note 28 at 453-454. 
35Mulgan, supra note 17 at 19; Busuioc, supra note 36 at 605; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: 
A Conceptual Framework,’ supra note 2 at 453-454 
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Lastly, the seventh element of accountability relates to the consequences the accountee might 
face upon the accountor rendering judgement. The consequences may be either positive or 
negative, depending on the nature of the judgement and the type of relationship and its guiding 
principles.36 This element is sometimes described as the liability dimension of accountability,37 
to underline the fact that actors can be held liable for their actions or inactions, penalized for 
their ‘malfeasance’, and rewarded for their achievements.38 However, the consequences of an 
unsatisfactory account need not only entail rewards or sanctions. For instance, instead of asking 
for the Minister’s resignation, parliament may increase monitoring or consider reducing a 
Minister’s authority over the budget.  
 
For there to be accountability, the above elements must be incorporated in the guiding 
principles that establish the respective accountability relationship. As highlighted in the 
introduction above, legislation has an important role to play in defining accountability 
relationships, the substantive principles of accountability, and in establishing the mechanism 
by which accountability is implemented in practice. This study uses the above accountability 
elements as a yardstick in determining whether the hydrocarbon’s legal framework in Tanzania 
facilitates accountable governance in the industry.   
 
3.3  TYPES AND SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY 
The different types and systems of accountability discussed in accountability consider five 
fundamental questions:  Which actor should give account? To whom should the accountee be 
accountable? For what must the account be given? By what standards must the account be 
given? Finally, by which means should the accountee be held accountable? Answers to these 
questions differ depending on the type of the accountability relationship and the applicable 
context. Each question is capable of providing a peculiar form of accountability even where 
                                               
36 K. Siegel-Jacobs & J. Yates, ‘Effects of Procedural and Outcome Accountability on Judgment Quality’, (1996) 
65(1) Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 1-17 at 1-4; Bergsteiner, supra note 3 at 154-55. 
37  Koppell, supra note 8 at 96-7; E. L. Normanton, ‘Public Accountability and Audit: A Reconnaissance’, in B. 
L. R. Smith and D. Hague, The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government: Independence Versus Control 
(1971) 311 cited in C. Scott, ‘Accountability in the Regulatory State’, (2000) 27 (1) Journal of Law and Society 
38-60 at 40. 
38 Koppell, supra note 8 at 96-7; J. Fearon ‘Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians’, in A. 
Przeworski et al,(eds) Democracy, Accountability and Representation, Vol. 2 ( Cambrigge:Cambridge University 
Press, 1999) 55; M. Philp, ‘Delimiting Democratic Accountability’, (2009) 57(1) Political Studies 28-53 at 30. 
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they are applied in the same context. This explains why there are various aspects of 
accountability. The study will only limit itself to the types and systems of accountability 
pertaining to public administration and governance.   
 
3.3.1  Horizontal and Vertical Accountability 
There are two major types of public accountability: vertical and horizontal accountability.39 
Horizontal and vertical accountability are categorized based on why and to whom the accountee 
should give account. The nature of the relationship between an accountor and accountee 
determines whether what is applied is horizontal or vertical accountability.  
 
3.3.1.1 Vertical Accountability 
Vertical accountability applies where there are formal obligations on the accountee to give 
account to the accountor.40  This may be due to a hierarchical relationship or by compulsion 
emanating from the laws.41 For instance, most government relationships and all relationships 
that involve delegation of powers or a chain of command are considered to fall under the 
vertical form of accountability.42  Vertical accountability may also apply in other legal or 
                                               
39  A third type of accountability, called diagonal accountability, is sometimes also mentioned. Diagonal 
accountability refers to direct public engagement with vertical or horizontal accountability institutions when 
inciting enhanced oversight of state conduct. See:T. Schillemans, ‘Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: 
The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies’, (2008) 8(2) Public Organization Review 175-194 at 178; P. Magnette 
et al ‘Conclusion: Diffuse Democracy in the European Union: The Pathologies of Delegation’, (2003)10(5) 
Journal of European Public Policy, 834-840 at 836; M. Bovens, ‘The Concept Of Public Accountability’, in  E. 
Ferlie et al, The Oxford handbook of public management (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 196; J.A. Fox, 
‘Social Accountability: What Does The Evidence Really Say?’, (2015) 72 World Development 346-361 at 347; J. 
Ackerman, ‘Co-Governance for Accountability: Beyond “Exit” and “Voice”’, (2004)32(3) World Development 
447-463 at 450-51. This study does not consider this type of accountability to be different from vertical 
accountability because civil society organizations represent the public interest and thus their demand for 
accountability falls within that of the citizens in vertical accountability.  
40  Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 23; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual 
Framework,’ supra note 2 at 460; L. J. Diamond & L. Morlino, ‘The Quality of Democracy; An Overview’, 
(2004)15 (4) Journal of Democracy 20-31 at 25.   
41 Bovens ibid. 
42Lupia, supra note 8 at 35; Schillemans supra note 43 at 178; Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: 
A Conceptual Framework,’ supra note 2 at 460; A. Michels & A. Meijer, ‘Safeguarding Public Accountability in 
Horizontal Government’, 10(2) Public Management Review 165-173 at 168. 
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administrative relationships where the accountor has the authority and the accountee is 
compelled to submit to the accountor and render an account by legislative or regulatory 
orders.43 In the same hierarchy model, vertical accountability applies to the means through 
which citizens seek to enforce performance standards and demand accountability from those 
in public office.44 
 
For purposes of this study, vertical accountability takes two forms: internal and external 
vertical. External vertical accountability refers to the process by which the state and other 
agencies are held to account by non-state actors through the relationship between citizens and 
their political representatives. 45  Internal vertical accountability refers to hierarchal 
accountability mechanisms within the specific government departments, institutions and 
agencies.  
 
3.3.1.2 Horizontal Accountability   
Horizontal accountability exists where you have actors of parallel authority demanding 
accountability from the other.46 Within the context of public administration and governance, 
horizontal accountability refers to a network of state actors that are authorized and willing to 
hold other state actors accountable for their actions or omissions.47 The accountor in this case 
ought to have autonomy and legal authority from the other. 48  It has been suggested that 
horizontal accountability also refers to voluntary accountability, which requires no formal form 
of compulsion on the accountee whether by way of a hierarchical relationship or legislative or 
                                               
43 Michels & Meijer, ibid at 168. 
44 Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 3. 
45 A.C. L Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001)77-78. 
46 C. D. Kenney, ‘Horizontal Accountability, Conflicts and Concepts’, in S. Mainwaring & C. Welna, Democratic 
Accountability in Latin America (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 59; C. Sampford et al , ‘From Greek 
Temple to Bird's Nest: Towards a Theory of Coherence and Mutual Accountability for National Integrity 
Systems’, (2005) 64 (2) Australian Journal of Public Administration 96-108 96-7; G. O’Donnell, ‘Horizontal 
Accountability in New Democracies’, in Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 29-51, P.C. Schmitter, ‘The Limits of 
Horizontal Accountability’ in Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 61-2. 
47 Donnell ibid at 38. 
48 See the sixth element of accountability above. 
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regulatory orders.49 A common example used is the giving of account to various stakeholders 
in society where the accountee voluntarily feels morally obliged to give account. 50  This 
classification begs the question to whether ‘moral compulsion’ is the governing principles of 
the particular relationships between the accountors demanding accountability and the 
accountee feeling morally obliged to give account. As discussed earlier, accountability 
relationships are governed by not only formal rules or legislation but also customs and morals 
depending on the respective accountability relationship.   
 
For purposes of this study, horizontal accountability refers to the intra-governmental 
accountability mechanisms between the executive and its administrative authorities and the 
other organs of state including other autonomous oversight institutions such as the auditor 
general, anti-corruption commissions, and human rights commissions. 
 
As shown in chapter two, the governance of hydrocarbons involves the cooperation of private 
actors, the government, multinational organisations and institutions, and even interactions with 
other sovereign powers.51 Accountability in the governance of such multiple actors calls for 
the application of both vertical and horizontal types of accountability. This is not peculiar to 
the hydrocarbon industry but modern governance generally. In public administration, 
traditional vertical forms of accountability in a hierarchical manner work alongside horizontal 
forms of accountability such as ombudsmen, various types of oversight bodies and boards of 
commissioners, professional evaluation bodies among others.52 In analysing Tanzania’s legal 
framework in chapter six and seven, the thesis looks at how these types of accountability are 
provided for and the manner in which they work alongside each other. 
 
3.3.2  Systems of Accountability 
                                               
49 Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework,’ supra note 2 at 460; Michels & 
Meijer, supra note 46 at 169. 
50Bovens Ibid; J. Koppenjan & E. H. Klijn, Managing Uncertainty in Networks (London: Routledge 2004) 195. 
51 Chapter 2 subsection 4 of this thesis. 
52 T. Schillemans, ‘Redundant Accountability: The Joint Impact of Horizontal and Vertical Accountability on 
Autonomous Agencies’, 2010 34(3) Public Administration Quarterly 300–337 at 301; T. Schillemans & M 
Bovens, ‘The Challenge of Multiple Accountability,’ in  M J Dubnick & H. G, Frederickson Accountable 
governance: Problems and promises (London, M.E. Sharpe 2015)at 3-4; Michels & Meijer, supra note 46 at 168. 
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Vertical and horizontal accountability are enforced through various systems of accountability 
depending on the context of the accountability relationship at hand. Systems of accountability 
are the various methods and procedures by which the respective type of accountability is 
enforced. These could be political, legal, administrative, professional, or social.  
 
1) Political accountability  
Government actors owe the political accountability to the public.53 In a majority of democratic 
political systems, enforcement is made though representative institutions such as parliament or 
congress.54 These representative institutions are charged with the power to oversee the manner 
in which public interests are protected by the executive or governing body. 55  Thus, the 
executive and other political organs of government are accountable to parliament or congress, 
which is in turn accountable to the citizenry via elections.56 The executive can give its account 
directly to the representative institution such as parliament or congress or through oversight 
agencies that report to parliament such as anti-corruption agencies or auditing agencies.57 
 
2) Legal accountability  
                                               
53 R. Bellamy & A. Palumbo, ‘Introduction’, in R Bellamy & A. Palumbo, Political Accountability (London: 
Routledge, 2017) at 1-12; A. Schedler, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability’, in Schedler et al, supra note 15 at 14. 
54 K. Strøm, ‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies’, (2000) 37(3) European Journal of 
Political Research 261-290 at 261; Mulgan, supra note 17 at 36. 
55 W. C Muller et al, ‘Parliamentary Democracy Promises and Problems’, in K. Strøm et al, (eds) Delegation and 
Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2003) 19; T. Persson et al, 
‘Separation of Powers and Political Accountability’, (1997)122(4) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1163-
1202 at 1164. 
56 D. Woodhouse & K. Alderman, ‘Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice’, (1994) 
72(4) Public Administration-London 611-619; F. Gains & G. Stoker, ‘Delivering ‘Public Value’: Implications for 
Accountability and Legitimacy’, (2009) 62(3) Parliamentary Affairs 438-455 at 445-7; Sinclair supra note 1 at 
222. 
57  M. Bovens, ‘The concept of public accountability’, in E. Ferlie et al, The Oxford handbook of public 
management (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) 187.  
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Legal accountability is enforced via the courts in accordance with prescribed legal standards, 
administrative, civil, or criminal. 58  Although it is usually enforced by ordinary courts, a 
specialized tribunal or other body with appropriate legal authority can sometimes enforce it.59  
 
3) Administrative or bureaucratic accountability  
Government bodies and their employees enforce administrative or bureaucratic 
accountability.60 The nature of enforcement procedures in this respect is dependent on the 
respective organization or institute. Employees of the respective institutes or organizations are 
subject to a number of operation codes, legislation, and regulations according to which their 
superiors or overseeing administrative bodies hold them accountable.61  
 
4) Professional accountability systems 
Human resource departments of organisations and other services delivery offices implement 
professional accountability.62 Professional accountability is based on the norms, codes, and 
regulations on ethics and practice of the particular profession.63 Enforcement could be by the 
relevant professional associations or monitoring bodies 64  or internal administrative 
accountability mechanisms.65 
                                               
58 ibid at 188.  
59R. W. Grant & R. O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’, (2005) 99(1) American 
Political Science Review 29-43 at 36; B.S. Romzek & M. J. Dubnick, ‘Accountability in the Public Sector: Lessons 
from the Challenger Tragedy’, (1987) Public Administration Review 227-238 at 228-9; Scott, supra note 36 at 42. 
60 B. G. Peters, ‘Accountability in Public Administration’, in Bovens et al, supra note 2 at 211-2; Bovens, 
‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability…’ supra note 2 at 456; R. Gregory, ‘Accountability in Modern 
Government’, in B.G. Peters et al, (eds) Handbook of Public Administration (London: SAGE, 2003)557-8. 
61  N. McGarvey, ‘Accountability in Public Administration: A Multi-Perspective Framework of Analysis’, 
(2001)16 (2) Public Policy and Administration 17-29 at 18; Peters, ibid at 218-223. 
62 Romzek & Dubnick, supra note 72 at 229; K. Kraus & C. Lindholm, ‘Accounting in Inter-Organisational 
Relationships within the Public Sector’, in H. Håkansson et al, Accounting in Networks (London: Routledge, 
2010) 124. 
63 Bovens, ‘The Concept of Public Accountability’, supra note 2 at 188; S. Banks, ‘Negotiating Personal 
Engagement and Professional Accountability: Professional Wisdom and Ethics Work’, (2013)16(5) European 
Journal of Social Work 587-604 at 593. 
64 M. Canning & B. O'Dwyer, ‘Professional Accounting Bodies' Disciplinary Procedures: Accountable, 
Transparent and in the Public Interest?’, (2001) 10(4) European Accounting Review 725-749 at 726-7. 
65 Mulgan, supra note 17 at 559; L. Deleon, ‘Accountability in a ‘Reinvented’ Government’, (1998) 76 (3) Public 
Administration 539-558 at 548-541. 
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The above systems of accountability address the fundamental element of enforcement. They 
address the forum and manner in which the accountee may be held accountable as well as the 
powers of the accountor to enforce accountability. They reflect the fifth, sixth and seventh 
elements of accountability discussed in section 2.2 above relating to implementation 
mechanisms that are sufficiently independent, have adequate mandate to inquire and render 
judgement, and have the capacity to enforce their verdicts. A sufficient legislation must not 
only establish accountability relationships but also sufficiently provide for the adequate forum 
and required autonomous mandate to ensure accountability implementation. In analysing the 
legal framework governing hydrocarbons in Tanzania, Chapter 7 analyzes how the above 
accountability implementation systems are provided for and questions whether they are 
sufficiently independent with adequate mandate to inquire and render judgement, as well as 
enforce their decisions. 
 
Alongside accountability is the concept of transparency, which in most cases is treated 
synonymously with accountability in governance policies, laws, and debates. The next section 
of this chapter analyses the concept of transparency. Thereafter, the chapter discusses the 
relationship between the two concepts and how they apply in governance.  
 
3.4  TRANSPARENCY   
The element of accountability that involves access to information is centred on the concept of 
transparency. This makes the analysis of the concept of transparency inevitable in this thesis. 
The concept of transparency is not only essential for accountability but also it is in itself an 
important aspect of good governance. Transparency in governance functions as a means to and 
ends where it plays a role as a key element in accountability, the rule of law, responsiveness 
among other aspects of good governance. In as far as, accountability is concerned; there are 
times where information disclosure in accountability may not necessarily amount to 
transparency as shall be elaborated further below in section 6. For these reasons, the thesis 
analyses transparency on its own merits in chapter six and as an element of accountability in 
chapter seven.  
 
CHAPTER 3 
-49 -  
 
Unlike accountability, transparency as a concept is under-conceptualized and theorized.66 In 
academic debates, the term transparency is used synonymously with terms such as honesty, 
accountability, democracy, publicity, frankness among others. 67  As with accountability, 
transparency poses a noteworthy difference on how it is interpreted and implemented within 
various fields, countries, institutions, economic or political dimensions.68 Even so, a number 
of scholars have tried to locate transparency within the framework of other concepts such as 
accountability, democracy, and openness or analyze it on its own69. In attempting to get a clear 
understanding of transparency as a concept, the discussion will draw on the various elements 
discussed earlier and later discuss its various types or classifications.   
 
3.4.1  Defining Transparency 
                                               
66M. Z. Hillebrandt, Living Transparency: The Development of Access to Documents in the Council of the EU 
and Its Democratic Implications (2017) PHD Thesis, Faculty of law, Amsterdam Center for European Law and 
Governance  at 19; A. Bellver & D. Kaufmann, ‘Trans parenting Transparency: Initial Empirics and Policy 
Applications’, (2005) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8188 at 342-3. 
67 S. J. Ward, ‘The Magical Concept of Transparency’, in L. Zion & D. Craig, Ethics for Digital Journalists: 
Emerging Best Practices (New York and London: Routledge, 2014) 47.  For instance, Stasavage uses the term 
transparency as being synonymous to publicity, D. Stasavage, ‘Polarization and Publicity: Rethinking The 
Benefits of Deliberative Democracy’, (2007) 69 (1) The Journal of Politics 59-72 at 61; WHO considers 
transparency as Honesty and openness, see; WHO, Regional Office for the Eastern Medi, Measuring 
Transparency to Improve Good Governance in the Public Pharmaceutical Sector: Jordan (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 2009) 12. 
68 S. Wehmeier & O. Raaz, ‘Transparency Matters: The Concept of Organizational Transparency in the Academic 
Discourse’, (2012) 1 (3) Public Relations Inquiry 337-366 at 338; J. Fox, ‘The Uncertain Relationship between 
Transparency and Accountability’, (2007) 17 (4-5) Development in Practice 663-671 at 664, C. Ball, ‘What is 
Transparency?’, (2009) 11 (4) Public Integrity 293-308 at 297-302. 
69C. Hood & D. Heald, Transparency, the Key to Better Governance? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
Vol. 135; G. Michener & K. Bersch, ‘Identifying Transparency,’ (2013) 18 (3) Information Polity 233-242; J. 
Forssbaeck & L. Oxelheim, ‘The Multifaceted Concept of Transparency’, in J. Forssbaeck & L. Oxelheim, The 
Oxford Handbook of Economic and Institutional Transparency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014 ) chapter 
1; S. J. Piotrowski, Transparency And Secrecy: A Reader Linking Literature and Contemporary Debate (New 
York: Lexington Books, 2010) chapter one; Wehmeier & Raaz ibid ; F. Bannister & R. Connolly, ‘The Trouble 
with Transparency: A Critical Review of Openness in E-Government’, (2011)3 (1) Policy and Internet 1–30; A. 
Meijer, ‘Understanding Modern Transparency’, (2009)75(2) International Review of Administrative 255-269 
among others. 
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Like accountability, transparency has no universally established definition. Adherents of 
transparency such as the EITI, World Bank, IMF, UN, and OECD adopt similar definitions of 
the term with some variations. The EITI defines transparency as the ‘openness and public 
disclosure of activities’.70 The World Bank and UN define it as the ‘availability of reliable, 
relevant and timely information’,71 while the IMF seems to combine all the latter definitions. 
IMF defines transparency as ‘the clarity, reliability, frequency, timeliness, and relevance of 
public fiscal reporting and the openness to the public of the government’s fiscal policy-making 
processes.72 According to the WTO, transparency refers to ‘easy access and notification of 
information’ of trade policies and regulations by member states.73  
 
Vishwanath and Kaufmann describe transparency as ‘the increased flow of timely and reliable 
economic, social, and political information’.74 They add that information should be of ‘good 
quality and reliable, timely, complete, fair, consistent and represented in clear and simple 
terms’.75 Holzner and Holzner define transparency as ‘the value of openness in the flow of 
information’.76 Naurin clarifies that the concept of transparency captures not only the question 
of ‘accessibility of information’ but also the ability of those seeking the information ‘to form 
opinions about actions and processes’ addressed by the respective information.77 Tracy, in the 
field of qualitative research, defines transparency as honesty in the research process.78 In the 
                                               
70 The EITI Glossary available at https://eiti.org/glossary accessed in September 2018. 
71 United Nations (E/C.16/2006/4), ‘Definition of basic concepts and terminologies in governance and public 
administration’, (2006) available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan022332.pdf 
accessed in September 2018 at 10; World Bank, ‘Transparency in Public Finance’ available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/transparency-in-public-finance accessed on September 
2018. 
72 IMF, ‘Fiscal Transparency, Accountability, and Risk’ (2012) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/080712.pdf accessed in September 2018 at 5. 
73 Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1986. 
74 T. Vishwanath & D. Kaufmann, ‘Toward Transparency: New Approaches and their Application to Financial 
Markets’, (2001) 16 The World Bank Research Observer 41–57 at 41. 
75 Ibid. 
76 B. Holzner & L. Holzner, Transparency in Global Change: The Vanguard of the Open Society (Pennsylvania: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006) at 1. 
77 D.  Naurin, ‘Transparency, Publicity, Accountability-The Missing Links’, (2006) 12 (3) Swiss Political Science 
Review 90-98 at 90. 
78 S. J. Tracy, ‘Qualitative Quality: Eight “Big-Tent” Criteria for Excellent Qualitative Research’, (2010) 16 (10) 
Qualitative inquiry 837-851 at 842. 
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field of security markets, Bessembinder and Maxwell define transparency as ‘the amount and 
timeliness of the information’.79 
 
The common elements mentioned by the above definitions of transparency are accessibility of 
information, the wholeness and reliability of information and the ability of the informed to use 
the respective information. For the purpose of this study, transparency refers to the 
accessibility80 of clear, timely, reliable, and complete information by stakeholders or the public 
who are willing and able to access and use such information. 
 
3.4.2  Elements of Transparency 
In accordance with the above definition, transparency entails several elements. The first 
element is the accessibility of information. By accessibility is meant the ease by which 
information seekers can locate or find information readily available. This includes the liberty 
of individuals to secure access to information via open knowledge resources such as the internet 
and databases held by government and other institutions. 
 
The second element relates to clarity of the information. Clarity of information involves the 
ease by which information is understood by its recipient, including the language in which 
information is and how simple the presentation is.   
 
The third element relates to the wholeness or completeness of information. For there to be 
transparency, information made available has to be whole and complete. Provision of partial 
information creates opacity and can be misleading.   
 
The fourth element of transparency relates to timing. Information must be accessed and 
disclosed in a timely manner. This is particularly necessary to allow for timely responses and 
interventions by relevant stakeholders. Information is of no use if access to it is given after 
material events have already passed.  
 
                                               
79 H. Bessembinder & W. Maxwell, ‘Markets Transparency and the Corporate Bond Market’, (2008) 22 (2) The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 217-234.at 218. 
80 By accessibility, we refer to the easy in which information seekers can locate or find information readily 
available. 
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For the purpose of this study, the analysis of transparency and its elements as defined above is 
based on it being a policy mechanism rather than a virtue. 81  Transparency as a virtue 
particularly in governance is used mainly as a substantive norm.82 Transparency as a policy 
mechanism involves the establishment of an appropriate regulatory framework for ensuring 
transparency through legislation.83 The manner in which transparency as a policy mechanism 
is implemented differs from one jurisdiction to another and from one sector to another.84  
However, these frameworks usually provide for information disclosure, the modes of such 
disclosure, the scope of disclosure and measures for non-compliance, among other things. 
Accordingly, it is these aspects of the hydrocarbon industry legal framework that the thesis 
interrogates. Chapter 6 interrogates how the hydrocarbon legal framework in Tanzania 
provides for information disclosure in the industry. It also addresses whether the legal 
framework makes adequate provision for access to clear, reliable, complete, and timely 
information by interested stakeholders and the public to promote transparency in practice.   
 
Transparency as defined above establishes a relationship between at least two actors: those who 
supply information and those who seek information. In the context of public governance, a 
transparency relationship exists between the government and citizens, public service providers 
and the public, organisations/ institutions and their stakeholders, government and development 
partners and so on. The demand for information is a two-way exchange. 85  For instance, 
government can demand information from organization or development partners the same way 
the latter can demand such information from government. Others have regarded the exchange 
of information or the demand for transparency to involve a principal agent relationship where 
the principal seeks information from the agent.86  
 
                                               
81  The study acknowledges the importance of transparency and accountability as values of governance and 
inference to transparency and accountability virtuous nature may be made in the course of study. 
82  T. Schillemans & M. Bovens, ‘The Challenge of Multiple Accountability’, in M. J. Dubnick & H. G. 
Frederickson, (eds) Accountable Governance: Problems and Promises (London: M.E. Sharpe 2015) 4. 
83 Hillebrandt, supra note 79 at 26-30. 
84 Ibid at 29 
85 Fox supra note 79 at 665; A. Fung et al, Full Disclosure: The Perils and Promise of Transparency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007)151-69. 
86 A. Prat, ‘The Wrong Kind of Transparency’, (2005) 95(3) American Economic Review 862 – 77; G. J. Miller, 
‘The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models’, (2005) 8 Annual Review of Political Science 203–225. 
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3.5  CLASSIFICATIONS OF TRANSPARENCY 
The right to demand information is widely regarded as a major component of governance.87 
Within the context of public governance, this right to information is now recognised by custom 
and legislation.88 Considering transparency as a fundamental tool in governance, in the relevant 
parties to transparency relations have presumed a right to know and demand information even 
where there are no formal provisions to that effect.89Good governance and democracy scholars 
have referred to access to information and transparency as a ‘human right’.90 They hold that 
there is a basic right to be informed and know what the government is doing and why.91 Apart 
from custom, different jurisdictions have adopted various information disclosure regulations. 
These regulations vary from country to country as well as the context in which they are applied. 
Based on the right to demand information, one can draw one category of transparency that is 
passive transparency as discussed in section 5.1 below. In governance, the right to demand 
information by citizens comes alone with the duty of government as trustee to inform citizens. 
This obligation to inform by government gives rise to proactive transparency as explained in 
section 5.2 below. 
 
3.5.1  Passive or Reactive Transparency 
                                               
87 See subsection 4.1 above. 
88 C. Hood, ‘Transparency in Historical Perspective’, in C. Hood & D. Heald, supra note 82 at 15; B. I. Finel & 
K. M. Lord, ‘The Surprising Logic of Transparency’, (1999) 43(2) International Studies Quarterly 315-339 at 
315. 
89 J. J Choi & S. Heibatollah, ‘Corporate Transparency from the Global Perspective: A Conceptual Overview’, in 
J. J Choi et al, (eds) Transparency and Governance in a Global World (Wales: Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited, 2012)4. 
90 P. Birkinshaw, ‘Transparency as a Human Right’, in C. Hood & D. Heald, supra note 82 at 47–58; J. Klaaren, 
‘The Human Right to Information as a Vehicle for Transparency’, in A. Bianchi &A. Peters, Transparency in 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 223; J. E. Stiglitz, ‘On Liberty, the Right to 
know and the Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life’, in M. J. Gibney, Globalizing Rights: 
The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 119-21; T. C. Hennings, 
‘Constitutional Law: The People's Right to Know’, (1959) 45 (7) American Bar Association Journal 667–770. 
91 J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Participation and Development: Perspectives from the Comprehensive Development Paradigm’, 
(2002)6 (2) Review of Development Economics 163-182 at 166; W. Parks, ‘Open Government Principle: Applying 
the right to know under the Constitution’, (1957) 26 The George Washington Law Review: 1-22 at 7. 
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Passive or reactive transparency refers to when the information seeker in a transparency 
relationship lodges a request for information from the information supplier.92 Such information 
is not supplied voluntarily. This happens where information is not readily available to the 
seeker but he/she has the right to demand for such information from the information holder.    
 
The problem with reactive transparency is that it does not guarantee whether the information 
holder will respond timeously to the information request with clear and complete information.93 
This problem highlights the fact that mere promulgation of the right to access to information 
laws does not make a government or institution accountable. For passive transparency to work 
the right to demand information must be clearly protected by law as must the procedures to be 
followed in accessing such information be clearly laid down.  
 
3.5.2  Proactive or Voluntary Transparency 
Proactive transparency refers to a process whereby the information holder or supplier 
voluntarily or by law makes information available to the public.94 This type of transparency is 
viewed as the future of the right to information and an integral part of governance by 
transparency.95 The majority of governments disclose information while in compliance with 
legislation other than being voluntary.96  
 
                                               
92V. Mabillard & M. Pasquier, ‘Transparency and Trust in Government (2007–2014): A Comparative Study’, 
(2016) 9 (2) NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 69-92 at 72-3; A.J Meijer et al, ‘Open 
Government: Connecting Vision and Voice’, (2012) 78(1) International Review of Administrative Sciences 10-29 
at 15; H. Darbishire, Proactive Transparency: The Future of the Right to Information (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2010) 3. 
93 Michener & Bersch, supra note 82 at 238. 
94 V. Mabillard & M. Pasquier, ‘Transparency and Trust in Government (2007–2014): A Comparative Study’, 
(2016) 9 (2) NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy 69-92 at 72-3 ; A. J Meijer et al, ‘Open 
Government: Connecting Vision and Voice’, supra note 103 at 15.  
95 Darbishire, supra note 103 at 3. 
96 Mabillard & Pasquier, supra note 105 at 72-3. Scholars have also identified a third category of transparency as 
that which involves information obtained from whistleblowing activities or the leaking of information.  This has 
been referred to as forced transparency.  Whereas as this type of transparency is acknowledged it is not within the 
scope of analysis the concept of transparency within the legal framework. Also see; Meijer et al, ‘Open 
Government: Connecting Vision and Voice’, supra note 103 at 15. 
CHAPTER 3 
-55 -  
 
This type of transparency has the danger of being inadequate. It has been observed that 
‘governments and politicians can manipulate the presentation and revelation of information to 
achieve the same basic goals as a policy of secrecy and obfuscation’.97 It may also encourage 
information suppliers to conceal damaging information. This is particularly true in corrupt and 
autocratic governments where information may be disclosed only nominally. In such regimes, 
information on decision-making processes or outcomes of their actions are usually concealed 
on the ground of ambiguous national security claims. 98  
 
In analyzing transparency in Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry, Chapter 6 critics how the legal 
framework provides for both passive and proactive transparency. It also analyses the nature of 
information disclosed under passive transparency as compared to proactive transparency and 
the manner in which such information is published.  
 
In governance literature and in practice, the concepts of transparency and accountability are 
habitually used together as twin principles. They are broadly accepted as a part of solutions to 
governance problems and considered by many to be inseparable in that course. The following 
section investigates the link between the two concepts and their function in governance. 
 
3.6  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The focus of accountability is bringing actors to account for their actions or inactions and 
imposing sanctions for failure to fulfil the expected relationship goals or provide reward for 
the fulfillment of those goals.99  The focus of transparency, by contrast, is disclosure and 
openness in the manner in which actors conduct their affairs.100 The question remains: at what 
point do the two concepts meet or overlap?  
 
                                               
97 J. M. Balkin, ‘How Mass Media Stimulate Political Transparency’, (1999) 3 Cultural Values 393-431 cited in, 
H. J. M. Ruijer, ‘Proactive transparency in the United States and the Netherlands: The Role of Government 
Communication Officials’, (2017) 47(3) The American Review of Public Administration, 354-375 at 356. 
98 See Lindlet and Naurin on information disclosure and Corruption. C. Lindstedt & D. Naurin, ‘Transparency 
and corruption: The conditional significance of a free press’, (2005) QOG Working Paper Series, 5. 
99 See section on the definition of accountability above. 
100 See section on the definition of transparency above. 
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In the process of giving an account, the accountee is required to inform the accountor and, 
where necessary, to explain the manner in which he/she conducted himself to achieve the 
particular relationship expectations. It is at this point that transparency is often treated as a 
precondition for accountability. However, while this may seem to be the juncture at which 
transparency and accountability intersects, this is not always the case. There are scenarios 
where the two concepts apply without intersecting. It is necessary to analyze such scenarios 
particularly because in the hydrocarbon industry, which is the subject of this study, consists of 
multiple players including private enterprises who may not always be obliged to account to the 
public even where they disclose certain information that may be of public relevance. For 
instance, hydrocarbon companies may be required to disclose their annual financial reports to 
the public. While this information could be easily and readily accessible to the public, 
hydrocarbon companies are not obliged to account to the public of any decisions that they 
make. However, hydrocarbon governance institutions where the public is a principal and 
government institutions agents, hydrocarbon companies become indirectly accountable to the 
public. The public can respond to information disclosed by applying pressure on the state 
institutions mandated to hold the government and other industry players accountable on behalf 
of the people.101  
 
There are also cases where accountability can take place without access to information. 
Common examples include where ministers are held accountable by parliament without full 
disclosure of information.102 For instance, where parliament wants to establish what kind of 
information the hydrocarbon Minister had while making decisions, a parliament committee 
may scrutinize security and intelligence services without public disclosure of their activities 
and who produced what information at what time to the Minister. In such a scenario, the non-
disclosure of the individuals who guided the Minster does not hinder the Minister’s 
accountability process. Such scenarios usually speak to the non-disclosure or confidentiality 
provisions in the legal frameworks. In analyzing Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry the thesis 
also looks at non-disclosure provisions and the extent to which they impede transparency and 
accountability. Other examples include scenarios where actors such as doctors or advocates 
                                               
101 J. Shkabatur, ‘Transparency With (out) Accountability: Open Government in the United States’, (2015) 31 (1)4 
Yale Law & Policy Review 79-140 at 82-83. 
102 C. Hood, ‘Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?’, (2010)33 
(5) West European Politics 989-1009 at 992. 
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who in the discharge of their duties may be sanctioned upon being called to account for public 
disclosure of their dealings with patients or clients. Thus while the concepts of transparency 
and accountability are always paired together in the majority of good governance policies, 
literature , statutes and treaties, they do not always harmoniously work together or positively 
influence each other. It is therefore necessary to analyze both concepts on their merits and the 
manner in which they relate to each other as provided for in the legal framework. This is done 
in chapters six and seven. 
 
3.7  CONCLUSION 
Transparency and accountability are central pillars of good governance. For there to be 
effective governance, the law must sufficiently incorporate the key elements of these concepts, 
define the accountability and transparency relationships and establish appropriate mechanisms 
of implementing these concepts. In particular, such relationships must address the questions on 
who are the actors, who is to be called to account, by whom and for what in as far as 
accountability is concerned. In the case of transparency, the relationships must address the 
questions of information disclosure, by whom, at what time and in which manner. It is also 
critical that accountability implementation mechanisms are sufficiently independent, have 
adequate mandate to inquire and render judgement, and have the capacity enforce their 
decisions. Usually, Accountability and transparency mechanisms operate in a pluralistic 
governance context. This calls for coordination and cooperation as well as checks and balances 
to ensure that accountability actors are themselves accountable. 
 
Lastly, the chapter has addressed transparency and showed that access to clear, reliable and 
complete information by interested stakeholders and the public is critical to ensuring good 
governance. In terms of form and substance, the information given must be capable of being 
comprehended by its users. These features represent the key elements of transparency and 
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CHAPTER 4 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TRENDS IN THE 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
As established in Chapter 2, the history of the hydrocarbon industry accounts that  transparency 
and accountability did not matter much as the industry emerged and evolved. Driven by private 
pioneer oil companies, the industry was in its early stages of development characterised by 
secrecy and muddy business tricks. As imperialist nations and companies tried to out-compete 
others to secure oil reserves across the globe, they used all kinds of measures including skirting 
accountability and transparency. Nonetheless, transparency and accountability have become 
‘buzz words’ in modern day discussions on the governance of hydrocarbon and the extractive 
industry in general. The industry now faces different and broader universal challenges 
including climate change, energy security, as well as critical concerns of the resource curse and 
its associated misfortunes. These concerns have brought about discussions of transparency and 
accountability in the hydrocarbon industry.   
 
This chapter identifies and discusses the key industrial trends on transparency and 
accountability. The focus is on general transparency and accountability practices of the key 
industrial players and, more specifically, on common practices, regional, transnational or 
international policy recommendations, and initiatives that have been adopted by the 
hydrocarbon industry.1 While the chapter does not engage in a detailed analysis of national 
regulatory regimes, it draws on various national regulations relating to the implementation of 
transnational policies in order to substantiate general and specific trends in the industry. In 
identify key industrial trends on transparency and accountability, the chapter considers the 
question of how the various industrial players interact and highlights the common challenges 
to ensuring the use of transparency and accountability in the hydrocarbon industry. 
Understanding these trends and challenges is essential to the analysis and critique of the manner 
                                               
1 Transparency and accountability are governance questions that affect all spheres of human association. Given 
their central role in governance, these principles have been provided for in a multitude of regional and international 
conventions and policy guidelines in all fields. In establishing the industry’s transparency and accountability 
trends, the thesis considers policy recommendations that are most relevant to the hydrocarbon industry and those 
that directly deal with concepts of transparency and accountability.  
Chapter 4:    
-60 -  
 
and extent to which Tanzania’s legal framework on hydrocarbons incorporates the governance 
tools of transparency and accountability.    
 
4.2  HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY TRENDS IN HOST GOVERNMENTS 
Transparency and accountability are governance questions that are affected by a nation’s 
customs, political orientation, and socioeconomic factors.2 A discussion on accountability of 
natural resources addresses the broader question of government and its accountability systems. 
Democratic hydrocarbon producing countries follow a constitutional form of government, 
which falls in either a presidential or a parliamentary structure of governance.3 These forms of 
government have in place an accountability system providing the needed checks and balance 
in the various arms of government.4  
 
This is in line with the UN Charter,5 and principles of international law that recognise the 
importance of sovereign rights in exploiting resources pursuant to a country’s development 
policies.6 International law places the responsibility to ensure adequate governance of natural 
resources on states. 7  International instruments such as environmental and human rights 
instruments require states to ensure the enactment of legislation that would set standards and 
                                               
2 See subsection 2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
3 A. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2012) Chapter 1 &2. Also see: B. Obi Nwabueze, Constitutional Democracy in Africa: 
Forms of government, (Vol 4) (New Delhi: Spectrum Books, 2003) 31 and P. M. Shane, ‘Analyzing Constitutions’, 
in R. A. W. Rhodes, et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook Of Political Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2008) 191. 
4 C. Harlow, ‘Accountability and Constitutional Law’ in M. Bovens et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook Public 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)195. See R. Bellamy, (ed) The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers (New York: Routledge, 2017) on a detailed discussion of the two doctrines. 
5 See Article 2 of the Charter observing Sovereign equality, territorial integrity, and political independence of a 
state. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
6 See Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, which provides that states under international law ‘have the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies’. Report of 
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev.1 (1992). 
7 See Article 7 of the UN General Assembly, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: resolution / adopted 
by the General Assembly, 17 December 1984, A/RES/39/163. 
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provide for implementation and accountability mechanisms.8 Sustainable  Development  Goal 
9 (SDG)  16  as international soft law also calls on states to ‘Promote  peaceful  and  inclusive  
societies  for  sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, 
accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.  
 
The extent to which these governance structures incorporate transparency and effective 
accountability depends on the respective national orientation and context. This section reviews 
common practice and best policy recommendations to states on transparency and accountability 
in the industry. It also considers how states use vertical and horizontal forms of accountability 
and the use of passive and proactive transparency in the governance of hydrocarbons. 
 
4.2.1  Vertical Accountability and Transparency 
In a majority of constitutional systems of governance, the management and regulation of 
natural resources is entrusted to the government on behalf of the people.10 This creates a 
vertical form of accountability where the people as owners of the natural resources bear a 
constitutional right to demand accountability for the governance of their natural resources from 
government. Such accountability is usually enforced through political or judicial systems of 
accountability. The common practice of democratic nations is that citizens enforce their role as 
accountors directly through democratic elections or indirectly through the legislature. The 
indirect enforcement of political accountability stems from the principle that the legislature has 
a legitimate right to serve as a check on the actions of government since the legislature 
represents the will of the people.  
 
                                               
8 See for instance: Article 2 of the UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
16 December 1966, UN, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171; Article 5 of the UN General Assembly, United Nations 
Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, A/58/422; Article 4 of the UN General Assembly, United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 20 January 
1994, A/RES/48/189 among others. 
9 UN General Assembly, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October 
2015, A/RES/70/1. 
10 Subsection 4.1 of Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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4.2.1.1 Parliamentary Oversight  
Indirect political accountability is by common practice well provided for in constitutions and 
legislation, 11  which establish accountability relationships identifying government (usually 
represented by the ministers) as the accountee and parliament as a representative branch as the 
accountor. Many constitutions oblige the government to be answerable to parliament for their 
actions or inactions.12  Parliament as the accountor has the authority to demand access to 
information from government and the government is obliged to provide such information. By 
common practice, governments usually table annual or quarterly reports before parliament. 13 
As the accountor, parliament seeks an explanation and justification based on the information 
provided by the accountee. Upon a careful evaluation of the government’s account, parliament 
may approve or censure the government for its actions or inaction. To ensure effective 
accountability, constitution normally provide for parliamentary independence by guaranteeing 
the principle of separation of powers.14  
 
The above account of indirect political accountability ideally incorporates all elements of 
accountability and should be able to enhance accountability if put to practice. The 
constitutional provisions on political accountability usually fail in weak or poorly governed 
democracies due to the lack of implementation of two essential elements of accountability. One 
relates to information disclosure or transparency and the other to the lack of parliamentary 
independence.  
 
                                               
11 Subsection 3.2 of Chapters 3 of this thesis on political accountability. 
12 K. Strøm, ‘Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies’, in A. Palumbo & R. Bellamay, (eds) 
Political Accountability (New York: Routledge, 2017)113; M. Elliott & D. Feldman, (eds) The Cambridge 
Companion to Public Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 96. 
13 R.Pelizzo & R. Stapenhurst, ‘Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation’, (2004) World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper 3388, available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/ToolsforLegislativeOversight.pdf accessed in September 
2004. 
14 A. Kavanagh, ‘The Constitutional Separation of Powers’, in D.Dyzenhaus & M. Thorburn (eds) Philosophical 
Foundations of Constitutional Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016) 221; R. Bellamy, ‘The Political 
Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights and Representative Democracy’, (1996) 44(3) 
Political Studies 436–456. 
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As regards accountor independence, a major challenge is usually the inability of parliament to 
exercise its accountability function due to lack of independence from the executive. 
Parliamentary systems tend to have close links between the government and parliament, 15 
especially in dominant party-based systems where both members of parliament and 
government leaders are elected from the same party.16 The latter is usually coupled with other 
factors like corruption by political leaders and other self-serving interests especially in 
developing countries.17 As noted in Chapter 3, the independence of the accountor is an essential 
element in ensuring accountability.18 The principle of separation of powers expressed in most 
constitutions has to be natured by the provisions establishing the oversight organs and its 
functions to guarantee independence.  
 
As far as transparency is concerned, a major challenge is usually the lack of political will in 
corrupt and weak governments to report their activities adequately. 19  Lack of adequate 
information hinders the National Assembly’s ability to hold government to account 
effectively.20 Good governance practices require comprehensive and full disclosure in a timely 
manner as shall be discussed further below on various information disclosure standards and 
recommendations.  
 
                                               
15 W. Hout, ‘Parliaments, Politics, and Governance: African Democracies in Comparative Perspective’, in M. A. 
Salih, African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 25; 
W.C. Müller, ‘Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work’, 
(2000) 37 European Journal of Political Research 309-333 at 310-11. 
16 Mülle, ibid. Also see, H. Kitschelt, ‘Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartelization: Political Representation and 
State Failure in Post-Industrial Democracies’, (2000) 37(2) European journal of political research 149-179. 
17  J. Davies, ‘Parliamentarians and Corruption in Africa: The Challenge of Leadership and The Practice of 
Politics’, (2009) A Report on Behalf of The African Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption (Apnac) and 
The Parliamentary Centre Of Canada available at https://www.parlcent.org/en/wp-
content/uploads/2011/04/research_and_reports/Challenge_of_Leadership.pdf accessed in September 2018 at 22-
32. 
18 Subsection 2.2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
19 R. Jenkins, ‘The Role of Political Institutions in Promoting Accountability’, in A. Shah, (Ed.) Performance 
Accountability and Combating Corruption (Washington DC: The World Bank 2007)170; J.Heilbrunn, 
‘Corruption, democracy, and reform in Benin’, A. Schedler et al, (eds) The Self-Restraining State: Power and 
Accountability in New Democracies (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1999) 227. 
20 Inter-Parliamentary Union, Constitutional and Parliamentary Information (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2009) 74. 
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4.2.1.2 Elections 
In modern democracies, free and fair elections are guaranteed as a constitutional right and 
operate as a major mechanism for political accountability. 21  Citizens assess and render 
judgement on national policies and their implementation by government through their votes. 
To fulfil their electoral role, citizen ought to be well informed of the respective government 
policies and their implementation. Accordingly, the right of citizen to seek information and be 
informed of all matters of public interest is recognized by most constitutions.22 The question 
of how such rights are enforced is usually left to legislation, which is expected to ensure that the 
public has timeous access, correct and complete information. Recognizing the significance of 
legislation in this regard, regional international organizations have adopted model laws on 
access to information such as the Model Law for Access to Information for Africa and the 
Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information.23 These are discussed below. 
 
4.2.1.2.1 Access to Information Policy Recommendations 
4.2.1.2.1.1 Regional Model Laws 
The Inter-America and the African regional model laws set out standards that countries should 
adopt in ensuring access to information. They make provision for both passive and proactive 
information disclosure. The proactive information disclosure they recommend relates to the 
                                               
21 M.N. Franklin et al ‘Elections and Accountability’, in M. Bovens et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook Public 
Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)389. 
22These rights are incorporated in the Bill of Rights of most constitutions. They are in line with International 
human rights treaties. They include; The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1981; The American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, and its 
Protocols of 1988 and 1990 and the European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, and its Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6 
and 7. 
23African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Model Law on Access to Information for Africa (2013) and 
Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information (2010) AG/RES. 2607 (XL-O/10). While there is an 
extensive list of similar recommendations, the study discusses the model laws as they represent what is considered 
an ideal legislation on access to information and incorporates the recommendations covered in different 
international guidelines. Other international guidelines with similar recommendations include : The Council of 
Europe Recommendation REC 2002(2) on access to official documents(2002) ; African Commission on Human 
and Peoples' Rights: Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa(2002) 
ACHPR/Res.62(XXXII)02; the UNESCO's Maputo Declaration on Fostering Freedom of Expression of Access 
to Information and Empowerment of People (2009) ; the UNESCO's Brisbane Declaration on Freedom of 
Information 2010; and the Dakar Declaration on Media and Good Governance (2005).  
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management of public resources such as information on public contracts, public expenditure, 
reporting, and monitoring mechanisms relevant to the public authority.24 Such information 
must be published by an adopted publication scheme, which ensures wide circulation of 
information.25 The Model Laws make detailed recommendations on access to information 
request procedures on passive information disclosure, which ensure timely response, and easy 
access of information by all. 26  The recommended procedures include mode of request 
application, recommendations on assistance the duty to assist information applicants, and 
manner of response by the information holder.27   
 
To ensure impartiality in handing access to information, both the Inter-America and the African 
Model Law recommend the establishment of an information committee or body responsible for 
monitoring the implementation of the legislation,28 setting publication schemes for proactively 
disclosed information, and addressing complaints on access to information procedures, among 
other responsibilities.29 They also recommend that such a committee should be free from 
executive interference and report to the legislature that in turn should be responsible for 
appointing the committee and approving its budget.30 Such provisions would ensure that access 
to information procedures are fair, independent and adequately resourced. 
 
As regards whose information can be accessed, both the Inter-America and the African Model Law 
provides that requests for access to information should extend to information held by public 
                                               
24 Section 12 (1) of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information and Section 7(1) and (2) of 
the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa.  
25 Section 9(1) of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information and section and section 66 of 
the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa. 
26 Sections 12-19 on access to information procedures in the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa and 
Part 111 on accessing information held by public authorities of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to 
Public Information. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Section 45 of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa and Section 55 of the Model Inter-American 
Law on Access to Public Information. 
29 Section 58-60 of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, and 62 and 63 of the Model Inter-
American Law on Access to Public Information. 
30 See section 53-57 on independence, structure and operations of the oversight mechanism of the Model Law on 
Access to Information for Africa and 55(1)(3) of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information. 
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bodies and private institutions such as companies as long as it is of public interest.31 In general, 
both model laws are quite comprehensive and largely incorporate the required transparency 
elements such as accessibility of information, clarity of information, wholeness, and 
completeness of information, as well as timeliness of information accessibility.32 They also 
recommend giving primacy to the provisions of access to information legislation in cases of a 
conflict between them and the provisions of any other laws. 33 
 
The main weakness of the Inter-American Model Law is the failure to address adequately the 
question of exemptions from disclosure.34 The Inter-America Model Law provides that access 
to information may be denied where ‘allowing access would create a clear, probable and 
specific risk of substantial harm’ to public interests such as ‘national security’, ‘international 
or intergovernmental relations’, ‘ability of the State to manage the economy’, ‘legitimate 
financial interest of a public authority, tests and audits, and testing and auditing procedures’.35 
The Model Law fails to provide a guide as to what amounts to ‘substantial harm’ and what is 
meant by terms such as ‘national security’ and ‘legitimate financial interest of the public 
authority’. These terms have been used in a number of countries to deny access to information 
on hydrocarbon agreements especially where diplomatic corruption was involved.36 It has also 
been common for hydrocarbons contracts to be treated as being confidential and therefore not 
open to public scrutiny even in states, which have adopted information disclosure policies.37 
                                               
31 Section 3 of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information. Section (1) of the Model Law on 
Access to Information for Africa defines information holder as ‘a public body, relevant private body and/or private 
body.  
32 See section: 7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 46, 53, & 58 of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa and 
sections 5, 9, 11, 20-26, 35, 55, & 64 of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information.  
33 Section 4 of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa.  
34 This is a universal shortfall in most of the recommendations citied under footnote 12 above.  
35 Section 41 (b) of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information.  
36 F. Al-Kasim et al, ‘Grand Corruption in the Regulation of Oil’, (2008) U4 (2) Anticorruption Resource Centre 
1-40 at 11. 
37  R. Weijermars, ‘Natural Resource Wealth Optimization: A Review of Fiscal Regimes and Equitable 
Agreements For Petroleum and Mineral Extraction Projects’, (2015)24(4) Natural Resources Research, 385-441 
at 433;  S. A. Mucci, Political and Investment Risk in the International Oil and Gas Industry (London: Lexington 
Books 2017) 91 ; T. L. Karl, ‘Ensuring Fairness: The Case for Transparent Fiscal Social Contract’, in M. 
Humphreys et al, (eds.) Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 266; P. Le 
Billon, Fueling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts (London: Routledge, 2013) 64-65.  
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Clear provisions defining the grounds upon which exemption from information disclosure can 
be made could remedy these challenges. 
 
Unlike the Inter-American Model Law, the African Model Law provides guidance on national 
security and defence. It provides that information that may not be accessible on natural security 
grounds including information on military tactics, strategies or military exercises; on 
operations undertaken in preparation for hostilities or in connection with the detection, 
prevention, suppression or curtailment of subversive or hostile activities; on intelligence 
relating to the defence of the state; on methods of, and scientific or technical equipment for, 
collecting, assessing or handling information on state defence; and on the identity of a 
confidential source.38 This definition is rare in comparative international and regional legal 
practice on transparency. 
 
4.2.1.2.1.2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Standards 
For countries with extractive industries such as hydrocarbons, the EITI provide an elaborate 
set of information disclosure standards that countries may adopt. 39  The EITI standards 
encourage countries to disclose publicly in full any contracts and licences that provide the terms 
of oil, gas, and minerals exploitation.40 The EITI Standards recommend countries to maintain 
‘a publicly available register or cadaster system(s) with timely and comprehensive information’ 
regarding the companies and licence holders engaging in the exploitation of extractive 
resources.41 Such information may include licence holder(s), coordinates of the licence area or 
the size and location of the licence area, date of application, date of award and duration of the 
licence, where there is production the nature of product produced.42 With regard to extractive 
resources location data, the standards recommend that the government should provide such 
data without unreasonable ‘fees and restrictions’.43 They encourage states to make a register of 
the ‘beneficial owners of the corporate entities that bid for, operate or invest in extractive assets, 
including the identity of their beneficial owners, the level of ownership and details about how 
                                               
38 Section 30(2) of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa. 
39 See subsection 4.4.2 of Chapter 2 for background details on the EITI. 
40 EITI Requirement 2.1 and 2.4 of the EITI Standards 2016. 
41 EITI Requirement 2.3 of the EITI Standards 2016. 
42 Ibid. 
43Ibid. at 2.3(b) 2. 
Chapter 4:    
-68 -  
 
ownership or control is exerted’, 44  and to make such register freely and electronically 
available.45  
 
The EITI Standards also recommend states to disclose comprehensive information on 
government taxes and revenues from extractives,46 including on the sale of the state’s share of 
production or other revenues collected in kind, infrastructure and barter arrangements, 
transportation revenues, state-owned enterprises transactions and sub-national payments.47 All 
such information is supposed to be accurate and reliable and made publicly available in a timely 
manner.48  
 
4.2.1.2.1.3  International Monetary Fund (IMF) Guidelines 
Another set of guidelines on transparency and accountability in the hydrocarbon industry is the 
IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency. 49  While these guidelines provide for 
comprehensive fiscal transparency of natural resource revenues, some of its principles are 
applicable to general resource governance. For instance, the IMF Guide recommends that there 
should be clarity of roles and responsibilities in resource revenue and that all grants of rights 
to exploit resources should be ‘well established in laws, regulations, and procedures that cover 
all stages of resource development’. 50  This recommendation addresses the accountability 
elements relating to the question of establishing who is responsible for what and who is 
accountable to whom. The recommendation that government’s policy and legal frameworks, 
their implementation and participation in resource exploitation be disclosed and explained to 
‘the public clearly and comprehensively’ sufficiently cover elements of transparency.51 The 
requirements for assurance of integrity described in the IMF guide relating to resource-related 
transactions also address the element of accountability enforcement mechanisms. The guide 
provides that ‘there should be adequate oversight mechanisms in place’.52 
                                               
44 EITI Requirement 2.5 (c) of the EITI Standards 2016. 
45 Ibid. 
46 EITI Requirement 4 of the EITI Standards 2016 
47 See EITI Requirement 4.1 to 4.6 of the EITI Standards 2016. 
48 EITI Requirement 4.8 of the EITI Standards 2016. 
49 International Monetary Fund: Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency (2007) 
50 Ibid, Guideline I.2.2. 
51 Ibid. Guideline II. 
52 Ibid Guideline IV. 
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While the IMF Guide has comprehensive provisions on fiscal transparency and accountability, it 
does not define what constitutes ‘adequate or effective oversight mechanisms’.53 This oversight 
is significant because it pertains to the independence of the accountor and the accountors’ 
ability to enforce decisions, which are important elements of accountability.  
 
The above recommendations by the model laws, the EITI standards and the IMF guidelines, if 
well adopted, could ensure that national legal frameworks incorporate transparency-facilitating 
stakeholders to hold government to account over the management of extractives. Read together 
the recommendations provide for accessibility, clarity of the information, wholeness or 
completeness of information and timeliness of information disclosure which are the key 
elements to transparency. 
 
4.2.1.3  Judicial Accountability 
Pursuant to international and national human rights law, citizens are entitled to have access to 
judicial remedies for human rights violations. 54  Citizens may therefore hold government 
accountable through judicial mechanisms in connection with human rights violations resulting 
from the process of hydrocarbon exploitation. In accordance with international human rights 
and humanitarian law as well as the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
(UNBP-Judiciary), 55  states are obliged to ensure access to a competent, autonomous and 
impartial judiciary.56 The UNBP-Judiciary principles call on states to guarantee independence 
of the judiciary by enshrining it in the Constitution or legislation.57 Accordingly, constitutions 
                                               
53 Ibid. 
54 See Article 2(3) (a) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (1976), Article 8 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Also see Human Rights Committee, Anthony Fernando v. SriLanka, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003 (2005), para 9.2 and Dissanayake v. SriLanka, UN Doc CCPR/C/93/D/1373/2005 
(2008), para.8.2. 
55 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders 
(1985) and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 and 40/146 (1985), Articles 1-8. 
56 Supra note 55; Article 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1986); Article 8 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights (1969); Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and Articles 12 & 13 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights (2004). 
57 Article 1 of the UNBP-Judiciary principles. 
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of democratic nations provide for an independent judiciary responsible for providing checks 
on laws of the legislature and acts of the executive according to the rule of law.58  
 
In accordance to principles on independence of the judiciary and constitutional practice, the 
judiciary is an impartial accountor and enforces accountability on ‘the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, 
threats or interferences.’ 59 The Judiciary therefore provides a sufficient accountability 
enforcement mechanism for citizens. Judicial accountability however remains an unfavourable 
mechanism in holding government to account in developing countries.60 This is mainly due to 
the lack of government’s failure to respect and observe judicial decisions on human rights 
violations conducted in the course of policy implementation.61  
 
From the above account on vertical accountability and transparency, it is ascertained that, 
international law and policies provide states with sufficient recommendations on transparency 
and accountability in their legal framework. The recommendations recognize the accountor 
role of citizens and clearly define the manner in which citizens may hold government as 
accountee accountable. Recommendations provided for under the above discussed political and 
judicial accountability mechanisms comprehensively incorporate the elements of transparency 
and accountability as established in Chapter 3.  
 
4.2.2  Policy Recommendations on Internal Vertical Accountability 
A number of international and regional standards for the conduct of the public administration 
have emerged. These standards largely address the theme of hierarchical accountability. They 
include the International Code of Conduct for Public Officials,62 the Council of Europe Model 
                                               
58 E. Barendt, ‘Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government’, in R. Bellamy, The Rule of Law and the 
Separation of Powers (London: Routledge, 2017) 275. 
59 Article 2 of the UNBP-Judiciary principles. 
60 J. Fox, ‘Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?’, (2014) Working Paper No. 1 Global 
Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) at 9. 
61 J. Court et al, ‘The Judiciary and Governance in 16 Developing Countries’, (2003) Discussion Paper 9 United 
Nations University World Governance Survey available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/4108.pdf accessed in September 2018. 
62 Annex to the UN Doc A/RES/51/59 Action against corruption (1996). 
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Code of Conduct for Public Officials,63 the Ibero-American Charter for the Public Service64 
and the Charter for the Public Service in Africa.65 Among other things, these policy standards 
expect public officials to be ‘accountable to [their] immediate hierarchical superior unless 
otherwise prescribed by law’.66 They also recommend that sanctions must be imposed for 
misconduct by public officials such as for being involved in a conflict of interest or failing to 
comply with their responsibility to provide access to official information.67  
 
These standards complement the anti-corruption conventions, which set standards for public 
conduct and criminalize corrupt practices, embezzlement of public resources and misuse of 
public office.68  However, they do not provide details about enforcement. Even those that 
provide for the establishment of monitoring bodies for the implementation of public 
accountability69  do not require them to be independent.70 This gap is however filled by the 
anti-corruption conventions discussed below.   
 
4.2.3  Horizontal Accountability Policy Recommendations 
It is common for states to adopt horizontal accountability mechanisms particularly as it relates 
to governance of national resources. Oversight institutions such as the anti-corruption bodies, 
national audit organs, good governance agencies, environmental authorities, and more recently 
transparency and accountability boards or committees are prime examples. International and 
regional organizations have adopted treaties that set standards by which horizontal 
                                               
63 Rec (2000)10, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe Recommendation on 11 May 
2000. 
64 Doc. A/58/193 adopted by the fifth Ibero-American Conference of Ministers for Public Administration and 
State Reform (2003). 
65 Charter for the Public Service in Africa adopted by the Third Biennial Pan-African Conference of Ministers of 
Civil Service Windhoek, Namibia 5 February 2001. 
66   Article 10 of the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials. Also, see Article 51(d) of 
the Ibero-American Charter for the Public Service.  
67 Article 24 of the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for Public Officials; Code II on Conflict of interest 
and Disqualification of the International Code; Part II on rules of conduct of public employees of the Charter for 
the Public Service in Africa; Chapter 5 of the Ibero-American Charter for the Public Service.  
68 See note 71 below. 
69 See the Ibero-American Charter for the Public Service and the Council of Europe Model Code of Conduct for 
Public Officials. 
70 Article 28 the Charter for the Public Service in Africa. 
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accountability mechanisms are expected to operate including the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption,71 AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption,72 and the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions.73 There are also environmental conventions including those that are industry 
specific such as the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-
Operation of 1990 (OPRC), The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (CLC) 1969 and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage 2001. 74 
 
All these conventions make provisions for the establishment of oversight institutions that are 
responsible for enforcing accountability.75 They recommend that such institutions should ‘be 
granted the necessary independence, in accordance with the fundamental principles of the legal 
system of the State to enable them to carry out their functions effectively and without any undue 
influence’.76 The EITI standards discussed earlier further recommend the formation of an 
independent multi-stakeholder oversight body that is comprised of government representatives, 
private enterprises and the civil society. 77  A similar recommendation is made by the 
transparency or access to information model laws as earlier. 78All these provision address the 
necessary accountability element pertaining to the independence and adequate mandate of the 
accountor in carrying out their functions.  
                                               
71 31 October 2003, UN DOC. A/58/422 entered into force in 14 December 2005. 
72 AU, African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (2003). 
73 OCED, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: 
adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997. 
74 These International instruments make provision for matters that are cross cutting and affect the hydrocarbon 
industry. They provide for the criminalization of corrupt practices by public officials and private enterprises; they 
set environmental standards, accounting standards among many other. This chapter does not analyse such 
standards but looks at the provisions with regard to the implementation of accountability for the breach of such 
standards by bodies put in place to ensure accountability. How these standards impact accountability will however 
be looked at when addressing the cases study in Tanzania. 
75 See for example Article 6 of the UN Convection against Corruption and Article 5 of the AU Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption. 
76 Article 6 of the UN Convection against Corruption. Also, see Article 20(4) of the African Union Convention 
on Preventing and Combating Corruption.  
77 Requirement 1 of the EITI Standards 2016.  
78 See note 28 above. 
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International policy recommendations clearly establish the accountability relationship between 
government and the people in resource governance. There is clear recognition of citizens as accountors 
and government as accountee. As ascertained above, national constitutions and international 
recommendations define adequate transparency and accountability structure providing for how citizens 
should hold government accountable and for what. The above account demonstrates that international 
recommendations incorporate the elements of accountability and transparency as established in chapter 
3. It is also apparent that ideal practice requires the existence of redundant transparency applying both 
vertical and horizontal forms of accountability as discussed in chapter 3. 
 
4.3  TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY TRENDS AMONG 
OIL COMPANIES 
This section discusses the transparency and accountability trends among oil companies 
focusing particularly on international and regional trends. As discussed in chapter two, there 
are two distinct groups of oil companies: national oil companies and multinational oil 
companies.79 In many respects, these companies play quite different roles in the industry’s 
structure especially in developing nations. It is for this reason that this dissection is structured 
around these distinct groups companies. 
 
4.3.1  National Oil Companies 
National Oil Companies vary tremendously depending on the economic, political, social and 
policy climate of its respective state.80 In most developing hydrocarbon producing countries, 
national oil companies are state owned either entirely or with the state being the majority 
shareholder. As state enterprises, national oil companies are usually held accountable through 
governance structures regulating state corporations. Their transparency and accountability 
practices mirror general transparency and accountability attitudes of the state.81 The vertical 
                                               
79 Subsection 5.2 of Chapter 2 of this thesis.  
80 V. Marcel, Oil Titans: National Oil Companies in the Middle East (Washington DC, Brookings Institution 
Press, 2007) 30-33; S. Tordo, National Oil Companies and Value Creation (Washington DC, World Bank 
Publications, 2011) xii; C. McPherson, ‘National Oil Companies: Evolution, Issues, Outlook’,   in M. J. M. Davis 
et al, (eds) Fiscal Policy Formulation and Implementation in Oil-Producing Countries ( Washington DC:  
International Monetary Fund, 2003) at 185-186. 
81 S. Tordo, supra note 80 at 24-25; C. McPherson, supra note 80 at 190; B. Sarbu, Ownership and Control of Oil: 
Explaining Policy Choices across Producing Countries (New York: Routledge, 2014) 35. 
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and horizontal systems of accountability discussed earlier therefore apply to national oil 
companies. These companies are normally obliged to disclose information on company 
financial transactions including procurement and expenditure, agreements, strategic plans and 
annual performance reports. 
 
A major challenge with enforcing transparency and accountability in national oil companies in 
developing countries arises where the state is the sole owner or controlling stakeholder. Studies 
show that management structures of solely state-owned oil companies lack transparency and 
accountability.82 Being sole owners, states with weak governance and democracy face little or 
no pressure to be transparent about the governance of their national oil companies, which are 
often operated as an extension of government.83 Such national oil companies run the danger of 
having a highly politicized and corrupt management, under pressure to do more than generate 
revenue for the government.84  In states where government controls national oil company 
decisions,85 national oil company reports form part of ministerial reports and fail to provide 
sufficient information on the company’s operations, hindering full accountability.86  
                                               
82 I. Gary& T. L. Karl, Bottom of the Barrel: Africa's Oil Boom and the Poor (Maryland, Catholic Relief Services, 
2003) 24-25; J. F. Seznec, ‘Politics of Oil Supply: National Oil Companies vs. International Oil Companies’ in 
R. E. Looney,(ed) Handbook of Oil Politics ( London: Routledge, 2012) 47; S. Tordo,  National Oil Companies 
and Value Creation (Washington DC: World Bank Publications, 2011)24-25; A. Cheon et al, ‘Instruments of 
Political Control: National Oil Companies, Oil Prices, and Petroleum Subsidies’, (2015) 48(3) Comparative 
Political Studies, 370-402 at 378. 
83 K. A. Auzer, Institutional Design and Capacity to Enhance Effective Governance of Oil and Gas Wealth: The 
Case of Kurdistan Region (Singapore: Springer, 2017)22; Seznec, supra note 82 at 48; Tordo, supra note 80 at 
24-25; D. L. Losman, ‘The Rentier State and National Oil Companies: An Economic and Political Perspective’, 
(2010) 64(3) The Middle East Journal, 427-445 at 436;  Cheon et al, supra note 82 at 377. 
84  McPherson, supra note 80 at 189; Marcel, supra note 80 at 3; Losman, supra note 83 at 433. 
85 P. J. Luong, & E. Weinthal, Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 46; Tordo, supra note 80 at 27-28; A. C. Inkpen & M. H. Moffett, 
The Global Oil & Gas Industry: Management, Strategy & Finance (Oklahoma: PennWell Books, 2011) 55-58. 
86 R. E. Gyampo, ‘Transparency and Accountability in the Management of Oil Revenues in Ghana’, (2016)51(2) 
Africa Spectrum 79–91; V. M., Glada Lahn et al,  ‘Good Governance of the National Petroleum Sector’ (2007) 
available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20
Development/ggdoc0407.pdf accessed in July 2017; I. Gary& T. L. Karl, supra note 13 at 25; A. Gillies, supra 
note 18 at 106-107. 
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The OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises address the 
above transparency and accountability challenges of national oil companies. 87  They 
recommend that states should ‘allow [their enterprises] full operational autonomy to achieve 
their defined objectives and refrain from intervening in management’.88 They also recommend 
government as a shareholder to avoid setting enterprise objectives in a non-transparent 
manner.89 They recommend that ‘ownership rights should be clearly identified within the state 
administration’90 and that the exercise of ownership rights should be ‘centralized in a single 
ownership entity or carried out by a coordinating body’ with the capacity and competencies to 
effectively carry out its duties.91 According to the Guidelines, state-owned entreprises should 
be ‘held accountable to the relevant representative bodies and have clearly defined 
relationships with relevant public bodies, including the state supreme audit institutions.92 The 
guidelines also recommend that state-owned enterprises should observe transparency and be 
subject to the same accounting, disclosure, compliance, and auditing standards as non-state 
companies.93 
 
These Guidelines recognize the significance of both vertical and horizontal accountability 
institutions for state-owned companies. By ensuring state owned companies independent from 
government control, the Guidelines subject state companies to sufficient scrutiny by 
government authorities providing for horizontal accountability. At the same time, state owned 
companies remain subject to accountability before the people as the owner through political 
accountability mechanisms.  
 
4.3.2  Multinational Oil Companies 
When operating in host states, multinational companies are governed by the host government’s 
legislation. As common practice, multinational companies disclose information and comply 
                                               
87 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, 2015 Edition. 
88 Ibid, Guideline II (B).  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid, Guideline II (D). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid, Guideline II (E). 
93 Ibid, Guideline VI. 
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with transparency and accountability requirements provided for by national laws of the host.94 
Even where a multinational cooperation is willing to disclose their payments and contracts, 
they may not do so without the consent of their host countries or against the law.95  
 
It has been observed that host governments, which lack the financial, technological, and human 
resources to run profitable hydrocarbon projects tend to have weak provisions on transparency 
requirements for multinational companies.96 This is not helped by the social, economic, and 
political pressure to attract foreign investment or ‘resource-for-infrastructure’ deals.97  
 
However, a number of global initiatives have promoted transparency and accountability among 
multinational companies. They include the EITI’s Company Expectations,98 the UN Global 
Compact,99 regional anti-corruption policies and laws, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises100 and the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.101 Increasingly, in 
varying degrees multination companies including a number of hydrocarbon companies have 
adopted these standards. 
 
4.3.2.1 The EITI’s Company Expectations 
The EITI expects companies to disclose publicly taxes and payments made to the host 
government and if they do not, to state why.102 For EITI implementing countries, companies 
                                               
94  Analysis drawn from information on supporting companies in the EITI website at 
https://eiti.org/supporters/companies, accessed in September 2018. 
95 Ibid. 
96 N.J. Ayuk & J.G. Marques, Big Barrels: African Oil and Gas and the Quest for Prosperity (London:  Clink 
Street Publishing, 2017) Introduction; see Chapter 2 subsection 5.2.2 of this thesis. 
97 A. C. Alves, ‘China's ‘Win-Win’ Cooperation: Unpacking the Impact of Infrastructure-For-Resources Deals in 
Africa’, (2013)  20 (2) South African Journal of International Affairs 207-226 at 212; I. Taylor, ‘Unpacking 
China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa’, in M.C Lee et al, China in Africa (Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
2007) 14 ; Generally  see N.J. Ayuk & J.G. Marques, ibid. 
98  Outline of Expectations for supporting companies of 2018 available at 
https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/company_expectations.pdf   accessed in September 2018. 
99  The Ten Principles of the United Nations Global Compact (2004) available at 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles accessed in September 2018. 
100 OECD: Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2008).  
101 Endorsed by the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Antalya on 16 November 2015. 
102 EITI: Expectations for EITI Supporting Companies (2018) 1. 
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are expected to ‘ensure comprehensive disclosure of taxes and payments made’,103 to support 
the implementation of decisions to disclose licences and contracts regarding hydrocarbon 
exploration and exploitation in accordance with the EITI Standards discussed earlier. 104 
Companies are also encouraged to ‘take steps to identify the beneficial owners of direct 
business partners, including joint ventures and contractors’ and to disclose them. 105 
Furthermore, companies are encouraged to ensure that their processes are ‘appropriate to 
deliver the data required for high standards of accountability’.106  
 
The EITI Company Expectations are listed in eight bullet points with no detailed commentary 
on how and what companies should do to ensure appropriate delivery of their information or a 
guideline on the circumstances under which it is justified to withhold information. The EITI 
Company Expectations ought to be elaborate and detailed as the EITI Standards applicable to 
states. They at the very least ought to provide companies with a guide on information disclosure 
to the public and company transparency and accountability policies in general. The lack of 
adequate guidelines for disclosure or exceptions for non-disclosure allows companies room to 
favour the long preferred opacity in hydrocarbon exploitation. This is substantiated by 
information on company support of the EITI. Of the 36 companies declaring support of the 
EITI initiative as indicated in the EITI website, only Total and Eni have practised proactive 
disclosure of payments even without the compulsion of the law. 107  The majority of the 
companies only implement the EITI in their operations in countries, which are party to the 
initiative and only upon request.108 Some are considered in support of the Transparency and 
accountability initiative by merely, participating in EITI meetings or by engaging with CSOs 
or government on outreach programmes on transparency and accountability.109 They however 
do not have any reports showing compliance of EITI information disclosure.  
 





107 Analysis drawn from supporting companies in the EITI website at https://eiti.org/supporters/companies 
accessed in 2017. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Ibid.  
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Companies can easily circumvent or comply with the requirement to ensure ‘appropriate’ 
disclosure processes without giving effect to sufficient transparency. For instance, some 
companies are considered in support of transparency and accountability initiative by merely, 
participating in EITI meetings or by engaging with CSOs or government on outreach 
programmes on transparency and accountability.110 They however do not have any reports 
showing compliance with information disclosure expectations.  
 
4.3.2.2 The UN Global Compact 
Of all principles of the UN Global Compact, Principle number 10 is directly relevant to 
transparency and accountability. It provides that:  ‘Businesses should work against corruption 
in all its forms, including extortion and bribery’.111 According to the commentary on this 
principle, companies should ‘introduce anti-corruption policies and programmes within their 
organizations and their business operations’,112 ‘report on the work against corruption in the 
annual communication on progress’, and ‘share experiences and best practices through the 
submission of examples and case stories’.113 The commentary also suggests that companies 
should ‘join forces with industry peers and with other stakeholders to scale up anti-corruption 
efforts, level the playing field and create fair competition for all’.114 As the UN Compact 
merely enunciates principles, it does not recommend any specific measures companies may 
take to combat corruption. 
 
                                               
110 Observation drawn from supporting companies in the EITI website at https://eiti.org/supporters/companies  
accessed in 2018. 
111 Principle 10 of the Ten Principles of the United Nations Global Compact available at 
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4.3.2.3 The OCED and G20/OCED Recommendations 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 115  and the G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance116 provide elaborate guidelines on company information disclosure. 
They both recommend that companies should ensure that ‘timely and accurate disclosure is 
made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, 
performance, ownership, and governance of the company’.117 Material information is defined 
in the principles and guidelines as ‘information whose omission or misstatement could 
influence the economic decisions taken by users of information’ or ‘that a reasonable investor 
would consider important in making an investment or voting decision’.118 Such information 
should be made public at least annually. Likewise, the G20/OCECD Principles call for ‘timely 
disclosure of all material developments that arise between regular reports’119 and ‘simultaneous 
reporting of material or required information to all shareholders’.120 Both the Principles and 
the Guidelines provide a comprehensive list of kind of information to be disclosed.   
 
Despite their comprehensiveness, the OECD Guidelines state that enterprises ‘should tailor’ 
their disclosure policies to the nature, size and location of the enterprise with due regard taken 
of costs, business confidentiality and other competitive concerns’.121 This gives discretion 
multinational enterprises to decide on the extent to which they adhere to the principles set out 
in the Guidelines. 
 
                                               
115  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, adopted at the OECD's annual Council meeting at ministerial level in Paris on 27 June 2000. 
116 G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, adopted at the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors Meeting 4-5 September 2015, Ankara. 
117 Principle V. of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. Also, see Chapter III guideline (1) of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
118 Principle V. of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and Chapter III: Commentary on disclosure 
paragraph (13) of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
119 Principle V. of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Chapter III guideline (1) of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
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4.3.2.4 The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights of 2011 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights not only call upon states to ensure 
that multinational corporations and other business enterprises respect human rights, they also 
impose a direct duty on the corporations and enterprises to respect human rights. 122  The 
UNGPS requires businesses to communicate with persons and communities affected by their 
operations. 123  Such communication should include human rights impact assessments, 
mitigation policies, and redress and other remedial procedures.124  Additionally, businesses are 
called upon to disclose information on the internal instruments of accountability for human 
rights violation including external verification procedures.125   
 
The UNGPS address a big gap in upstream natural resource exploration where companies as 
major investors are rarely held accountable directly by the communities impacted by their 
operations. Direct accountability of companies to the affected communities has largely 
depended on a state’s diligent legislative measures. These Guidelines impose an obligation on 
host states to provide individuals with access to effective domestic judicial mechanisms to 
address business-related human rights abuses.126 
 
 4.3.2.5 National Anti-Corruption Laws with a Global Reach 
Western countries, particularly the United States of America (USA), EU, and OECD members, 
have increasingly adopted anti-corruption legislation with a global reach. This legislation has 
had the effect of extending the application of transparency and accountability to multinational 
oil companies operating beyond the territorial jurisdiction of their home countries. For instance, 
the USA now requires companies registered with the United States’ Securities and Exchange 
Commission to disclose in their annual reports payments made to any non-USA government 
                                               
122 Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: implementing the United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, UN DOC: A/HRC/17/31.  
123 Ibid, principle 16.  
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid, principle 21. 
126 Ibid, principle 25.  
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for purposes of the commercial development of oil, gas, and minerals.127 The EU has adopted 
similar directives that have already been incorporated into national legislation by some member 
countries.128 OECD member countries are required by the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions129 to criminalize the 
bribery of foreign public officials by companies based in their territories.130 The Convention, 
accompanied by related guidelines and policy recommendations, provides a comprehensive 
structure for eradicating foreign bribery by companies based in OECD countries.131 Thus, even 
where host counties lack sufficient transparency and accountability systems, Western 
multinational corporations may still be held accountable by their countries of origin. 
 
OECD countries represent about 90 per cent of the world’s total foreign direct investment 
outflows and harbour the largest investors of the hydrocarbon industry.132 By adhering to and 
                                               
127 Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub.  L. 111-203, H.R. 
4173 (July 2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). 
128   In June and October of 2013, the European Union (EU) Parliament and Council adopted two directives—the 
EU Accounting Directive and the EU Transparency Directive, respectively (the “EU Directives”). These EU 
Directives require oil, gas, mining, and logging companies to disclose payments they make to governments on per 
government and per project basis. Although it has since exited the EU, in 2014, the United Kingdom became the 
first of the EU member states to implement the EU Accounting Directive, which has since been implemented by 
11 other EU member states. See Proposing Release at I.C. (Introduction and Background/Developments 
Subsequent to the 2013 Court Decision). See Letter from United States Department of the Interior (November. 6, 
2015), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction-
issuers/resourceextractionissuers-96.pdf (describing the United Kingdom’s Reports on Payments to Government 
Regulations 2014 (December 1, 2014). The other EU member states to implement the EU Accounting Directive 
include Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, 
and Spain. See Proposing Release at I.C. (Introduction and Background/Developments Subsequent to the 2013 
Court Decision). Further, the EU Accounting Directives require large public companies incorporated in the EU to 
report their resource extraction payments. The EU Transparency Directives require companies listed on EU-
regulated stock exchanges to report their resource extraction payments. 
129 37 ILM 1, entered into force February 15, 1999. 
130 Article 1 of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions Adopted by the Negotiating Conference on 21 November 1997. 
131 OCED, ‘Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 
and Related Documents’ available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/ConvCombatBribery_ENG.pdf 
accessed in 2017. 
132 OCED, ‘Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Data’ available at https://data.oecd.org/fdi/fdi-flows.htm accessed in 
2017. 
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enforcing OECD policy guidelines, OECD countries can greatly improve the use of 
transparency and accountability in the hydrocarbon industry. According to the 2015 report of 
Transparency International, only the UK, the USA, Germany, and Switzerland effectively 
enforce the Convention.133 Austria, Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, and Norway moderately 
enforce it while the rest do little to or do not enforce it at all.134  
 
While anti-corruption laws with global reach are encouraging transparency among 
multinational corporations, in some host states this is undercut by legislation, which protects 
the confidentiality of concession and other agreements.135 National legislation in developing 
counties such as Tanzania should take advantage of the shift in the West, which has presented 
an opportunity of enhancing transparency and the accountability of multinational corporations 
operating the hydrocarbon sector in their jurisdictions.   
 
4.4  CONCLUSION 
International and regional organizations (state and non-state) have increasingly set guidelines 
for national legislation on transparency and accountability in resource governance. These 
guidelines recommend the kinds of accountability structures that may ensure that the 
exploitation of hydrocarbons takes place in a manner that benefits all stakeholders especially 
citizens. At the very least, they call for states to ensure that there are sufficient legal and 
regulatory frameworks that define clear transparency and accountability relationships and their 
applicable implementation mechanisms. Increasingly, national constitutions have, at least at 
the formal level, identified citizens as the accountor and government as the accountee and 
defined what the government should be held accountable for and by what means should citizens 
hold it to account. However, this broad commitment to accountability requires legislation that 
defines the specific principles, mechanisms and procedures for implementing the various 
                                               
133 H. Fritz et al, ‘Exporting Corruption Progress Report 2015: Assessing Enforcement of the OECD Convention 
on Combatting Foreign Bribery’ (2015) Transparency International at 7. 
134 Ibid.  
135 J. Topal & P. Toledano, ‘ Why the Extractive Industry Should Support Mandatory Transparency: A Shared 
Value Approach’,  (2013)  118(3) Business and Society Review 271-298 at 280; P. Eigen, ‘Fighting Corruption in 
a Global Economy: Transparency Initiatives in the Oil and Gas Industry’, (2007) 29 Houston Journal of 
International Law 327–354 at 343; Also see: EITI, EITI rules (2011) Including the Validation Guide (Oslo, 
Norway: EITI Secretariat, 2011) for further examples. 
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elements of accountability and transparency in specific sectors, as the guidelines and policies 
discussed in this chapter highly recommend. 
 
Such legislation, it has been shown, should establish accountability implementation 
mechanisms that are sufficiently independent and have adequate mandate to carry out their 
accountability function. It must also facilitate easy and timely access to clear, reliable and 
complete information by interested stakeholders and the public. The information given must 
be capable of being comprehended by its users in terms of both form and substance. 
 
One of the enduring challenges to transparency and accountability remains the fragmentation 
of domestic legislation governing hydrocarbon resources. A majority of states with 
hydrocarbon resources, particularly in developing countries, have weak democracies, face 
challenges in enforcing the rule of law, and have corrupt leadership. These problems make it 
difficult for such nations to codify in a comprehensive manner all elements of transparency and 
accountability in their legal frameworks. At the end of the day, the ability of a state to ensure 
that there is accountability and transparency in the hydrocarbon industry depends on its overall 
commitment to the rule of law, constitutionalism and human rights.  
 
The thesis will now shift to a discussion of how well the elements of transparency and 
accountability identified in Chapter 3 and elaborated upon in this chapter are incorporated into 
Tanzania’s legal framework governing the hydrocarbon industry. In particular, the next chapter 
introduces Tanzania’s legal framework of the hydrocarbon industry while Chapters 6 and 7 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE HYDROCARBON 
INDUSTRY IN TANZANIA 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
Having identified the core elements of transparency and accountability that should underpin a 
satisfactory legal framework for the hydrocarbon industry, the study will in the next two 
chapters address the central question of the extent to which the legal framework governing 
Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry incorporates these core aspects of transparency and 
accountability. Before proceeding with such an analysis, it is important to study the 
development of the legal framework governing hydrocarbons in Tanzania. 
 
Thus, this chapter traces the development of the extractive industry and later the discovery of 
the hydrocarbon resources from the pre-colonial era, the colonial era, and the independence 
era. The chapter also discusses the post-independence era, especially the impact of economic 
liberalization and foreign investment policies. Throughout the discussion, emphasis is laid on 
the legal and constitutional developments that have had implications for the regulation of the 
hydrocarbon industry particularly in general and transparency and accountability in the industry 
particularly. Finally, the chapter introduces the current legal framework and the corresponding 
institutional framework for the governance of Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry.     
 
5.2  PRE-COLONIAL ERA  
Tanzania’s extractive industry dates back to the pre-colonial era, that is, the period before the 
1880s.1 There are tales of Arab and local traders who mined and sold extractive resources such 
as gold, copper, iron, and salt before colonialism.2 There was also inter-community batter trade 
                                               
1 A. Elbra, Governing African Gold Mining: Private Governance and the Resource Curse. (London: Springer, 
2016) 88; C. S. L. Chachage, ‘New Forms of Accumulation in Tanzania: The Case of Gold Mining’, (1993) 9(2) 
Minerals and Energy 2-13 at 3. 
2 C. S. L. Chachage, ‘The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth but not the Mining Rights’, in P. Gibbon, (ed) Liberalised 
Development in Tanzania: Studies on Accumulation Processes and Local Institutions (Uppsala: Nordic Africa 
Institute, 1995) 48. 
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involving resources like iron ore, salt, honey and bark cloth. 3  Although it is known that 
extractive industry existed in pre-colonial Tanzania, its activities remain poorly documented. 
However, before Tanganyika was colonized natural resources were governed by the customary 
laws of the respective tribes across the country.4 Under the various customs, land ownership 
was predominantly communal, allocated to a tribe, clan, or family.5 The chiefs or headsmen 
had the power to administer the land on behalf of the community.6  
 
Apart from land, tribal communities engaged in trade involving various extractive resources 
such as gold, copper, iron, and salt.7 Community members shared the benefits from such trade.8 
However, due to lack of information on how these communities lived, it is not possible to 
ascertain the extent to which transparency and accountability were entrenched in their practices 
on exploitation and use of natural resources.    
 
5.3  COLONIAL ERA  
The colonial era planted the seed for the modern legal and regulatory policies of Tanzania’s 
extractive industry. During the German rule in the 1880s, unoccupied land and its natural 
resources were owned and controlled by the German colonial state under the Imperial Land 
Ordinance of 1895.9 It was at this point that state ownership of land and mineral resources 
started. The German colonial government exercised full ownership of natural resources. They 
                                               
3 T. Håkansson, ‘Rulers and Rainmakers in Precolonial South Pare, Tanzania: Exchange and Ritual Experts in 
Political Centralization’, (1998) 37(3) Ethnology 263-283 at 269-272. 
4 A. Rwegasira, Land as a Human Right: A History of Land Law and Practice in Tanzania (Dar es salaam: Mkuki 
na Nyota Publishers, 2012) 50; E. J. Luoga et al, ‘Land Cover and use Changes in Relation to the Institutional 
Framework and Tenure of Land and Resources in Eastern Tanzania Miombo Woodlands’, (2005) 7(1) 
Environment, Development and sustainability 71-93 at 76. 
5 Rwegasira, ibid, at 50. 
6 Ibid. 
7 C. S. L. Chachage, ‘The Meek Shall Inherit the Earth but not the Mining Rights’, in P. Gibbon, (Ed) Liberalised 
Development in Tanzania: Studies on Accumulation Processes and Local Institutions (Uppsala: Nordic Africa 
Institute, 1995) 48. 
8 Ibid, 180. 
9 M. Prevezer, Varieties of Capitalism in History, Transition and Emergence: New Perspectives on Institutional 
Development (London: Routledge, 2017) 201; J. Emel et al, ‘Extracting Sovereignty: Capital, Territory, and Gold 
Mining in Tanzania’ (2011) 30(2) Political Geography 70-79 at 74. 
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granted mining concessions over huge pieces of land to interested private parties.10 By 1910, 
the Germans had about 76 prospecting fields of gold. 11  The colonial government was 
accountable to its government in Germany and not to the people of Tanganyika. All mineral 
resources benefitted the colonial government and not the colonial territory.  
 
When the British took over Tanganyika in 1919 in accordance with the Versailles Peace Treaty, 
they maintained the same colonial control of resources.12  The 1920 Tanganyika Order in 
Council annexed Tanganyika to the centralized governance of his majesty the king.   State 
secretaries of the territory and the respective governors all reported to the British Crown.13 The 
Mining Ordinance was passed in 1920, which declared all land with mineral resources property 
of the British Crown.14 The Governor controlled the land on behalf of the Crown; the main 
interest was in encouraging big capital investments in the extractive industry through 
concessions.15 In 1922, the Crown passed another piece of legislation, the Mineral Oil Mining 
Ordinance,16 which empowered the Governor to grant a lease to exploit oil to any person over 
any area over any period of time and under any conditions determined by the Governor.17 
Absent in the Ordinance were provisions on revenue collection and their distribution and use.18 
Given it was the Governor who had the power to negotiate and approve leases for oil mining 
and reported to the British Crown in London,19 it is not surprising that the first concessions 
                                               
10 Elbra, supra note 1, at 88. 
11 Emel et al, supra note 9, at 74.  
12 In 1919, the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany was signed at Versailles.  
In accordance with the treaty German renounced in all her rights over German East Africa to the British colony.  
Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) 1919 available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-
treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-0043.pdf accessed in September 2018.  
13See Article 4-12 of the Tanganyika Order in Council 1920. 
14 Tanganyika Territory (1920) Mining Ordinance, in Imperial Institute, (Ed) The Mining Laws of the British 
Empire and of Foreign Countries.  (Vol. VIII, East Africa.  Part 1 - Tanganyika, Kenya, Nyasaland and Zanzibar) 
(London: His Majesty Stationary Office, 1927) 3-4. 
15Emel et al, supra note 9 at 74-75 
16 Tanganyika Territory (1922) Mineral Oil Mining Ordinance supra note 14.  
17 S. 3 of the Mineral Oil Mining Ordinance 1922; supra note 14 at 32. 
18Ibid at 32. 
19 Ibid at 58. 
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were awarded to British Petroleum (BP) and Shell along the coast of the territory, although no 
commercially viable hydrocarbon reserves were discovered.20  
 
With the increased activity of BP and Shell in the coast, a new 1958 Mining (Mineral Oil) 
Ordinance was passed.21 The new Ordinance, though more detailed than its predecessor, still 
maintained the vast powers of the Governor. For purposes of accountability, the British Crown 
established the British Overseas Audit Services based in London.22 The Audit Service had audit 
departments in overseas territories to audit, monitor, and report all of its colonies’ activities.23  
 
Natural resources during the colonial era were explored and extracted for the benefit of the 
colonial governments. The people of Tanganyika were deprived of their resources and lost any 
rights to demand accountability from their colonial masters. 
 
5.4  INDEPENDENCE AND NYERERE’S AFRICAN SOCIALISM 
5.4.1  Transparency and Accountability in Government 
Tanganyika gained independence from Britain in 1961.24 Consequently, Tanganyika’s natural 
resources were now in the hands of the people of Tanganyika to be governed and exploited for 
their benefit. In 1962, the then ruling Tanganyika National African Union (TANU) pushed for 
the adaptation of the first republican Constitution.25 Nominees of TANU formed the National 
Assembly that converted itself into a constituent assembly that adopted the 1962 Republican 
Constitution.26 The 1962 Constitution provided limited provisions on executive oversight and 
                                               
20 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) ‘Exploration History’ available at http://www.tpdc-
tz.com/upstream.php accessed in September 2017. 
21 Cap.  399 of the laws of Tanganyika. 
22 C. Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938) 175; J. 
Ridley, Cutting Edge Internal Auditing (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2008) 66. 
23 Jeffries, ibid at 176-177; G. Van Deleur Fiddes, The Dominions and Colonial Offices (London: Putnam's, 1926) 
cited in A. Bertram, The Colonial Service (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 45. 
24See the Tanganyika (Constitution) Order in Council, 1961 and the Tanganyika Independence Act, 1961. 
25 J. P. W. B, McAuslan, ‘The Republican Constitution of Tanganyika’, (1964) 13(2) International & Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 502-573 at 504. 
26 IG Shivji et al, Constitutional and Legal Systems of Tanzania: A Civics Source Book (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na 
Nyota Publishers, 2004) 47; L Ndumbaro, ‘The State of Constitutionalism in Tanzania’, in B. Tusasirwe, (Ed) 
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transparency. It adopted a presidential system with the President as the head of state, the head 
of government and commander in chief of the armed forces.27 The President had vast powers 
including appointing all members of the executive branch of government including its 
departments and no law could pass without his assent.28  Executive functions where carried out 
by the Vice President and Ministers who reported to and received directives from the 
President. 29  The President exercised oversight over the collective and individual 
responsibilities of Ministers.  
 
National Assembly had no power to check sufficiently powers of the President or Ministers. 
While the National Assembly had the ability to inquire into executive activities including 
decision of the President, it could not enforce its decisions.30 Under the 1962 Constitution, 
National Assembly had no authority to pass a vote of no confidence in the President but the 
President had the power to dissolve the National Assembly on any ground and at any time as 
he thought fit.31 As explained in Chapters 3 and 4, an accountor has not only to have the 
mandate to hold the accountee accountable but also the independence and capability to enforce 
its decisions.  
 
The 1962 Constitution had no bill of rights, let alone the right of access to information. It 
therefore fell short of recognizing the elements of transparency and eventual accountability 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
                                               
Constitutionalism in East Africa: Progress, Challenges and Prospects in 2003 (Vol. 5) ( Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 2005)13. 
27 Article 3 of the Tanganyika Republic Constitution 1962. 
28 Article 4 of the Tanganyika Republic Constitution 1962. 
29 Article 11 (3) and 15 (2) of the Tanganyika Republic Constitution 1962. 
30  B.M. Nchalla, ‘Tanzania’s Experience with Constitutionalism, Constitution-Making and Constitutional 
Reforms’, in M. K. Mbondenyi & T. Ojienda (Eds), Constitutionalism and Democratic Governance in Africa 
(Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press, 2013) 28. 
31 Article 64 (2) of the republican constitution 1962; see J. S. R. Cole & W. N. Denison, ‘Tanganyika: The 
Development of its Laws and Constitution’, in G. W. Keeton, The British Commonwealth (Vol. 12) (London: 
Steven & Sons, 1964)51. 
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The 1965 Constitution replaced the 1962 Constitution after the union between Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar was formed, creating what is now known as Tanzania.32 The Union Government of 
Tanzania was responsible for 11 union matters, while the Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar had exclusive jurisdiction over all other matters regarding the island.33 The 1965 
Constitution introduced the monopoly of one political party as it abolished all political parties 
and declared TANU for Tanzania Mainland and Afro Shiraz Party (ASP) for Tanzania Zanzibar 
as the only political parties respectively.34 All members of parliament and government leaders 
were thus members of the respective political parties. 35  Consequently, all parliament and 
government activities were to be run under the supervision of the respective parties.36  
 
The 1965 Constitution did little to entrench accountable governance particularly in as far as the 
elements of the independence of the accountors and the separation of powers was concerned. 
The lack of checks and balances was worsened by the 1975 amendment to the  Constitution,37 
which rendered government organs subordinate to the political party that run all government 
affairs.38   
 
In 1977, the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) came into force. The 1977 
Constitution continued with the concept of party supremacy by declaring Chama cha 
Mapinduzi the only political party and all government affairs were run according to directives 
of the party. 39  Article 63(4) of the 1977 Constitution cemented the lack of political 
                                               
32 The Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Title Act, No. 22 of 1964 and the Union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika 
Law, 1964. These are collectively referred to as Acts of Union. 
33 Section 5 & 6 of the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar Title Act See also article 6 (1), 12, and 13 of the Interim 
Constitution of Tanzania, 1965. 
34 Article 3 (1) of the Interim Constitution of Tanzania, 1965. 
35 Article 3 (3). See also P. J. Kabudi ‘The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and its Application in Tanzania: 
Success, Challenges and Prospects’, available at http://www.utumishi.go.tz/utuweek/SOP.pdf accessed in 
September 2018 at 14-15.  
36 The Constitution of TANU was even made the first schedule of the state Constitution making it by law a part of 
the republic’s Constitution. See also I. G Shivji et al, Constitutional and Legal System of Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: 
Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2004) 52-53. 
37 The Act No. 8 of 1975 to amend the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965. 
38 Section 3 of the Act to amend the Interim Constitution of Tanzania 1965. 
39 Article 3 (1) & (2).  Shivji observes that interpreting the respective provision of the article as establishing party 
supremacy is erroneous. He argues that ‘the provision does not say anything of the sort. It declares the party to be 
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accountability through parliament by declaring Tanzanian Parliament a special committee of 
the national party congress.   
 
Governance of resources under the then President Julius Nyerere was therefore unchecked. 
Nyerere had the liberty to run the country as he thought fit with no need to render an account 
over his actions.40 There was no transparency and all information to the public was controlled. 
Most government information was classified and the National Security Act 41  prohibited 
disclosure of information by government officials.42 Disseminated information was geared 
towards advancing government interests.43 
 
5.4.2  The Hydrocarbon Industry 
TANU under the leadership of Nyerere adopted a conservation approach and advocated for 
zero exploration and extraction of Tanzania’s extractive resources until Tanzania had both the 
geological and engineering capacity to explore its extractive resources.44 Nonetheless, for the 
                                               
the final authority subject to provisions of its own as well as the constitution of the united republic. The CCM 
constitution pertains to private rights of its membership while the state’s constitution pertains to public rights and 
prevails in all cases. Thus the Constitution is supreme.’ Whereas the supremacy of the constitution as the mother 
law of the land is undisputed, given the extensive mandate given to the president who is the party chairman and 
the role of the party national congress in legislative affairs, it subsequent to refer to the provision as “technically” 
establishing party supremacy. See. I. G. Shivji, Tanzania: The Legal Foundations of the Union (Dar es Salaam: 
Dar es Salaam University Press, 2009) 71 footnote 140 in page 118. 
40 Further, see Shivji’s discussion on manipulating law in a democratic environment in the period of 1964-1967. 
I. G Shivji, Where is Uhuru? Reflections on the Struggle for Democracy in Africa (Nairobi: Fahamu/Pambazuka, 
2009) 80. 
41 Act No. 3 of 1970. 
42 Section 5 (1) of the National Security Act 1970. 
43 P. Grosswiler, ‘Changing Perceptions of Press Freedom in Tanzania’, in F. Eribo & W. Jong-Ebot, Press 
Freedom and Communication in Africa (Asmara: Africa World Press, 1997)104-105. 
44 C. Chachage, 'Mwalimu in Our Popular Imagination: The Relevance of Nyerere Today', in A. Cassam, & C. 
Chachage, Africa's Liberation: The Legacy of Nyerere (Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2010) 4; D. F. Bryceson & J. 
B.  Jønsson, ‘Mineralising Africa and Artisanal Mining Democratising Influence’, in D. F. Bryceson et al, (Eds) 
Mining and Social Transformation in Africa: Mineralizing and Democratizing Trends in Artisanal Production 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2014) 13. Also see Pratt, Cranford, The Critical Phase in Tanzania 1945-1968: Nyerere and 
the emergence of a socialist strategy ( Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1978) p.227. 
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existing concessions, Nyerere adopted a policy of total state control and nationalization.45 
Subsequently, in 1969, the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) was 
established by a presidential decree published in the Gazette as per the Public Corporations Act 
No 17 of 1969. 46  TPDC was established to ensure direct state ownership of shares and 
operations in the hydrocarbon industry. At this time, Tanzania had entered an exploration 
agreement with Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP), an Italian company that explored 
and made gas discoveries in Songo in 1973.47   Upon the discovery, the Italian company 
relinquished its rights declaring the discovery not to be commercially viable.48 During this time, 
there was no change in the laws governing hydrocarbons from those adopted in the colonial 
era. TPDC, like all other public corporations, operated under strong directives from the 
President who was given extensive powers under the Public Corporations Act.49 
 
5.5  THE BEGINNING OF ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND 
REVIEW OF UJAMAA POLICIES: 1970s TO EARLY 1980s 
                                               
45 Elbra, supra note 1 at 91; S. Nghambi ‘The Process of Obtaining Mineral Rights in Tanzania’ in N. Leader-
Williams et al, Mining in Protected Areas in Tanzania (International Institute for Environment: wildlife series) 
(London: International Institute for Environment & Development 1996) 11. 
46 Government Notice No. 140 of 30th May 1969. 
47 P. Bofin & R H. Pedersen, ‘Tanzania's Oil and Gas Contract Regime, Investments and Markets’, (2017) No 1 
DIIS Working Paper at 9; Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF), The Petroleum Exploration Study: 
A Baseline Survey Report (2009) available at http://www.policyforum-
tz.org/files/ESRFNPAPetroleumSectorBaselineReport.pdf accessed in August 2018 at 15. 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Section 6 of the Public Corporations Act No. 17 of 1969. 
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Nyerere’s ujamaa (socialism),50  nationalization and state control over economic resources 
failed and Tanzania was thus forced to reconsider its policies.51 Nyerere started reconsidering 
his policies on the extractive industry in the late 1970s by, among other things, increasing 
private sector participation in the exploration of the extractive industry.52 These moments saw 
a change in the extractive industry legislation allowing licensing of extractive resource 
activities though still maintaining state ownership and control. 53  In 1980, the Petroleum 
(Exploration and Production) Act54 was passed, laying the foundation for a detailed legal 
framework governing the hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania. The 1980 Petroleum Act was 
adopted following the discovery of commercially viable gas reserves in Songo between 1974 
and 1979 by joint operations between TPDC and AGIP under a 50-50 share agreement.55 The 
Act reproduced the Constitution's provisions that vested the ownership and control over any 
petroleum under the lands forming part of the Tanzanian Republic to the people. 56  All 
hydrocarbon activities could thus only be conducted in accordance with the licence conferred 
in terms of the Act.57 
                                               
50 Ujamaa was a form of social and economic policy developed by Nyerere. The principles of the Ujamaa policies 
were self-reliance, total participation of all in developing the nation, communal labour in the rural sector and 
communal ownership of land, and nationalisations in the private sector and of public services. These Ujamaa 
principles where implemented by Nyerere from 1960s to 1985. See : G. Hydén, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: 
Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry (California: Univ of California Press, 1980); J K Nyerere, 
Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism (Newark: Jihad Productions, 1970) ; M. Jennings, ‘Ujamaa’ in Oxford 
Research Encyclopedia of African History available at 
http://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-
172?print=pdf (accessed in September 2018).  
51 J. Ndembwike, Life in Tanzania Today and Since the Sixties (Dar, es Salaam: Continental Press, 2010) 151; K. 
J. Havnevik, Tanzania: The Limits to Development from Above (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki Na Nyota Publishers 1993) 
56-62; K. E. Svendsen, ‘The Creation of Macro-Economics Imbalance and a Structural Crisis’, in J. Boesen et al, 
Tanzania: Crisis and Struggle for Survival (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 1986)71-78. 
52 Chachage, supra note 2 at 54-55. 
53 P. Butler, ‘Tanzania: Liberalisation of Investment and the Mining Sector Analysis of the Content and Certain 
Implications of the Tanzania 1998 Mining Act’, in B. K. Campbell, (Ed) Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose 
Benefit? (Vol. 26) (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2004) 67. 
54 Act No. 27 of 1980. 
55 D. M. Anderson & A J. Browne, ‘The politics of oil in eastern Africa’, (2011) 5 (2) Journal of Eastern African 
Studies 369-410 at 379. 
56 Section 4 (1). 
57 Section 4 (2). 
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5.5.1  The Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 1980 
The 1980 Act set out the basic structure for management and control of petroleum including 
administration matters in relation to exploration, extraction, licensing; regulatory powers of the 
Minister; duties and powers of the office of the Petroleum Commissioner, dispute resolution, 
and the rights of persons affected or disturbed by exploration or development processes. The 
Act also formally introduced the use of product sharing agreements as the mode of contractual 
agreements in the hydrocarbon industry.58 The Act gave the Minister extensive discretion.59 
All industry decisions were to be taken solely by the Minister who was the regulating authority 
of the industry.60 With the lack of transparency and insufficient checks on the executive, the 
Minister’s vast powers were only subject to internal vertical accountability by the President.61 
The Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs in the Minister’s office who was appointed by the 
President assisted the Minister in executing his duties.62 The Commissioner was responsible 
for ensuring implementation of the Act.63  
 
The Act did not give much detail on the process by which exploitation rights were to be granted, 
conditions for exploitation or detailed fiscal provisions. The latter were subject to negotiation 
under the PSA agreements. The Act did not contain the terms transparency, accountable or 
accountability. There were no provisions demanding the Minister nor the Commissioner to 
ensure transparency or accountability under the Act. Any information regarding operations was 
deemed confidential and disclosure of such information was considered an offence. 64 
Disclosure could only be made for, or in connection with, the administration of the Act or to 
an authorised agency of the Republic or in accordance with section 10 of the Act.65 The only 
                                               
58 Section 14. 
59 See Part III of the Act. 
60 Ibid. 
61 See subsection 3.2 of Chapter 3 on internal vertical accountability.  
62 Section 8. 
63 Section 9. 
64 Section 10 (1). 
65 Section 10 provides that: ‘No person shall disclose any information obtained by him in, or in connection with, 
the administration of the Act, unless the disclosure is made for or in connection with the administration of the Act; 
In formation may be disclosed for or in connection with the preparation of official statistics; information may be 
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persons authorized to demand or receive information from licence holders were the Minister, 
Commissioner or other authorized government authority. 66  There were no procedures for 
making any information public or for the public to access or obtain information. 
 
5.5.2  Other Constitutional Developments 
Tanzania adopted a series of constitutional amendments towards the late 1970s and the early 
1980s that contributed to significant changes in the countries accountability structures. Some 
of these changes make up the current constitutional provisions and are discussed further in 
Chapters 6 and 7 as they relate to transparency and accountability. The most significant 
amendment was the introduction of bill of rights in 1984.67 Among other rights, the amendment 
eshrined the ‘right to seek, receive and, or disseminate information regardless of national 
boundaries’ and ‘the right and the freedom to participate fully in the process leading to the 
decision on matters affecting [citizens], [their] well-being or the nation’. 68  The 1984 
amendment also empowered the High Court to declare any Act of Parliament or part of it 
unconstitutional if in contradiction with the Constitution.69 Article 27 (2) of the Constitution 
also imposed a duty on ‘all persons to safeguard the property of the state authority and all 
property collectively owned by the people’. These amendments introduced some important 
aspects of transparency and accountability that are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7.   
 
                                               
disclosed with the consent of the person from whom the information was obtained and it may also be disclosed 
for the purpose of any legal proceedings. See section 10(1) a-g. 
66 Section 16, 55, 68, and 86. 
67 Constitutional Amendment Act No. 15 of 1984. C. K. Mtaki & M. Okema, ibid at 167; C.M. Peter, Human 
Rights in Africa: A Comparative Study of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the New 
Tanzanian Bill of Rights (London: Greenwood, 1990) 5-7. The Bill of Rights was introduced but it was suspended 
for a period of three years allegedly in order to give the government time to put its house in order. It therefore 
became operational in 1988. It is in that year that the first human rights case was filled in the High Court of 
Tanzania at Mwanza- Chumchua s/o Marwa v. Officer i/c of Musoma Prison and Another, High Court of Tanzania 
at Mwanza, Miscellaneous Criminal Cause No.2 of 1988(Unreported). See D.Z. Lubuva, ‘Reflactions on Tanzania 
Bill of Rights’ (1988)14(2) Commonwealth Law Bulletin, 853. 
68 Article 18 (1), Article 21 (1) & (2). 
69 Part VI of the constitution establishing the Constitutional Court. 
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The 1984 constitutional debates also led to demands of more autonomy to Zanzibar.70 These 
demands marked the beginning of the current controversy over control of hydrocarbon 
resources between Zanzibar and Main Land Tanzania. 71  In 2009 Zanzibar’s House of 
Representatives declared the Island’s natural resources (hydrocarbons included) not a union 
matter.72 The 2010 amendment of the Zanzibar Constitution incorporated a declaration to this 
effect without following the due process provision of the 1977 Constitution.73 As this study 
only focusses on the legal and institutional framework-governing hydrocarbon resources in 
Tanzania Mainland, it does not address this controversy.  
 
5.6  THE ERA OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION AND FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT POLICIES 
In 1986, under the presidency of Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Tanzania opened up to the World Bank’s 
structural adjustment programme. 74  The program advanced economic liberalization, 
                                               
70 P. J. Kabudi, Human Rights Jurisprudence in East Africa: A Comparative Study of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995) 
63M. Suksi, Sub-State Governance through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of 
Powers, Procedures and Institutions (London: Springer, 2011) 195-197. 
71 See a discussion on the parliamentary debates on Zanzibar’s sovereignty in D. Lawrence, Tanzania: the Land, 
its People and Contemporary Life (Dar es Salaam: New Africa Press, 2009) 131-146; M. A. Bakari, The 
Democratisation Process in Zanzibar: A Retarded Transition (Volume 11 of Hamburg African studies) (Hamburg: 
GIGA-Hamburg, 2001) 125-126. 
72 Budget Speech of Zanzibar's Minister for Natural Resources, Works, Energy and Lands, Mr Mansour Yussuf 
Himid in 2008 at the House of Representatives. Salma Said and Orton Kiishweko, ‘Tanzania: Zanzibar Says No 
Oil Sharing’ Thursday 17 July 2008 the Citizen available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200807180026.html 
(accessed in September 2018). See H I.Majamba, ‘Tanzania’s Oil and Gas Industry: Legal Regime, Management, 
and Access Rights’, (2016) 19(1) RiA Recht in Afrika| Law in Africa| Droit en Afrique 3-23 at 7. 
73 The tenth constitutional Amendment of the Zanzibar Constitution 1984 Act No. 9 of 2010.The Oil and Gas 
Upstream Act No. 6 of 2016 (Zanzibar) clearly vests all hydrocarbon resources under the Zanzibar government 
on behalf of its people under section 4. Such amendments of the law are contrary to the united republic constitution. 
The united republic constitution sets out procedures for amending the constitution in Art.98 (1) b. This includes 
the list of union matters as provided for in the second schedule of the constitution that may be amended or deleted 
as stated in item 7. See H.I. Majamba ibid at 6-7; for a discussion on the access to oil and gas in the context of the 
union. 
74 B. J. Ndulu and F. M. Mwega, ‘Economic Adjustment Policies’, in J. D. Barkan, Beyond Capitalism Vs. 
Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994) 119; A. Bigsten & A. Danielson, 
Tanzania: Is The Ugly Duckling Finally Growing Up?( Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2001) 19. 
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encouraging foreign investment and involvement of private actor’s in economic development 
projects.75 This period marked the end of total state control in the extractive industry.  
 
As far as hydrocarbons were concerned, between 1980 and 1991, Tanzania experienced the 
most activity and most of the hydrocarbon drilling in Tanzania is reported to have occurred 
during this period.76 Seismic data was mostly collected in the Rift Rukwa Basin and Mafia 
Deep Offshore Basin with discoveries being made in Songo and Mnazi Bay.77  
 
During this period, the 1980 Petroleum Act was the law in operation. However, a number of 
significant constitutional amendments took place that brought further fundamental changes to 
the government accountability structure. In 1992, the one-party system ended and a multiparty 
system was adopted.78 Members of Parliament (MPs) and presidential candidates could now 
come from any registered political party. This promised an improvement in the accountability 
function of parliament through the introduction of MPs from the opposition parties. Another 
amendment in the same year strengthened the powers of the National Assembly. It provided 
for the removal of the President by way of impeachment, introduced the post of a Prime 
Minister as head of government, and gave the National Assembly powers to take a vote of no 
confidence against the President or Prime Minister?.79 These changes brought about bolster the 
separation of powers in Tanzania. The extent to which these changes affect transparency and 
accountability of hydrocarbon resources is further discussed in Chapters 6 and 7.  
 
                                               
75 P. Bulter, supra note 54 at 67. 
76  Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), ‘Exploration History’ available at 
http://tpdc.co.tz/upstream.php accessed in September 2016. 
77 Ibid. 
78 The Eighth Constitutional Amendment Act No. 4 of 1992. These Constitutional amendments were based on the 
report of the Nyalali Commission.  The Nyalali Commission of February 1991 was a Presidential Commission set 
up under the leadership of then-Chief Justice Francis Nyalali. The Commission collected views of citizens and 
made appropriate recommendations on whether the country should adopt a multiparty or single party system. It 
sat during the term of President Ali Hasan Mwinyi. The Constitutional amendments included the change of Article 
3 (On One party); deleting Article 10 (party supremacy); deleting Article 63(4) the position of the National 
Assembly as a Committee of the Party’s National Conference. These Changes came under the enactment of the 
Declaration of multiparty state Act No.4 of 1992.  For further details, see Msekwa, Pius, The transition to 
multiparty democracy (Dar es Salaam Tema Publishers Co., 1995). 
79 The Ninth Constitutional Amendment Act No. 20 of 1992. 
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The new political system led to the mushrooming of media houses with various newspapers, 
radio and TV stations, and a greater public demand for access to information.80 Although no 
specific legislation was adopted to facilitate access to information, a new information and 
broadcasting policy was adopted in 1993. Unfortunately, the policy did not advance access to 
information. On the contrary, it protected information held by government from public view 
and sought to control the media houses. 
 
5.7  TOWARDS THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
As Tanzania embraced economic liberalisation and marketed itself as an investor friendly 
country, the hydrocarbon industry experienced increased activities through foreign investment 
especially from 2000. The extraction of natural gas in Songo and Mnazi Bay took off with the 
implementation of the Gas to Electricity project.81 Seismic data was acquired in a number of 
phases between 2000-2012 that led to exploration drilling of wells by British Gas BG (Blks - 
1,2,3), Statoil (Blk - 2) and Petrobras (Blk - 5), making significant gas discoveries in blocks 1, 
2, 3 and 4.82 Exxon Mobil and Statoil also made major reserve discovery offshore named the 
Zafarani field off the coast of the Indian Ocean.83 Together these discoveries make Tanzania 
one of Africa’s major gas reserve owners. 
 
The major discoveries referred to above necessitate a reconsideration of the adequacy of the 
existing legislation to govern the industry. As noted earlier, the 1980 Act was inadequate and 
superseded by later events. The extensive ministerial powers, the lack of an appropriate 
institutional framework and the provisions on revenue in the 1980 Act were incompatible with 
the nation’s policies that had been adopted since the Act was enacted. Tanzania had evolved 
politically as well. Various policies and laws governing land, environment, investment, good 
governance among other cross cutting sectors have also been enacted. Internationally, policies 
                                               
80 M. Sturmer, The Media History of Tanzania (Ndanda: Ndanda Mission Press, 1998.)  172-175; Tanganyika Law 
Society (TLS), Legislative Hindrances to Transparency and Open Governance in Tanzania: A Study on Access 
and Right to Information in Mainland Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Tanganyika Law Society 2014) 6. 
81 A. Eberhard et al, Independent Power Projects in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Five Key Countries 
(Washington: World Bank Publications, 2016) 206; Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) 
‘Exploration History’ available at http://www.tpdc-tz.com/upstream.php accessed in September 2017. 
82 TPDC, ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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on the extractive industries have also demanded more transparency and accountability and 
increased local participation in the governance of extractive resources.84   
 
Accordingly, in 2015 a new legal framework to govern the hydrocarbon industry was 
promulgated. The legal framework followed a series of reviewed and new policies to regulate 
and govern hydrocarbons. They include National Energy Policy of 2015, the National 
Petroleum Policy of 2015, the National Natural Gas Policy of 2013 and the Natural Gas 
Utilisation Master Plan 2016 – 2045 Strategy. Although these policies inform the current legal 
framework, they will not be discussed in this chapter and reference to them may only be made 
in the course of analysis where relevant.  
 
The following section discusses the current legal and institutional frameworks governing the 
hydrocarbon industry. In outlining the legal framework, the section also covers laws in cross 
cutting sectors relevant to the hydrocarbon industry. It is also note worth that in Tanzania; 
hydrocarbons have always been handled by individual laws and not the general investment 
promotion and protection codes. They were therefore not anticipated in the Foreign Investments 
(Protection) Act, 1963 (Cap 533); National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990 
(Act No. 10 of 1990); and the current Tanzania Investment Act, 1997 (Act No. 26 of 1997). 
  
5.8  CURRENT HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY LEGAL AND 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN TANZANIA 
5.8.1  The Constitution 
Legal provisions on the regulation of hydrocarbons in Tanzania may be traced from its 
Constitution. Article 27 read together with Article 4 of the 2015 Petroleum Act vests all 
hydrocarbon resources in the republic to be managed by the government as trustee. These 
provisions establish the accountability relationship between government and the people. This 
relationship is discussed further in Chapter 7.   
Following the Constitution is the principal legislation of the hydrocarbon industry, starting with 
the Petroleum Act 2015, which has to be read together with the Oil and Gas Revenues 
Management Act,85 and the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) 
                                               
84 See chapters 2 and 4 of the thesis. 
85 Act No. 22 of 2015 
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Act all of 2015.86 More recently in July 2017, the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent 
Sovereignty) Act 87  and the Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-
Negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act were passed.88 
  
5.8.2  Principle Legislation 
5.8.2.1 The 2015 Petroleum Act 
The 1915 Petroleum Act is the main legislation governing the hydrocarbons industry in 
Tanzania. It provides for the regulation of the activities of the entire value chain of the industry 
starting with the upstream to mid and downstream activities. The major aim of the Act is to 
‘secure the accountability of petroleum entities and to provide for other related matters’.89 The 
preamble shows the countries commitment to accountability in the sector unlike the 1980 Act, 
which did not contain the term accountability, or transparency. The Act is applicable in the 
entire Republic of Tanzania including Zanzibar.90  
 
The Act designates Cabinet as the superintendent of the hydrocarbon industry.91 Cabinet is 
responsible for approving all strategic sector decisions. The Minister responsible for 
hydrocarbons is the custodian of the industry. He or she is however obliged to consult and seek 
directives from Cabinet before making any major strategic decisions.92 The Minister is also 
obligated to consult with other sectoral ministers before making decisions that could affect 
other sectors.93 As the custodian of the industry, the Minister is charged with the duty, among 
other things, to develop and implement policies and plans; the administration of all industry 
licenses; entering into petroleum agreements on behalf of the government; promoting local 
                                               
86Act No. 16 of 2015.  
87 Act No. 5 of 2017. 
88 Act No. 6 of 2017.  
89 Preamble of the Act. 
90  Section 2. Where hydrocarbon activities are undertaken in Tanzania Zanzibar, they are governed and 
administered by the institutions in accordance with the laws of Zanzibar (Section 2(2) b of Petroleum Act). As 
noted earlier, the applicability of the law in Zanzibar remains out of the scope of this thesis and shall not be 
discussed further. It is however important to note that there are debates going on as to whether or not oil and gas 
should be removed from the list of union matters in the constitution.  
91 Section 4 (3). 
92 Section 5 (3) (a). 
93 Section 5 (3) (b). 
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participation; attracting foreign investment; and ensuring transparency.94 The Minister may, in 
writing, give the regulatory body directives with respect to policy issues to be observed and 
implemented.95 He may also give policy directions to the National Oil Company in respect of 
performance of its functions.96 In discharging his functions, the Minister is assisted by the 
Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs.97 Chapter 6 and 7 analyse these provision against the 
backdrop of the core requirements of transparency and accountability discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4.  
 
5.8.3.1.1 Administrative Provisions and Institutional Framework 
The Petroleum Act establishes various institutions for the governance and regulation of the 
industry’s activities. These include the Oil and Gas Bureau within the Office of the President. 
The Bureau’s role is to advise Cabinet on strategic matters relating to the oil and gas economy.98 
The Act also establishes two regulatory authorities: the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory 
Authority (PURA) as the regulator of upstream activities and the Energy and Water Utilities 
Regulatory Authority (EWURA) as the regulator of midstream and downstream activities.99 As 
the scope of the study is limited to upstream activities, the analysis on transparency and 
accountability in Chapter 6 and 7 will only examine PURA, the regulator of upstream activities. 
 
Apart from the regulatory Authorities, the Petroleum Act re-establishes Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC) to be the National Oil Company.100 The Act relinquished 
TPDC’s initial regulatory obligations under the 1980 Act. The Government of Tanzania is 
supposed to maintain a 51% share of the Oil Company at all times. 101  The National Oil 
Company’s main role is to carry out the nation’s commercial aspects in the entire value chain 
of the hydrocarbon industry.102 In carrying out this role, TPDC is mandated to form subsidiary 
                                               
94 Section 5. 
95 Section 14. 
96 Section 10. 
97 Section 6. 
98 Section 7. 
99 Section 11 and 29 respectively. 
100 Section 8. 
101 Section 8 (2). 
102 Section 8  
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companies to implement its function effectively. 103  TPDC has exclusive rights over the 
exploration, production, and development of the country's hydrocarbons. All industry activities 
are accredited to TPDC who enters agreements with interested investors on behalf of the 
government.104 TPDC also has an advisory role; it advises the government on matters relating 
to the hydrocarbon industry.105  
 
As observed in Chapter 2 and 4, the major challenge with developing nations lies in ensuring 
that national oil companies have the autonomy to perform their commercial functions and are 
held accountable. They are usually operated as an extended arm of government making hence 
not sufficiently held accountable by government oversight bodies. Chapter 7 analyses how 
Tanzania’s legal framework tackles this common problem.  
 
5.8.3.1.2  Regulation of Upstream Activities 
Having laid down the administrative provisions and established the various institutions, the Act 
provides for the governance of the hydrocarbon activities. It sets out the manner in which 
hydrocarbon operations are to be conducted and the mandate, duties, roles and functions of the 
various institutions and industry players. Part III of the Act, which governs upstream activities, 
provides for the management of petroleum areas and reconnaissance permits and the 
administration of upstream hydrocarbon rights, licences, and agreements.106 The provisions on 
cessation of upstream hydrocarbon operations are provided for under part V of the Act. The 
administration of these provisions rests with the Minister subject to advice from PURA.107 
Cabinet approves all agreements that the Minister upon advice from PURA enters with TPDC 
and its partners on behalf of government.108  Chapter 7 explores the implications of these 
provisions for both internal vertical and horizontal accountability.109 
 
The Petroleum Act also defines the obligations of licence holders and contractors. Among other 
things, it obliges the licence holders to undertake corporate social responsibility programs to 
                                               
103 Section 8 (3). 
104 Section 8 (1) and section 9 (2). 
105 Section 9 (1) (a). 
106 Sections 32- 127. 
107 Section 43 (2), 47 (1), 48 (3), 50 (5), 52 (1) among other such provisions under the Petroleum Act. 
108 Section 47 (2). 
109 Sub section 3 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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be agreed upon by respective local authorities and communities.110 The Act also obligates the 
licence holders to use of goods manufactured or available locally and of services rendered by 
Tanzanian companies.111 Licensees are also required to submit to the regulator a training and 
recruitment plan of Tanzanian citizens.112 Other obligations relate to work practices for licence 
holders, maintenance of property and survey of wells.113 Chapter 7 analyses how the licence 
holders and the contractors are held accountable over the fulfilment of these obligations. 
 
The Petroleum Act addresses the issues of surface rights and land users. It provides for 
compensation to surface right holders where such rights are disturbed by hydrocarbon 
activities;114 and for the protection against interference of other surface activities in sea during 
hydrocarbon operation such as fishing, navigation and other lawfully authorized activities.115 
Other provisions address grazing rights, cultivation rights and land development in 
hydrocarbon operation sites.116 These rights form the basis of the vertical relationship between 
the state and citizens and, to some extent, the horizontal relationship between citizens and 
private upstream actors. Chapter 7 analyses at how citizens can use these rights and other rights 
to hold the government and upstream actors accountable.  
 
Furthermore, the Petroleum Act provides for the management of hydrocarbon information and 
documentation. All data and information developed from hydrocarbon activities is owned by 
the government and placed under the custody of the upstream regulatory authority.117 The 
provisions on information touch on the availability of information to the public, the 
confidentiality of data, failure to provide information required information, among other 
things.118 These provisions are consistent with the EITI Standard recommendations and several 
                                               
110Section 222. 
111 Section 219. 
112 Section 220 (4). 
113 Part III sub-part V. 
114 Section 111. 
115 Section 110 (4). 
116 Section 110. 
117 Section 42. 
118 Part III sub-part IV. 
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international policy recommendations on access to information discussed in Chapter 4.119 
These provisions are discussed further in Chapter 6.   
 
The Petroleum Act also addresses health, safety, and environmental issues.120 Upstream health 
and safety matters are further addressed by the Occupational Health and Safety Act121 and other 
relevant related laws122  while environmental matters are addressed by the Environmental 
Management Act. 123  The National Environment Management Council is in charge of all 
relevant environmental clearance and permits. 124  Chapters 7 and 6 analyses how these 
provisions and the regulatory authorities facilitate greater accountability within the upstream 
sector.125  
 
The Petroleum Act is the first comprehensive piece of legislation governing the hydrocarbon 
sector in Tanzania. If implemented properly, it has potential to improve accountability in the 
hydrocarbon sector in Tanzania. However, its effective implementation is dependent in part on 
a number of other laws including those discussed below.  
 
5.8.2.2 The Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act, 2015 
The Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act (hereinafter the Hydrocarbons Revenue Act) 
mainly provides for fiscal rules and management of hydrocarbon revenues. In archiving this 
objective, the Act establishes the Oil and Gas Fund that consists of a Revenue Holding Account 
and a Revenue Saving Account held at the Bank of Tanzania.126 The Holding Account acts as 
a current account where revenue collection and distribution is done.127 The Savings Account 
                                               
119 Subsection 2.1.21 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
120 The act in Part VI provides for safety standards, safety precautions and emergency preparedness. It also 
provides for in Part VII for environmental provisions relating to compliance with environmental principles, 
pollution damage, liability of licence holder for pollution damage, liability for pollution damage caused without a 
licence, claiming of damages among other things.  
121 Act No. 5 of 2003. 
122 Section 199 (1). 
123 Section 208 (1). 
124 Section 17 (1) &18 of the Environmental Management Act. 
125 Subsection 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
126 Section 8 (1) & (2). 
127 Section 10 (3). 
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receives savings from the Holding Account.128 The Finance Minister is the administrator of the 
fund. 129  
 
The Hydrocarbons Revenue Act requires all collection, deposit, and disbursement of 
hydrocarbon revenues to be done in a transparent and accountable manner.130 The records of 
hydrocarbon revenues and expenditure in whatever form are to be simultaneously published by 
the Minister in the Gazette.131 The Act also requires all information required to be made public 
to be published online on the Government and Ministry of Finance website. 132  The 
Hydrocarbons Revenue Act subjects all records on hydrocarbon revenues and expenditure to 
National Assembly oversight.133  
 
These legislation provisions on revenue disclosure are quite commendable are consistent with 
the IMF guidelines on Resource Revenue Transparency as discussed in Chapter 4.134 Improper 
management of revenues from non-renewable resources particularly in developing countries is 
usually the source of under development and associated social ills. As discussed in Chapter 2 
and 4 transparency in hydrocarbon revenue is one way to mitigate the resource curse effects of 
corruption and related misfortunes. Chapter 6 analyses these provisions on hydrocarbon 
revenue disclosure taking into account the claw-back clauses in the Act and other contradictory 
legislation in the legal framework. The Chapter established the extent to which these provision 
guarantee transparency in hydrocarbon revenue information. Complementing the Petroleum 
Act and the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act is the Tanzania Extractive Industries 
(Transparency and Accountability) Act as described below.  
 
                                               
128 Section 10 (4). 
129 Section 4. 
130 Section 18 (1) & (2). 
131 Section 18 (4). 
132 Section 18 (5). 
133 Section 18 (6). 
134 Subsection 2.2.1.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
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5.8.2.3 The Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and 
Accountability) Act 2015(TEITA Act) 
The TEITA Act domesticates the global Extractive Industries Transparency and Accountability 
Initiative.135 This underscores Tanzania’s formal commitment to promoting transparent and 
accountable exploitation of non-renewable resources. The TEITA Act provides for the 
‘establishment of the Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Committee 
(hereinafter the Transparency Committee) for purposes of ensuring transparency and 
accountability in extractive industries and to provide for other related matters’.136 
 
The Transparency Committee is an independent government entity with oversight mandate 
over the extractive industry.137 It is composed of a chairperson and 15 multiple stakeholders; 
five from government, five from the extractive industry companies and five from civil society 
organizations.138 The main responsibility of the Transparency Committee is to ensure that 
‘benefits of the extractive industry are verified, duly accounted for, and prudently utilized’ for 
the benefit of Tanzanians.139 The provisions of the TEITA and the powers of the Transparency 
Committee are analyzed further and critiqued in Chapters 6 and 7.   
 
While the Petroleum Act, the Hydrocarbons Revenue Act, and the TEITA Act collectively 
constitute the main legal and institutional framework of the hydrocarbon industry, several other 
laws complement this legal framework. 
 
                                               
135 Refer to Sub section 5.4.2 of chapter 2 of this thesis on the Extractive industry transparency and accountability 
initiative.  
136 Preamble of the TEITA Act No. 16 of 2015. 
137 Section 4 (2). 
138 Section 5. 
139 Section 10 (1). 
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5.8.3  Ancillary Legislation140 
5.8.3.1 The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) 
Act, 2017 
The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act is a short piece of legislation 
with 13 sections that seeks to ensure the protection of the national interest in the exploration of 
natural resources. The Act was passed by National Assembly in July 2017. It is applicable only 
in Tanzania Main land. The Act is implemented and overseen by the Minister responsible for 
constitutional affairs.     
 
The Act reiterates the constitutional provision on national sovereignty over natural resources.141 
Unlike the Petroleum Act where natural resources are vested in the republic to be managed by 
the government as trustee, the Sovereignty Act vests all natural wealth and resources in the 
President on behalf of the people.142 However, it prohibits the exploitation of natural resources 
except for the benefit of the people of Tanzania.143 Section 7 of the Act specifically requires 
that all exploitation of natural resources should ‘guarantee returns’ towards the development of 
the national economy. 
 
Particularly notable in the Sovereignty Act are provisions promoting the participation of the 
people and the government in the exploitation of natural resources,144 requiring the government 
to hold an equitable stake in all natural resource ventures and providing for the opportunity for 
                                               
140 Other laws that have a bearing on the hydrocarbon upstream operations are not discussed in this chapter but 
may be discussed in the analysis as would be necessary. Such legislation include: the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 2003 which provides the promotion, co-ordination, administration and enforcement of occupational 
safety and health standards; Laws pertaining to anti-corruption including the Prevention and Combating of 
Corruption Act 2007; Laws relating to access to land and compensation including The Land Acquisition Act 1967 
and the Local Government(District Authorities) Act 1982; Bank of Tanzania Act 2006; Foreign Exchange Control 
Act; Insurance Act 2009; Companies Act (Cap 212 2002); Fair Competition Act 2003; Tanzania Investment Act 
(Cap 38 [R: E] 2002); Standards Act 2009; Merchant Shipping Act 2003; Income Tax Act 2004 as amended;  The 
Value Added Tax Act 2014; The Stamp Duty Act 1975 and the East African Community Customs Management 
Act 2004. 
141 Section 4 & 5 (1). 
142 Section 5 (2). 
143 Section 6. 
144 Section 6. 
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any person to acquire stakes in natural resources ventures.145 The participation of citizens 
requires access to information and transparency in hydrocarbon operation. Section 11 of the 
Sovereignty Act prohibits the institution of proceedings concerning the exploitation of natural 
resources in Tanzania in a foreign court or tribunal. All proceedings related to natural resources 
are instead expected to be determined by Tanzanian courts and in accordance with national 
laws. The Sovereignty Act also provides for National Assembly review of all exploitation 
arrangements under section 12 of the Act. These provisions are discussed further in Chapters 6 
and 7.  
 
5.8.3.2 The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and 
Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act, 2017 ("Unconscionable 
Terms Act") 
The Unconscionable Terms Act, applicable only in Tanzania Mainland, regulates to contracts 
on natural resource concluded before the Act was enacted. It therefore has retrospective effect. 
Its aim is to identifying natural resource agreements with ‘unconscionable terms’ so that they 
can be re-negotiated in order to remove such terms or terminate such agreements.146 The Act 
defines ‘unconscionable terms’ as including terms that restrict the right of the state to ‘exercise 
full permanent sovereignty over the country's natural resources’, and terms that restrict 
government’s control over foreign investors that are ‘inequitable and onerous’. The Act also 
prohibits agreements that permit the use of foreign courts and tribunals as a means of settling 
disputes.147 It also provides for the National Assembly review of all agreements on natural 
resources to identify the ones that are unconscionable or have unconscionable terms so that the 
government can renegotiate them.148  
 
Chapter 7 of the thesis considers the implications of these provisions for National Assembly 
oversight and dispute resolution involving multinational corporations and international law.  
 
                                               
145 Section 8. 
146 Preamble of the Act No. 6 of 2017. 
147 Section 6. 
148 Section 5 (3). 
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5.8.3.3 Environmental Management Act, 2004 
The Environmental Management Act is the principal legislation governing environmental 
affairs of the country.149 The Act vests the management of all environmental affairs in the 
Minister responsible for the environment. 150  The Minister is assisted by the National 
Environmental Advisory Committee established under the Act.151 The Environmental Act also 
establishes the National Environment Management Council (NEMC), which exercises general 
supervision and coordination over all matters relating to the environment.152   
 
The Environmental Management Act enshrines key environmental principles such as the 
polluter pays principle, the precautionary principle and the principle of sustainable 
development. 153  The Act makes it mandatory for all extractive operations including 
hydrocarbon projects to undertake an environmental impact assessment before they can be 
implemented.154 Additionally, specific Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations address 
hydrocarbon exploration and extraction. 155  National Environment Management Council 
(NEMC) oversees all environmental impact assessment and other environmental clearance 
assessments.156 The power to issue any environmental clearance and licence for hydrocarbon 
projects is vested in the Minister. 157  The Act also requires the Minister responsible for 
hydrocarbons to conduct a strategic environmental assessment upon the discovery of such 
resources.158   
 
5.7.4.4 The Access to Information Act 2016 
The Access to Information Act provides for access to information by the public and for the 
transparency and accountability of information holders.159  It applies to all public authorities 
                                               
149 Act No. 20 of 2004. 
150 Section 13. 
151 Section 11. 
152 Section 17 (1) 
153 See Part II of the Act.  
154 Section 81. 
155 Environmental Impact Assessment and Audit Regulations of 2005. 
156 Section 17 (1) &18. 
157 Section 13. 
158 Section 105. 
159 Preamble of Act No. 6 of 2016. 
Chapter 5: 
-109 -  
 
and to private bodies that use public funds or are in possession of information of significant 
public interest.160  This Act is discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
5.8.4  International Law 
Ratification of International treaties and conventions by Tanzania makes the ratified legal 
instruments part of the country’s law upon domestication. According to Article 63(3) e of the 
Constitution, the National Assembly is required to deliberate and ratify any international 
instrument that Tanzania is party to.161 Upon ratification, if the legal instrument is domesticated 
by parliament legislation, it will then form part of the law. However, Tanzanian courts use 
international treaties and customary international law in interpreting domestic legislation. For 
instance, in Director of Public Prosecution v. Daudi Pete,162 the Court of Appeal interpreted 
the bill of rights by taking into account provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.  
 
The applicability in Tanzania of international legal instruments relating to the governance of 
the extractive industry including human rights treaties, anti-corruption treaties and treaties on 
environmental and maritime matters will be discussed in chapter 6 and 7. The Chapters will 
also explore how Tanzania could learn from international standards and best practice. 
 
5.9  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry is noticeably young. This does 
not mean that other natural resources have not been exploited for a long time. For example, 
before Tanzania was colonized, the customary laws of the respective tribes governed natural 
resources across the country. Under the communal system that prevailed then, the various tribes 
and communities generally used natural resources such as land and water for the common good. 
However, during the colonial era, natural resources were explored and extracted for the benefit 
of the colonial governments, which did not consider themselves accountable to the colonized. 
 
                                               
160 Section 2 (2). 
161 Article 63 (3) (e) of the Tanzania Constitution 1977. 
162 DPP v. Daudi Pete [1993] TLR 22(CA) 34. On the use of international law in the interpretation of domestic 
legislation, see e.g. Republic v. Mbushuu Alias Dominic Mnyaroje and Kalai Sangula [1994] TLR 146(HC) 156; 
Attorney General V. Rev Christopher Mtikila [1995] TLR 31 (HC). 
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Upon gaining independence in 1961, the law was changed to provide that all natural resource 
wealth now vested in the people of Tanganyika to be governed and exploited for their benefit. 
The early independence constitutional framework did not, however, clearly recognize 
accountable governance. Under President Nyerere, the government operated without checks. 
Parliament under the 1962 Constitution had no power or political will to censure the executive. 
The Constitution did not have a bill of rights; neither did it recognize the right of access to 
information. Most government information was classified, and the National Security Act 
prohibited disclosure of information by government officials. Due to President Nyerere’s policy 
of zero exploration, no exploitation of hydrocarbons took place during this period.  
 
In the late 1970s, Tanzania reconsidered its policy of zero exploitation of resources. This move 
led to the enactment, in 1980, of the first Petroleum Act, which gave the responsible minister 
extensive discretion in making all industry decision. In a context of lack of transparency and 
insufficient checks on the executive, the Minister’s vast powers were only subject to oversight 
by the President. In 1977, multiple constitutional amendments were made which introduced 
elements of accountability, such as the separation of power and the bill of rights. The new 
Constitution afforded citizens opportunities of holding the government accountable.  
 
Until recently, Tanzania did not have a comprehensive legal framework governing the 
hydrocarbon industry. It is also clear that the 2015 legal framework on hydrocarbons has made 
efforts not only to provide for sufficient regulation of the industry but also to support the 
transparency and accountability initiatives in the industry by ensuring the integration of the 
same in its policies and laws. The current legal framework, unlike the 1980 Act, extensively 
provides for the regulation of industry activities and for transparency and accountability. 
Notable in this framework is the specific provision for a special oversight transparency and 
accountability committee. The question remains to what extent the current law incorporates the 
aspects of transparency and accountability to be able to facilitate transparent and accountable 
practice in the governance of hydrocarbon resources. The next two chapters address this 
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CHAPTER 6 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING 
HYDROCARBON RESOURCES IN TANZANIA 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
As established in Chapter 3, public administration and governance function best in a context 
where transparency and accountability principles are fully recognized and respected. Hence, 
the pursuit of greater efficiency in the extractive industry informs the move in recent years by 
the global extractive industry towards promoting accountability and transparency.  As shown 
in Chapter 3, transparency in resource governance facilitates accountability and promotes good 
governance and sound decision making. The governance of hydrocarbon resources in 
developing countries such as Tanzania involves complex relationships including multinational 
players.  To ensure that all such players are held fully accountable, it is necessary that there be 
full transparency in the industry.  
 
This and the subsequent chapters aim at answering the question whether the legal framework 
governing the hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania fully recognizes the principles of 
accountability and transparency and establishes sufficient mechanisms to ensure that those 
principles are respected in practice. Chapter 3 identified the analytical tools for determining 
whether a legal framework establishes adequate accountability and transparency frameworks.  
This chapter focuses on transparency.  As has been shown in Chapters 3 and 4, a legal 
framework that fully embraces transparency must clearly protect the right of access to 
information, establish what type of information can be publicly disclosed or accessed, who is 
bound to provide access to information, who can seek access or is entitled to the information, 
lay down the procedures by which the right of access to information can be realized in practice. 
The legal framework must facilitate access to clear, reliable, timeous, and complete information 
by industry players, interested stakeholders and the public. Furthermore, it must provide for the 
duty of the state to enable the public to understand and make use of the information held by the 
state and other players. This chapter seeks to establish the extent to which these aspects are 
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In addressing the above, this chapter identifies and critically discusses the various transparency 
relationships in the governance of upstream hydrocarbon industry provided for under the law.  
As will become clear in the chapter, Tanzanian law establishes three main transparency 
relations: the relationship between the hydrocarbon resource owners and the trustee charged 
with the task of managing the resource; the resource managers and the resource development 
players; the resource owners and the resource development players.  The chapter investigates 
whether the law makes sufficient provision for transparency in these relationships in upstream 
hydrocarbon activities.   
 
6.2  OVERVIEW OF PRINCIPAL LAWS ADDRESSING 
TRANSPARENCY IN THE HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
The main laws addressing the question of transparency in the hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania 
are the Constitution, the Petroleum Act, the Tanzanian Extractive Industry Transparency and 
Accountability (TEITA) Act, the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act (Hydrocarbons 
Revenue Act) and the Access to Information Act.1 The Tanzanian Constitution recognizes the 
right of the people to seek information and to be informed at all times on matters that are of 
importance to them.2 Broadly construed, such matters of importance would include information 
on activities pertaining to the governance of natural resources.  
 
These Acts have taken commendable steps towards championing transparency in the industry. 
The Petroleum Act makes it mandatory for the regulatory authorities, the National Oil 
Company and the Minister to conduct all industry activities in a transparent manner.3 In doing 
this, the Petroleum Act codifies the international policy recommendations made by the 
Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
                                               
1 The Petroleum Act No.21 of 2015; the Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act 
No. 16 of 2015; Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act No. 22 of 2015 and the Access to Information Act  No. 6 
of 2016.  
2 Article 18 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
3 Section 13(1) (d), 31(1), 9(2) (f), 5(1) (f) also see Section 18(1) of the Oil and Gas Revenue Management Act 
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Guidelines discussed in Chapter 4.4 The Minister responsible for hydrocarbons is charged with 
the duty to ensure and sustain transparency in the industry.5 The National Oil Company (NOC) 
and the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA) are the main organs responsible for 
acquiring, analyzing, and disseminating information on issues relating to the hydrocarbon 
industry. 6  The TEITA Act establishes a Transparency and Accountability Committee 
responsible for overseeing and ensuring transparency as discussed in Chapter 5.7 
 
Essentially, these laws provide for both passive and limited proactive transparency in the 
various transparency relationships they establish.8   The sections below provide a detailed 
analysis of how transparency is enshrined and regulated in these relationships.  
 
6.3  VERTICAL TRANSPARENCY BETWEEN OWNER AND 
TRUSTEE OF TANZANIA’S HYDROCARBON RESOURCES 
As discussed in Chapter 3, vertical accountability applies where there are formal obligations 
on the accountee to give account to the accountor. 9  Transparency being an element of 
accountability, the term ‘vertical transparency’ is used in analyzing the transparency aspects in 
vertical accountability relationships, in this case, the relationship between the hydrocarbon 
resource owners and the government.  
 
As outlined in Chapter 5, in accordance with the Constitution, the Petroleum Act and the 
Natural Resources Act, hydrocarbon resources, like all other non-renewable extractive 
resources, belong to the people of Tanzania.10 The people have a constitutional right to monitor 
and protect their national resources for the benefit of the nation as a whole.11 These resources 
                                               
4 Subsection 2.1.2.1.2 and 2.1.2.1.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
5 Section 5(1) (f) of the Petroleum Act No. 21 of 2015. 
6 Section 12(2) (c), 9(2) (f), Section 88(1) and (5), 84(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
7 See subsection 7.3.3 Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
8 See subsection 2.1.2.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
9 Sub section 3.1.1 Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
10 Subsection 7.2 of Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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are vested in the state as the trustee of the people. Thus, the control of the nation’s natural 
resources is done through the medium of a trust in a democratically elected government.12  This 
is the first transparency and accountability relationship that the law establishes. This 
relationship involves the people as the owners of the resources and those entrusted with the 
public power and responsibility to protect and manage those resources. As owners of the 
resources, the people are the accountors and information seekers while the government, as the 
manager of the resources on people’s behalf is the accountee and information holder.  This 
section analyzes how the law defines this vertical transparency relationship and the mechanisms 
of enforcing such transparency. 
 
6.3.1  Proactive Transparency 
Proactive transparency, as noted in Chapter 3, refers to when the information holder or supplier 
makes the initiative of making information public voluntarily or pursuant to legislation.13  As 
regards the relationship between the public and the government, Tanzanian law provides for 
proactive transparency under the Petroleum Act, the Hydrocarbons Revenue Act, and the 
TEITA Act.  
 
6.3.1.1 Proactive Transparency under the Petroleum Act  
Proactive transparency as provided for under the Petroleum Act relates to information on 
graticulation of the earth’s surface and the constitution of blocks, on the assessment made to 
open an area for hydrocarbon activities and on the tendering processes of hydrocarbon 
agreements.14  Reference maps prepared for hydrocarbon sites are required to be deposited and 
made available to the public at the offices of PURA and on its website.15 Similarly, assessment 
reports on areas to be open for hydrocarbon activities are expected to be published by the 
Minister in the Gazette and on the website of the Ministry and PURA.16  
 
                                               
12 See subsection 2.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
13 Subsection 5.2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
14 See Section 32(7), 33(9) and 48 (1) & (2). 
15 Section 32(7) of the Petroleum Act. 
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However, section 33(9) of the Act reads; ‘The Minister shall publish the decision in the Gazette, 
website of the Ministry and PURA or in any other manner as the Minister may determine’. This 
provision suggests that the Minister has discretion to choose the mode of publication.  To ensure 
transparency, it is important that, at the very least, the law require the publication to be in one 
of the formal means by which the government publishes its policies and laws, and the 
publication has wide circulation to the public. International policy recommendations call for 
states to have publication schemes for proactively disclosed information. 17  To ensure 
transparency and avoid misuse of power, publication schemes are required to be known to the 
public and be approved by a body responsible for monitoring information disclosure and access 
to information.18  
 
The Act also makes provision for proactive transparency in relation to tendering processes.  It 
provides that hydrocarbon agreements ‘shall [only] be entered into after a transparent and 
competitive public tendering process’ has been completed.19 The Minister is obliged to publish 
an invitation to tender or intention to initiate direct negotiation with a particular stakeholder in 
a newspaper with wide circulation.20 While this is a noteworthy development consistent with 
best practice,21 the Petroleum Act does not regulate the tendering process, leaving the issue to 
be addressed via regulations promulgated by the responsible Minister.22 At the time of writing, 
regulations addressing hydrocarbon-tendering processes were yet to be promulgated.  The only 
regulations promulgated under the Petroleum Act are those on local content.23  In addition, no 
new licences have been issued in Tanzania Mainland since the 2015 Petroleum Act came into 
force.  
 
                                               
17 Section 65(1) (b) and 65(4) and (5) of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa and Section 9 and 10 
of the Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information. See Subsection 2.1.2.1 of Chapter 4 of this 
thesis. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Section 48(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
20 Section 48(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
21 See Subsection 2.1.2.1.2 and 2.1.2.1.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
22 See section 48(4) of the Petroleum Act. 
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Provisions requiring the disclosure of information on the declaration of hydrocarbon discovery 
and the revocation of the discovered blocks are another form of proactive transparency under 
the Act.  The Minister is required to publish in the Gazette all declared ‘location’ blocks upon 
a discovery or the revocation of the discovered and declared blocks as stipulated under section 
64 and 77 of the Petroleum Act. The rest of the information on the hydrocarbon industry as 
provided for under the Petroleum Act falls under passive transparency as discussed below.  
 
6.3.1.2 Proactive Transparency under the Oil and Gas Revenue 
Management Act 
The provisions of the Oil and Gas Revenues Management Act (hereinafter the Hydrocarbons 
Revenue Act) requiring information on hydrocarbon revenue management to be published 
constitute an instance of proactive transparency.  Section 18(4) of the Hydrocarbons Revenue 
Act states that ‘oil and gas revenues and expenditure in whatever form, shall simultaneously be 
published by the Minister in the Gazette’.  Subsection (5) adds that ‘information required to be 
made public shall also be published online on the website of the Government and Ministry of 
Finance’.  These provisions are the most commendable provisions providing effectively for 
transparency consistent with EITI Standards and IMF Guidelines on Natural Resource Revenue 
Transparency.24 The requirement to publish revenue records assures the public of timeous and 
reliable information. Furthermore, the additional requirement to publish the information online 
enables easier access by the public and interested stakeholders than publishing in the Gazette.25   
 
What is missing from the Act is an explicit indication of the regularity by which information 
on the revenues and expenditure of hydrocarbon revenues is required to be so published.  It is 
unclear whether the information on revenue and expenditure that needs to be published refers 
to the quarterly reports on the performance of the Oil and Gas Fund from the Board and 
Governor of the Bank submitted to the responsible Minister, or the records on oil and gas 
                                               
24 Subsection 2.1.2.1.2 and 2.1.2.1.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis 
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revenue and expenditure compiled by the collecting authorities in accordance with section 
18(3) of the Revenue Act or both.26  
 
This problem is compounded by the fact that while section 15 of the Revenue Act requires the 
Auditor General to audit the quarterly reports, it does not say whether such audited quarterly 
reports ought to be submitted to the Minister or published in anyway.  Similarly, section 20 of 
the Hydrocarbons Revenue Act that deals with the accounting and auditing of the Fund does 
not make any provisions with regard to the publication of revenue and expenditure reports.    
 
One may consider section 18(4) to refer to the requirement of publication of information on 
hydrocarbon revenue records as compiled by the collecting authorities.  Even so, the published 
tax annual reports are aggregated reports, which do not give any insight on the industry’s 
revenue performance.27 Additionally, the audited reports are published annually and are only 
considered public documents after they have been tabled before the National Assembly.28 
Revenue collection information, it must be underlined, is not public information.29 Section 12 
of the Tax Administration Act provides that information and documents on taxpayers and any 
other information obtained during the fulfilment of tax laws ‘must be treated with secrecy and 
not published or disclosed to unauthorized person’.30 
 
While section 22 of the Hydrocarbon Revenue Act provides that the Hydrocarbon Revenue Act 
is to prevail in case of inconsistency with other laws, the application of section 22 under section 
18(4) of the Hydrocarbon Revenue Act as it relates with other laws on disclosure of revenues 
                                               
26 Section 18(3) refers to the respective laws pertaining to tax collection, audit, and disbursement of government 
funds. 
27 See, Tanzania Revenue Annual Report 2014 – 2015 available at 
http://www.tra.go.tz/images/uploads/AnnualReport2014-2015.pdf (accessed in September 2018); Tax Statistics 
Report 2015/16(Tanzania Main Land) - Tanzania National Bureau of Statistics available at 
https://nbs.go.tz/nbs/takwimu/Tax/Tax_Statistics_Report%20_2015_16_Tanzania_Mainland.pdf accessed in 
September 2018. 
28 Section 39 of the Public Audit Act No. 11 2008.  
29 Section 12 of the Tax Administration Act No. 10 of 2015. 
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is complex. This complexity is raised by section 18(3), which clearly notes that the respective 
laws pertaining ‘to tax collection, audit, and disbursement of government funds shall apply in 
the collection, audit, and disbarment of government funds’.  This may be considered as 
inconsistency within the Hydrocarbon Revenue Act itself where publication is interpreted in 
the context of revenue reports as reported and published under the tax laws.  In order for section 
18(4) to be effective, the section ought to be explicit as what it means by ‘simultaneous 
publication of hydrocarbon revenue and expenditure’.  
 
6.3.1.3    Proactive Transparency under the TEITA Act 
The TEITA Act provides for proactive transparency by the Minister and hydrocarbon 
companies.  As outlined in Chapter 5, the Petroleum Act is to be read together with the TEITA 
Act whose main purpose is the establishment of the Extractive Industries (Transparency and 
Accountability) Committee (hereinafter the Transparency Committee).  The purpose of the 
Transparency Committee is to ensure transparency and accountability in the extractive industry.  
Accordingly, through the Transparency Committee, the Act provides for proactive transparency 
by the Minister and hydrocarbon companies on three major information categories. The first is 
on information pertaining to contracts, licences and other resource access information; the 
second is about information on stock and revenue; and the third is information from the 
reconciliation reports of the Transparency Committee as discussed below. 
 
On information concerning the access of resources, section 16(1) of the TEITA Act obliges the 
government, through the Transparency Committee, to publish extractive resource information.  
It   provides : ‘the Committee shall cause the Minister to publish in the website or through a 
media which is widely accessible all concessions, contracts, licenses’ relating to extractive 
industry companies and ‘names of shareholders owing interest in the companies’.  The 
Committee is also required to ‘cause the Minister’ to publish environmental management plans 
of extractive industry companies. 31  While section 16(1) codifies proactive information 
disclosure, it is unclear what ‘to cause the Minister to publish’ means and how the Committee 
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could fulfil this obligation.  One may question whether the duty to publish lies with the Minister 
or the Committee. This provision is inconsistent with Requirement 2 of the EITI Standard 2016 
under which the TEITA Act is modelled after. Under the Requirement 2.1, the obligation to 
disclose information is mandatory and lies solely with the state. 
 
Since its establishment in 2015,32 the Transparency Committee has not succeeded to ‘cause the 
Minister’ to publish hydrocarbon information as required under section16 (1).  According to 
the 2016 reconciliation report published in March 2018 commissioned by the Transparency 
Committee, the Ministry  of  Energy  ‘does not  maintain an up-to-date  contacts  database  of  
the extractive  companies  in  Tanzania’.33  The report also indicates that ‘the Petroleum 
Upstream Regulatory Authority(PURA) does not have a proper petroleum register, which 
contains the licence information set out  in Requirement 2.3 of the EITI such as name of licence 
holders, coordinates, and date of application’.34  At the time of writing, PURA did not have a 
functioning website and the Transparency Committee did not report on the measures it had 
taken to cause the Minister to comply with the TEITA Act.   
 
According to the 2017 Transparency Committee report, the Minister communicated his 
intention to publish the required information on the Ministry’s website to the hydrocarbon 
companies.35 British   Gas   and   Statoil,   replied,   observing   the   ‘need   to   protect 
proprietary information’ before the disclosures of the agreements are made.36   The Minister is 
yet to publish any PSA agreements or information required under section 16(1) on its website.  
                                               
32  Before the enactment of the TEITA Act, the Transparency Committee was in operation as an entity 
implementing the global EITI. (See chapter 2) The TEITI was founded in 2009 honouring the government’s 
commitment in implementing the global EITI initiative by disclosing company payments and government receipts 
of taxes and revenues from the extractive sector. 
33 Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Final Report for the Period 1July 2015 to 30June, 2016, 
58-59, available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TANZANIA-EITI-2015-2016-FINAL-
REPORT.pdf (accessed in September 2018).  
34 Ibid. 
35  TEITI, Annual Progress Report January- December 2017 at 6, available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-
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There are however three hydrocarbon companies in support of the EITI initiative that have 
published their agreements in the online extractive resource contracts website.37 
 
With regard to stock information, section 16(2) requires extractive companies to ‘report or 
submit all information’ relating to extractive activities that they would ‘report or submit to their 
local or foreign stock exchange’ to the Transparency Committee.  The Committee is also 
equipped with powers to obtain any information regarding all extractive industry activities from 
all industry players.38   
 
While these provisions provide for proactive transparency, the Transparency Committee is not 
compelled to publish all reports or information it may receive. This is so because the 
Transparency Committee is mandated to disseminate information, as ‘it may consider 
necessary’.39 There is thus no guarantee that all information reported by the companies to the 
Committee would be published.  Apart from the TEITI annual reports, the Transparency 
Committee has not published any hydrocarbon company reports or information to date. The 
Committee recently uploaded a list of active hydrocarbon licences that indicates the name of 
company, the type of licence, date awarded duration and operating area.40 The TEITA Act 
could borrow a leaf from Ghana’s EITI provisions. Ghana better provides for the publication 
of company information and any other information obtained by the GEITI Committee by 
making it mandatory for the GEITI Committee to publish such information.41  Both in Ghana 
and Nigeria, EITI committees have websites on which such information is published. These 
                                               
37  See  PSA agreements with Pan African Energy, ExxonMobil, and Statoil, available at 
http://resourcecontracts.org/countries/tz (accessed on 20 January 2019). 
38 Section10 (2) (b), (c), (e) of the TEITA Act No. 16 of 2015.  
39 Section10 (2) (h) of the TEITA Act. 
40  TEITI, Active PSAs/Licenses (Exploration & Development), available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/Active-PSAs-Licenses-Exploration-Development.pdf (accessed in June 2018). 
41 Rule 3(h) of the Rules of Procedure for the Ghana Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (Gheiti) Multi-
Stakeholder Group (Msg) of 2010. It reads: ‘Publish the reports of all audits, investigations and/or reconciliations 
conducted pursuant to this Act and to disseminate such reports through widely accessible media, including but not 
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websites are up-to-date and contain hydrocarbon and mining agreements.  The Ghanaian one 
also includes a section on company reports.42  
 
Regarding revenue reconciliation reports, section 17(5) of the TEITA requires ‘reconciliation 
reports on government revenues to be submitted to the Transparency Committee by the 
independent administrator for consideration and publication’.  Although the requirement for 
publication provides for proactive transparency, the provision does not set out the time limit 
for the consideration period nor the manner in which the reports ought to be published.  Similar 
provisions are also made under section 18 (1) requiring the Committee to ‘submit the reports 
to the Minister for consideration and publication’.  The Transparency Committee has so far 
published only one reconciliation report on its website. The reconciliation report published 
covers the period of July 2015- June 2016 and was posted in March 2018.  The consideration 
period before publication by the Transparency Committee appears to have been more than a 
year and does not fit the transparency definition of timely publication. 43  A review of 
publications made by the Transparency Committee in their website suggests a pattern of undue 
delay in publication. For example, the Transparency Committee published 2011-2014 reports 
only in January 2017 and those of 2015-2016 in March 2018.44  
 
6.3.1.3.1 Transparency and the Mandate of the Oversight Transparency 
Committee 
Notwithstanding the above short falls, the TEITA Act still has the potential of enhancing 
transparency if the Transparency Committee implemented the existing provisions of the Act.  
One of the functions of the Committee is to develop a framework for transparency and 
accountability in the reporting and disclosure by companies of the revenue they pay to the 
government.45  This mandate gives the Committee an opportunity to improve the state of 
transparency in the extractive industry. The Committee could develop a framework that 
                                               
42  See http://www.gheiti.gov.gh/site/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=sections&Itemid=54 
(accessed in June 2018). 
43 See Section 4.2 of Chapter 3 and Section 2 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
44 See http://www.teiti.or.tz/?cat=6&paged=1 (accessed in September 2018).  
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compels companies to publish the revenue they have paid the government and other relevant 
financial information in a clear and easily understood language, on a widely circulated media 
and on their webpages.  At the time of writing, the Transparency Committee had not yet 
promulgated any reporting guidelines or format.  
 
Apart from creating guidelines, the Transparency Committee also has the power to ensure 
compliance of the TEITA Act by extractive industry stakeholders.  Section 23 of the TEITA 
Act makes it an offence to withhold information from the Committee or fail to adhere to 
publication requirements as stipulated under the Act. The Transparency Committee can 
therefore compel stakeholders to adhere to transparency provisions. However, it appears as if 
the Transparency Committee does not to make use of this policing authority.  According to the 
reconciliation report, it was observed that reporting stakeholders ‘were not readily willing to 
provide the data required for the production of the EITI Report’.46 Yet the Committee does not 
seem to have taken any measures to ensure such co-operation by stakeholders.  Unsurprisingly, 
the report also observed that a majority of industry stakeholders were not aware of the 
Transparency Committee and its functions.47 This observation seems to be consistent with 
those of many global initiatives.48 After over eight years of EITI implementation, one would 
expect the Transparency Committee to be well known by both the industry stakeholders and 
the citizens.  The Transparency Committee is obliged under section 10(d) and (i) to promote 
extractive industry awareness and transparency among stakeholders and citizens.    
 
It can be concluded that the mandate given to the Transparency Committee and the provisions 
in the TEITA Act on proactive transparency give hope of improved transparency in the sector.  
However, the TEITA Act codifies proactive transparency only in relation to revenue disclosure 
                                               
46 Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Final Report for the Period July 1 2015 to June 30, 2016, 
at 59, available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TANZANIA-EITI-2015-2016-FINAL-
REPORT.pdf (accessed in September 2018). 
47 Ibid, at 57. 
48 L David-Barrett and K. Okamura, ‘The Transparency Paradox: Why do Corrupt Countries Join EITI’, (2013) 
Working Paper No. 38, European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building at 6; A. Gillies, 
‘Reputational Concerns and the Emergence of Oil Sector Transparency as an International Norm’, (2010) 54(1) 
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of payment made to government. It does not cover transparency in other industry processes 
such as the granting of licences. The mandate afforded to the Transparency Committee is also 
limited to extractive companies and not the government. Although there is already a revenue 
reporting system, the framework developed by the Transparency Committee could be more 
specific to ensure timeous publication of revenue reports to the public.  In this aspect, Tanzania 
could borrow from similar disclosure requirements in other jurisdictions such as Canada, the 
EU and even the USA49 where companies registered in their jurisdictions are required to 
disclose annually to the public specific payments made to all governments.  Such payments 
include bonuses, dividends, government fees, infrastructure improvement, production 
entitlements, royalties, and taxes.50   
 
6.3.2  Passive Transparency under the Legal Framework 
Passive transparency relates to information that may be accessed by an information seeker from 
the information holder upon request.51  In this case, the public from the government may request 
information on hydrocarbon activities. The legal framework makes provision for passive 
transparency under the Constitution, the Petroleum Act, and the Access to Information Act. 
This subsection evaluates the nature of the information catered for by passive transparency 
under the law and critiques the way the law provides for access to such information. It raises 
the question whether the law as is currently conceived makes adequate provision for easy and 
timeous access to reliable information.  
 
6.3.2.1 Right to Hydrocarbon Industry Information 
The Petroleum Act gives the public the right of access to information pertaining to the industry 
held by the regulatory authority.52 Section 84(6) of the Petroleum Act reads: ‘any person may 
request access to information in the Petroleum Registry, and the information registered shall be 
                                               
49 See subsection 3.2.5, Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
50 Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act 2015 of Canada, The EU Accounting Directives; Article 41(4) 
the Directive 2013/34/EU and Section 1504 on Disclosure of payments by resource extraction issuers of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010.  
51 Subsection 5.1 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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public except as otherwise provided by law’. At the same time, the Access to Information Act 
confers the same right to any Tanzanian national with respect to access information held by any 
public authority or private body.53  These provisions give effect to the Constitution, which 
recognises the right to receive and access information by citizens.54 As outlined in chapter 5, 
the Regulatory Authority is the holder of the hydrocarbon industry information and has the 
responsibility of disseminating such information to the public.55 
 
The right of access to hydrocarbon information is however subject to approval and fees as 
provided for under the Petroleum Act and complemented by the Access to Information Act.56 
Section 91(1) of the Petroleum Act reads: ‘PURA may, with a written approval of the Minister, 
make available to the public’ hydrocarbon industry information.’  Information referred to in 
section 91(1) (a)-(d)  includes details of all agreements, licences, permits and any amendments 
to the licences, permits or agreements whether valid or terminated; details of exemptions, 
variations or suspensions of conditions of licence and permit; approved development plans; and 
all assignments and other approved arrangements in respect of a licence or permit.  Section 
91(2) states that access to information is provided upon payment of prescribed fees. 
 
At the time of writing, no regulations had been promulgated concerning access to hydrocarbon 
industry information or prescribing the applicable fees.57 Both the Access to Information Act 
and the Petroleum Act are silent on the regulation of fees and do not give any directives.  
Section 21 of the Access to Information Act states that ‘the information holder … may charge 
fees for recovering actual costs of production of the requested information.’  Charging fees for 
access to information is a normal practice in most countries.58 However, it has been argued that 
such fees ‘should not be such as to constitute an unreasonable impediment to access to 
                                               
53 Section 5(1) of the Access to Information Act No.6 of 2016 passed in September 2016.  
54 Article 18(d) of the Tanzania Constitution 1977. 
55 Section 12(2) (C) of the Petroleum Act. 
56 Section 91(1) and (2) of the Petroleum Act and section 21 of the Access to Information Act No. 
57 The Access to information Act requires the information holder in this case the Minister and PURA to determine 
the fees for access to information.  
58 M. Daruwala, Open Sesame: Looking for the Right to Information in the Commonwealth: CHRI's 2003 report; 
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information’.59 Experiences from other countries show that the amount of fees affects the level 
of access to information by the people.60 In many law income countries, the applicable fees are 
set without regard to the financial capacity of the majority of the population.61 Access to 
information law in countries like South Africa have addressed this problem by giving the 
Minister the mandate to exempt certain groups of people or certain information categories from 
the prescribed fees.62 No such arrangement has been made in Tanzania.  
 
Another impediment to accessing information related to the hydrocarbon industry is the 
requirement in section 91(1) that access to information must be given upon ‘the written 
approval of the Minister’.  According to section 84(6) of the Petroleum Act information 
received under section 91(1) of the same Act is ‘public except as otherwise provided by law’.  
It is therefore questionable why access to such information should be provided only when the 
Minister approves in writing. Apart from the bureaucratic hurdles that arise from vesting such 
a power in a senior government position like that of a Minster, the law does not provide 
guidelines on the manner in which ministerial approval is to be acquired. 
 
As observed in Chapter 4, the trend in the hydrocarbon industry worldwide is to proactively 
make information including that on contracts and licences public. Over 72 countries 
implementing the EITI, including new gas producing countries like Mozambique, publish 
contract and licence details.63  Such information provides the citizens the much-needed tools 
of assessing government’s commitment to accountable governance as far as its hydrocarbon 
revenue and environmental commitments, among other things, are concerned. 
 
                                               
59  Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34 Freedom of Opinion and Expression 
CCPR/C/GC/34/CRP.4 at 7.2010.  
60 Daruwala, supra note 48 at 42. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Sections 22 (8) and 92 of the Promotion of Access to Information Act No. 2 of 2000. 
63 EITI, ‘Progress Report 2017: Ending Company Anonymity – The Key to Fighting Corruption’, available at 
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Section 91(1) is also inconsistent with the provisions of the TEITA Act as regards proactive 
transparency. The provisions on proactive transparency require the Minister to publish 
hydrocarbon industry information including agreements and other hydrocarbon company 
information.  Since the TEITA Act requires such information to be published by the Minister, 
there is thus no need for ministerial consent.  The inconsistency in the legislation may explain 
the lack of compliance and poor adherence to the provisions of the TEITA Act by the 
government institutions highlighted above. 
 
6.3.2.2 Accessing Hydrocarbon Industry Information 
Passive transparency is triggered by the request of information by the information seeker. For 
there to be passive transparency, there has to be clear provisions on the procedures taken in 
accessing the information.  Part III (b) of the Access to Information Act of 2016 lays down the 
procedure for accessing information.  These procedures are largely consistent with international 
best practices.64  Section 10 of the Access to Information Act permits the use of hard or 
electronic correspondence in making information requests. It also requires the ‘information 
holders’ to offer appropriate assistance to illiterate or disabled requestors. 65  There is no 
application fees charged for information requests.  Section 21 provides for fees for the ‘actual 
costs’ of information production.  The response time for furnishing information is a maximum 
of 30 days.66  
 
Upon a request, the ‘information holder’ notifies the seeker ‘whether the information exists, 
and if it does, whether access to the information or a part thereof shall be given’.67  Where 
access is granted, the information holder must ‘promptly’ give the applicant the required 
information.68 Where access to information is denied, the information holder is required to give 
reasons for the refusal including ‘the specific provisions of the Act’ relied upon and the ‘factors 
                                               
64 See Subsection 2.1.2.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
65 Section 10(4) of the Access to Information Act No. 6 of 2016. 
66 Section 11(1) of the Access to Information Act No. 6 of 2016. 
67 Section 11(1) (a) of the Access to Information Act  No. 6 of 2016. 
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taken in consideration in relation to public interest’.69  Where the information requested is held 
by ‘another holder’, the holder should ‘transfer the request to such other holder’ within 7 days 
and notify the seeker of such transfer.70 The access to Information Act also gives a number of 
reasonable grounds on which access to information may not be granted. These include reasons 
related to the protection of national interests or security, legally privileged information, and 
personal privacy.71  
 
Although the Act appears to be well developed, several factors undermine access to information 
and significantly impede transparency. These factors may be divided into major and minor 
concerns.  The major concerns relate to the primacy of the Access to Information Act, the lack 
of an independent commission to determine access to information matters, the lack of redress 
for information applicants, severe penalties for wrongful disclosure, no penalties for denial of 
access to information, and broad exemptions to disclosure of information.  The minor concerns 
relate to the limitation of information seeks to Tanzanian citizens and natural persons, the 
possible abuse of the transfer of request procedure, and lack of guidelines regulating cost of 
production fees as highlighted earlier.  
 
6.3.2.2.1 Major Concerns Limiting Access to Information 
Firstly, contrary to best practice, the Access to Information Act does not supersede other pieces 
of legislation in the event of a conflict relating to information disclosure.  Section 5(2) of the 
Access to Information Act reads: ‘The information holder shall, subject to the provisions of 
section 6 and any other written laws, make available to the public or, on request, to any person, 
information which is under his control’. Section 6 lists the conditions under which information 
may not be disclosed.  Section 5(2) therefore clearly pre-empts primacy of the Information Act.  
Other laws that may expressly deny access to information override access to information 
provided for under the Access to Information Act.  Such law would include confidentiality 
provisions provided for under the Petroleum Act as shall be discussed further below.  According 
to international best practice and the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa, access 
                                               
69 Section 14 (a) and (b) of the Access to Information. 
70 Section 13 (1) of the Access to Information Act. 
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to information laws are always to prevail in the event of legislative conflict.72 Tanzania could 
learn from such best practice, which includes examples from Latin America, America and other 
African countries such as Nigeria and Malawi.73   
 
Secondly, where access for information is denied or the prescribed fees are too high, the 
procedures for appeal present no viable remedy to the information applicant.  Contrary to best 
practice, Tanzania’s Access to Information Act does not provide for an independent body to 
adjudicate access to information disputes and does not permit applicants to seek judicial 
remedies.  According to section 19(1), an aggrieved information seeker ‘may appeal to the head 
of the [respective] institution’ of which the request was lodged.74  The head of the institution 
reviews the appeal in consideration of ‘its own laid down procedures … within 30 days’ from 
the day of appeal.75  Where a party is aggrieved by the decision, he/she ‘may within 30 days 
upon receiving such a decision appeal to the Minister [of Justice and Constitutional Affairs] 
whose decision shall be final’.76  The provisions do not permit any aggrieved party to seek 
judicial redress in court except where the ‘requested information is within the authority of an 
information holder who is under the Minister [of Justice]’.77  In such an event, ‘the Minister 
shall cease to be an appellate body and any aggrieved person may apply to the high court for 
review.’78   
 
                                               
72 Article 4 of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa of 2012, prepared by the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Right. 
73  See; H. J., Blanke & R. Perlingeiro, (Eds.) The Right of Access to Public Information: An International 
Comparative Legal Survey (Berlin: Springer 2018). The Latin Americans also have the Inter-American model law 
which is similar to the African model law and provides for primacy of the Access to Information Act under it 
article 4. See Model Inter-American Law on Access to Public Information (AG/RES. 2607 (XL-O/10) of 2010. 
See also section 6(1) of Malawi’s Access to Information Act and section 3 of Nigeria’s Freedom of Information 
Act of 2011. 
74 Section 19(1) of the Access to Information Act. 
75 Section 19(2) of the Access to Information Act. 
76 Section 19(3) of the Access to Information Act. 
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By denying access to ordinary courts via judicial review, the Act falls short of fully 
guaranteeing access to information.  These provisions have not yet been challenged in the courts 
of law on the basis that they violate the right of access to courts or a remedy.79 It therefore 
remains to be seen whether they will stand judicial scrutiny. Tanzania could learn from its East 
African neighbour Kenya that has established an impartial Commission on Administrative 
Justice to review decisions on access to information. 80  Decisions of the Administrative 
Commission are subject to appeal to the High Court.81 A similar practice obtains in Malawi, 
Uganda, Nigeria, and South Africa, where judicial redress is possible with respect to access to 
information decisions.82  
 
Thirdly, granting access to information may be deterred by severe penalties imposed on public 
officials upon disclosure of confidential or exempted information. This is due to the 
consequences of improper disclosure.  Section 6(6) of the Access to information Act reads: 
Any person who- 
(a) disclose exempt information, other than information relating to national security, commits an offence 
and shall, on conviction be liable to imprisonment for a term not less than three years but not exceeding 
five years. 
(b) discloses exempt information relating to national security, commits offence and the provisions of the 
National Security Act shall apply. 
 
Section 93(4) of the Petroleum Act also criminalizes disclosure of confidential hydrocarbon 
information.  It provides that ‘any person who contravenes the nondisclosure provisions under 
section 93 (1) and (3) commits an offence and shall be liable to a fine of not less than million 
shillings’.   
 
                                               
79 The denial of judicial redress is arguably unconstitutional as it is contrary to Article 13(6) (a) providing for 
access to justice and Article 30(3, 4) giving the High Court ‘original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter 
brought before it’ on infringement of rights. 
80 Section 14 of the Access to Information Act No. 31 of 2016, Kenya. 
81 Section 23(3). 
82 Section 49 of the Access to Information Act No. 13 of the Malawi laws 2017, Section 37 and 38 of the Access 
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These provisions inhibit access to information that is key for transparency.  Public actors may 
be forced to interpret narrowly the provisions of the Act to favour non-disclosure.  It is best 
practice and consistent with international policy recommendations for countries to criminalize 
the denial of requested information.83 Under the Tanzanian laws, offences only lean towards 
wrongful disclosure providing an incentive for non-disclosure by the information holder.  
Collectively, the factors discussed above inhibit access to information. Access to information 
is an essential pillar in attaining transparency as discussed in Chapter 3.  The law fails to 
guarantee the right to access information by provisions that favour government decisions on 
nondisclosure.  
 
6.3.2.2.2 Minor Concerns Limiting Access to Information 
The Access to Information Act limits access to information to only Tanzanian citizens and 
natural persons, which is contrary to international best practices.  Section 5(4) of the Access to 
information Act reads: ‘For purposes of this section, “person” means a citizen of the United 
Republic’.  This limitation considerably affects transparency.  As discussed in Chapter 2 and 
4, CSOs and research institutions play a significant role in enforcing transparency.  CSOs are 
better equipped with the capacity to analyze and interpret information for use by other 
stakeholders particularly citizens.  They play an important oversight role in monitoring natural 
resources that the public might not efficiently do.  Equally, foreign stakeholders play an 
important role in applying global political pressure where needed to combat corruption or 
enforce international standards.  By excluding such key stakeholders from the right of access 
to information, the Act falls short in guaranteeing transparency.  This limitation may however 
be easily addressed by a broad interpretation of the term ‘citizen’ to include legal persons, but 
this would still leave out interaction organizations. 
 
                                               
83 See provisions of various country laws on the following surveys. D. Banisar, ‘The Freedominfo. Org Global 
Survey: Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws around the World’ available at 
http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2004.pdf (accessed in September 2018). Also, see F.Diallo 
and C. Richard, (Eds.) Access to Information in Africa: Law, Culture, and Practice (Boston, Brill, 2013) Part III 
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The procedures governing access to information permit the transfer of a request made by one 
information holder to another.  Section 13 (1) of the Access to information Act provides that 
‘[w]here the information holder to which a request for information is made considers that 
another information holder is the appropriate holder of the information requested, [he or she 
may] transfer the request to such other information holder and give a written notice of the 
transfer to the person who made the request.’  The response period ‘shall’ apply to the new 
‘information holder with effect from the date on which the request is transferred’.84  This 
provision could create an unreasonably lengthy period in accessing information.  Institutions 
may potentially avoid information disclosure by passing on requests among themselves.  Best 
practice is that in the event of such a transfer, the response period is calculated from the day in 
which the information request was originally received. 85  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
transparency not only entails access to information but timely access to information.  Such 
provisions could impede transparency by delaying access to information.  In addition, 
Tanzania’s 30 days period of granting access to information is already longer than the 
recommended and widely adopted 21 or 14 days periods in the Modal Access to Information 
laws.  
 
6.3.2.3 Confidentiality Provisions   
The nature of information subject to passive transparency under the law is not clearly defined.  
As noted earlier, section 91 of the Petroleum Act directs the regulatory authority to make public 
all information pertaining to industry activities and players upon the approval of the Minister 
and payment of the prescribed fees. However, the same information is considered confidential 
in other provisions of the Act. According to section 92 (1) (a) and (b) of the Petroleum Act, all 
data submitted by licence and permit holders to the regulatory authority is confidential and 
‘shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party’.86 As an exception, such information may 
be disclosed where the disclosure is sanctioned by the licence or permit holder after a ‘written 
consent of the Minister’ or sanctioned by the regulator with ‘prior written consent of the license 
                                               
84 Section 13(2) of the Access to Information Act No. 6 of 2016. 
85 Section 17(4) (b) of the Model Law on Access to Information for Africa. 
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holder’.87 Section 92(3) of the Petroleum Act protects the confidentiality of data by allowing 
disclosure of hydrocarbon industry information only for government purposes, arbitration, or 
statistical records.  
 
Furthermore, section 93(1) of the Petroleum Act provides that ‘Information furnished or report 
submitted under this Act by a licence holder and permit holder shall not be disclosed to any 
person who is not PURA or an officer in the public service except with the consent of the 
licence holder or permit holder.’  However, according to section 93(2) (i), information may be 
disclosed ‘to ensure transparency and accountability under the relevant law’.   
 
Given these confidentiality provisions and those that criminalize information disclosure 
discussed earlier, it is unclear whether hydrocarbon industry information in Tanzania is public 
information or not.  Although the Act makes an exception that information may be disclosed 
for purposes of transparency, the confidentiality provisions impose serious restrictions on the 
scope of the right of access to information. They leave state authorities with a wide scope of 
interpretative discretion that could be used to frustrate efforts to enforce and uphold 
transparency.  
 
As noted above and in Chapter 4, the trend in the extractive industry is to eliminate 
confidentiality in the governance of the resources. In Tanzania, the contradiction in the law 
encourages non-disclosure of information. Moreover, the Act leaves the question of access to 
hydrocarbon information to the discretion of the Minister. As pointed out earlier, where the 
Minister denies access to information, his or her decision is final, which means that it may not 
be challenged before an impartial body or court of law. In view of all these factors, it is fair to 
argue that the Petroleum Act does not make hydrocarbon industry information easily 
accessible. It therefore hence fails one of the key tests for transparency. 
 
6.3.3  Accessibility of Public Information 
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Tanzanian law makes the publication of information in the government Gazette and the 
declaring of documents ‘public documents’ as the main channels of information disclosure and 
publication. This raises the question whether public documents and the government Gazette are 
easily accessible. 
 
The government Gazette is available at the government bookshop and on the government 
website.88 However, the Gazette is mainly known by lawyers and a few other professionals.  
The Gazette is not a widely circulated source of information in Tanzania. Although it is 
published on the government’s website, few Tanzanians have access to computers and the 
internet. Fewer Tanzanians have access to the government bookshop and can afford to pay a 
fee of one thousand Tanzanian shillings (Tshs.1000).  Access to the government bookshop is 
limited because there is only one government bookshop in the whole of the Tanzania coastal 
zone, one in the Northern Zone and one in the Lake Zone.  Most of the time the government 
bookshops are not sufficiently stocked.89    
 
The publications of the government gazette are equally not available timely.  For instance, in 
the case of the government gazette as available on the government website, there is a delay of 
6 to 7 months or even more.  Example after the publication of 29 January 2016, the next 
publication was posted on the website on 16 September 2016.  At the time of writing this 
particular section in December 2017, the last post on the website of the gazette was on 4 August 
2017.  
 
As for reports tabled before the National Assembly, they are regarded as public documents and 
subject to requests for access to information. The Clerk of the National Assembly is the 
custodian of all public documents and is responsible for facilitating access to it by members of 
parliament and the public.90  However, the National Assembly (Administration) Act does not 
compel the Clerk to publish these public documents.  While some of the reports tabled before 
the National Assembly are posted on the website of the National Assembly, this is not done 
                                               
88 See http://www.tanzania.go.tz/home/pages/12. 
89 Based on visits by the researcher to these bookshops. 
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consistently.  As a result, many reports and public documents remain unpublished.  For 
instance, at the time of writing, only eight National Assembly reports released between 2008 
to 2015 had been published.91  
  
 
6.4  TRANSPARENCY BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND 
HYDROCARBON COMPANIES AND OTHER INDUSTRY 
DEVELOPERS 
The transparency relationship between the government and hydrocarbon companies can take 
both vertical and horizontal forms. Where a contractual relationship is entered into between the 
companies and the state, such a relationship is private in nature and gives rise to horizontal 
accountability with either party having a contractual right to demand accountability from the 
other.  On the other hand, the state has the public duty to manage and regulate hydrocarbon 
activities.  In its capacity as the manager of hydrocarbon resources, its relationship with the 
hydrocarbon companies is vertical in nature.  Tanzanian law provides for both vertical and 
horizontal transparency to regulate the relationship between the government and hydrocarbon 
companies.  The nature of transparency recognized is both proactive and passive.  
6.4.1  Proactive and Passive Transparency in the Horizontal Transparency Relationship     
The Petroleum Act compels hydrocarbon companies to disclose information proactively to the 
regulatory authorities and Minister throughout the various stages of the upstream industry.92  
Companies disclose information pertaining to their general operations and financial status, 
ability to undertake and develop hydrocarbon projects, their company policies, for example, to 
the government.93  Similarly, government plans, policies, and strategies on the industry are 
available to the hydrocarbon companies seeking to invest in the country.  Companies and the 
government have a contractual obligation under the product sharing agreements or other 
agreements to disclose information to each other in fulfilment of their contractual duties.   
                                               
91 See http://www.parliament.go.tz/publication/reports (accessed 20 January 2019). 
92 Section 51(2), 46, 62, 57 of the Petroleum Act. 
93 Section 51(2), 46, 62, 57 of the Petroleum Act; Section 14 &15 of the TEITA Act No. 16 of 2015 among other 
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6.4.2  Passive Transparency in the Vertical Transparency Relationship 
The Petroleum Act mandates the Minister, the regulatory authority, the tax collector and the 
Transparency Committee to seek information from hydrocarbon companies including 
information pertaining to different stages of hydrocarbon activities from application of 
permits/licences, 94  tax collection, 95  oversight, 96  and other administrative matters. 97  The 
Petroleum Act and the TEITA Act state that any person who fails to comply with a request for 
the disclosure of such information commits an offence and is liable to a fine or imprisonment.98  
According to the Petroleum Act, a government authority may give a written notice to an 
identified holder of information to provide the information specified under the notice. 99  
Hydrocarbon companies are required to comply with the notice: if they do not, they would be 
committing an offence. 100 
 
The Petroleum Act does not only require  hydrocarbon companies to provide information: the 
Act also expects  any person believed to be capable of giving information or producing 
documents relating to exploration or development operations to provide the relevant 
information upon written request by relevant authorities.101  Where a person or authority refuses 
or fails to comply with a requirement to disclose information demanded by the government or 
‘knowingly or recklessly furnishes false information or misleading in a material particular 
commits an offence’,102  he or she is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment.103  
 
                                               
94 Section 49(1), of the Petroleum Act.  
95 Section 122 of the Petroleum Act. 
96 Section 10(1) (b), (c), (e) of the TEITA Act. 
97 Section 94 of the Petroleum Act No.21 of 2015 and other related laws such as the companies Act and Investment 
Act.  
98 Sections 95 and 123 of the Petroleum Act; section 24 of the TEITA Act. 
99 Sections 49(1), 65(3) and 94(1) of the Petroleum Act.  
100 Sections 49(1), 65(3) and 94(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
101 Sections 94(1) and 122(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
102 Section 15(3) of the TEITA Act ; section 95 and 123 of the Petroleum Act. 





-138 -  
 
The Petroleum Act also mandates government to conduct investigations, negotiations, or 
consultations with the various industry players to ensure the smooth administration of upstream 
activities.104   
 
In short, these provisions have potential to ensure that the government holds hydrocarbon 
companies accountable. With these provisions, the government has the legal authority to 
demand access to reliable and clear information relating to the upstream hydrocarbon activities. 
By imposing sanctions for failure to comply with requests for information or for furnishing 
false or misleading information, the law seeks to guarantee that information holders provide 
reliable information.  
  
6.5  TRANSPARENCY BETWEEN THE HYDROCARBON 
INDUSTRY COMPANIES AND THE PEOPLE 
Transparency between hydrocarbon companies and the people may be considered horizontal in 
nature as the people and companies are both private.  A direct transparency relationship 
between hydrocarbon companies and the people is established within the context of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and in environmental legislation.  In these two contexts, the law 
makes room for limited forms of proactive and passive transparency.  
 
Tanzania could have capitalized on guidelines on information disclosure for companies and 
compelled companies to disclosure information directly to the public. For instance, the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance, discussed in chapter 4, call for companies to ensure ‘timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company’.105   Domestic laws in the 
United States of America and some EU countries also compel companies to publish financial 
information.106   
                                               
104 Sections 49(2) (3) and 107 of the Petroleum Act. 
105 Principle V. of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.  Also, see Chapter III guideline (1) of the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
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Section 222 (4) (a) of the Petroleum Act merely mandates local authorities to  create by-laws 
that could compel companies to publish information on the implementation of agreed projects 
on CSR. It also requires licensed companies to prepare annual corporate social responsibility 
plans upon consultation and agreement with local authorities.107  The plans must take into 
consideration environmental, social, economic and cultural activities based on local 
government priorities of the host community.108 The local authorities are tasked with endorsing 
and overseeing the implementation of the respective plans.109 They are also supposed to prepare 
guidelines for corporate social responsibility within their localities and raise public awareness 
on hydrocarbon projects in their areas.110 The by-laws promulgated by the local authorities 
could promote proactive transparency by compelling companies to publish information on the 
implementation of the CSR plans.  
 
Apart from the Petroleum Act, local government legislation is also very clear on local 
participation and access to information in development projects.111 For instance, the Local 
Government (District Authorities) Act provides that where a scheme for development has been 
approved, the ward development committee has the obligation  to disseminate information  to 
all persons in the ward of the details of the scheme and of the date, time and place upon which 
and when people  can participate in it. 112  Communities can gain access to information 
pertaining to the various CSR projects conducted by companies in their communities by this 
one commendable mechanism.    
 
With regard to the environment, the process of conducting environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) for hydrocarbon projects requires companies to consult with the host local 
                                               
107 Section 222. 
108 Section 222(2), of the Petroleum Act. 
109 Section 222(4), of the Petroleum Act. 
110 Section 222(4), of the Petroleum Act. 
111 Section 33(1) & (2) of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No.7 of 1982. 
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communities. 113  The Environmental Act and the Environmental Impact Assessment and 
Auditing Regulations 114  give local communities hosting hydrocarbon projects access to 
information.115 All information pertaining to EIAs including project brief, terms of reference, 
reports of persons presiding at public hearings, decisions and any other information submitted 
to the Environmental Management Council is public information.116  The regulations clearly 
state that any person shall be given access to such information unless the information is 
exempted from public disclosure. 117  Proprietary information 118  or information considered 
detrimental to national security may also be exempted from public records as stipulated under 
regulation 39(2) and 40.  Though the provisions do not define what constitutes national security, 
the language of the Environmental Act as well as the regulations  is clear enough to prevent 
abuse, and hence to promote  participation of the communities in decisions relating to the 
environment.  
 
Despite these notable provisions, hydrocarbon companies and other industry players are not 
required by law to disclose any information on their actives directly to the public.  As noted 
earlier, hydrocarbon companies are only compelled to disclose certain information to the 
government or to the relevant state authorities, which may or may not relay the information to 
the public.  As observed in Chapter 4,119 where hydrocarbon companies are compelled by their 
countries of origin to disclose information, good practice suggests that such information should 
be accessible directly from company websites. Such direct access is essential for purposes of 
holding both the government and companies accountable. Information from companies helps 
citizens to check and verify the information provided by the government.  
                                               
113 Regulation 17 of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Auditing Regulations (GN No.349 of 2005). 
114 Ibid. 
115 Regulation 17 of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Auditing Regulations; sections 26, 27, 28 (3) and 
29 of the Environmental Management Act No. 
116 Regulation 39 of the Environmental Impact Assessment and Auditing Regulations. 
117 Regulation 40 . 
118 Regulation 3.  ‘Proprietary information’ means information relating to any manufacturing process, trade secret, 
trademark, copyright, patent, or formula protected by law in Mainland Tanzania or by any international treaty to 
which the United Republic is party. 
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6.6  THE STATE’S DUTY TO PROMOTE ACCESS TO 
HYDROCARBON INFORMATION 
For there to be transparency, information need not only be accessible: those who seek such 
information should be able to understand and make use of it.120 In Tanzania, the Petroleum Act 
and the TEITA Act require the public to be educated and encouraged to participate in the 
hydrocarbon industry.  The Transparency Committee is charged with the responsibility of 
promoting awareness about, and public participation in, the governance of extractive 
industries.121 The regulatory authority PURA is also responsible of promoting local content122 
and ensuring citizen participation in the upstream industry activities.123 In practical terms, this 
obligation entails conducting public awareness campaigns, holding stakeholders seminars to 
publishing simplified information on the industry and access to information procedures.  
 
In this regard, the Ministry has an Energy and Minerals News Bulletin where the public is 
informed about energy and mineral industry activities of the ministry. The Transparency 
Committee also conducts awareness raising workshops on disclosure of revenue receipts and 
CSR contribution at district level.124 The News Bulletin published by the Ministry is only 
available online and therefore accessible to those who have access to the Internet. So far, the 
Transparency committee has conducted a number of awareness rising workshops.  125  By 
contrast, PURA is yet to do the same. 
 
6.7  CONCLUSION 
                                               
120 See Section 7.1 of Chapter 3. 
121 Section 10(2) (i) of the TEITA Act. 
122 Local content refers to the building of local skills, and use of local labour and local manufacturing in extractive 
or other industries. For detailed information on local content see, S. Tordo et al., Local Content Policies in the Oil 
and Gas Sector (Washington: The World Bank, 2013). 
123 Section 12(2) (e) of the Petroleum Act.  
124  See TEITI, Operational TEITI Work Plan 2017-2018 available at http://www.teiti.or.tz/wp-
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Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal framework recognizes the value of transparency in the 
governance of the industry. This is traced from the recognition of the constitutional right of the 
people to seek information and be informed, to the principle industry legislation. As discussed 
above, the Petroleum Act makes it mandatory for the regulatory authorities, the national oil 
company, and the Minister to conduct all industry activities in a transparent manner. The 
Hydrocarbons Revenue Act, TEITA Act, and the Natural Resources Act provide similar 
provisions.  
 
The legal framework also sets out commendable provisions promoting transparency between 
the government and hydrocarbon companies. Hydrocarbon companies are compelled to 
disclose proactively all information pertaining to their upstream activities and similarly 
government plans, policies and strategies on the industry are available to the hydrocarbon 
companies. As elaborated in section 4 above, the law safeguards the government’s right to 
demand and easily access reliable, clear, and timely information from any person or body for 
the governance of the upstream activities.  
 
Section 3 of the Chapter ascertained that the law makes commendable efforts towards achieving 
transparency between the government and the public. The law makes an explicit requirement 
of hydrocarbon agreements to be entered into after a transparent and competitive public 
tendering process has been completed. The law requires hydrocarbon revenues and expenditure 
in whatever form, to be simultaneously published by the Minister in the Gazette, website of the 
Government and that of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Equally, section 5 above establishes that creditable steps are taken under the law to enforce 
transparency between the public and the hydrocarbon companies in as far as environmental 
issues, and corporate social responsibility projects are concerned. The local government 
authorities Acts are very clear of local participation and access to information on respective 
development projects. All information with regard to Environmental Impact Assessment is 
public information. However, these commendable steps taken to provide for transparency under 
the legal framework on hydrocarbons fall short of the required elements to facilitate 
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Contrary to best practice, the Tanzanian Access to Information Act, which provides for access 
to information procedures, is not prevalent in the event of conflicting legislation on information 
disclosure.  Confidentiality provisions provided for under the Petroleum Act or any other law 
prevail over the Access to Information Act.  Furthermore, where access to information is denied 
or where fees are charged too high, the procedures for appeal present no viable remedy to the 
information applicant. Contrary to best practice, Tanzania’s Access to Information Act does 
not provide for an independent body to entertain access to information matters and does not 
permit applicants to seek judicial remedies.  By denying access to ordinary courts via judicial 
review, the Act falls short of fully guaranteeing access to information.  The denial of judicial 
redress is also unconstitutional as it is contrary to Article 13(6) (a) providing for access to 
justice. 
 
The Legal frame work also makes a firm prohibition against disclosure of information furnished 
or reported under the laws to any person who is not the regulator or an officer in public service 
except with the consent of the licence or permit holder. Granting access to information may be 
deterred by severe penalties imposed on public officials upon disclosure of confidential or 
exempted information.  This is due to the consequences faced upon improper disclosure as 
compared to no consequences faced in the event of nondisclosure.  
 
The access to information procedures permit a transfer of request by one information holder to 
another which maybe prone to abuse as explained above.  Such provision could create an 
unreasonably lengthy period in accessing information.  Institutions may potentially avoid 
information disclosure by passing on requests among themselves.  This is mainly because time 
of the response period of the application is calculated from the date of transfer.  Best practice 
is that in the event of such a transfer, the response period is calculated from the day in which 
the information request was originally received.  Transparency not only entails access to 
information but timely access to information.  Such provisions impede transparency by 
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The Petroleum Act and the Access to Information Act leave the question of access to 
hydrocarbon information within the discretion of the Minister.  As discussed above, in the event 
that the Minister denies access to information, his decision may not be appealed before an 
impartial body or court of law. Consequently, the Petroleum Act does not make hydrocarbon 
industry information easily available hence fails to provide sufficiently for Transparency. 
 
Apart from the access to information procedures, the nature of information subject to passive 
transparency under the Petroleum Act is not clearly defined. Section 91 of the Petroleum Act 
directs the regulatory authority to make public all information pertaining to industry activities 
and players upon approval of the Minister and payment of prescribed fees.  The same 
information is considered confidential in subsequent provisions of the Act.  Section 93(2) (I) 
make an exception that information may be disclosed as ‘the requirement to ensure 
transparency and accountability under the relevant law’.  However, given the confidentiality 
provisions and the criminalization of information disclosure, it is unclear whether hydrocarbon 
industry information is public information or not.  The Act does not shed light on the criteria 
to be used in the application of the exemption.  It is unclear at what point the information shall 
be confidential and at what point it is disclosed for ‘the requirement to ensure transparency and 
accountability’.  The contradiction in the law encourages non-disclosure other than disclose of 
information. 
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that there is an implementation gap in publishing 
public information.  The Main media of publishing government information is through the 
government gazette and the government websites.  The gazette is not a widely circulated source 
of information and it is not available in a timely manner.  Equally, government websites are 
usually not up to date and do not timely release required information.  Public documents tabled 
before the National Assembly are also not easily accessible as they are subject to the access to 
information procedures as discussed above. 
 
The Petroleum Act and the TEITA Act do not compel the hydrocarbon companies to publish 
directly information to the public.  Even where the companies are required to furnish 
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such information except where it deems fit.  The committee is equally not compelled to publish 
its reports as explained above.  
 
Collectively, the above shortfalls fail to ensure fully the incorporation of accessibility of clear, 
reliable, and complete information by industry players, interested stakeholders, and the public 
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CHAPTER 7 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING 
HYDROCARBON RESOURCES IN TANZANIA 
 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
As argued in Chapter 3, for accountability and transparency to be institutionalized within the 
hydrocarbon industry, their principles must at the very least be incorporated in the legal and 
regulatory framework governing the industry. The aim of this chapter is to analyse how key 
aspects of accountability discussed in Chapter 3 are incorporated in the upstream hydrocarbons 
legal framework in Tanzania. These aspects of accountability in question include the 
establishment of accountability relations and their guiding principles, access to information, 
the accountor’s capacity to seek an explanation and justification, the accountor’s capacity to 
render judgement, consequences of the accountor’s judgement, and the adequacy of the 
mandate and independence of the accountor. 
 
The aspects of access to information and relevant guiding principles have already been explored 
in previous chapters. Specifically, Chapter 6 discussed the extent to which Tanzania’s legal 
framework embodies key aspects of transparency. It was shown that while Tanzania has made 
some notable efforts to codify the principle of transparency, not all aspects of transparency 
have been so recognised and legislated. Consequently, Tanzania’s hydrocarbons legal 
framework falls short on this important aspect of accountability. Chapter 5 discussed 
Tanzania’s upstream hydrocarbon legal framework which forms the guiding principles 
governing accountability in the industry. 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which Tanzanian law regulates various accountability 
relationships arising from the hydrocarbon industry and the adequacy of the mechanisms 
established to ensure that the accountees are held fully accountable by the accountors. Firstly, 
the chapter investigates how the law defines the various actors in these accountability 
relationships, that is, who are liable to an account, and by whom. Secondly, the chapter asks, 
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accountees are accountable to the accountors? Thirdly, the chapter considers the question 
whether the law gives the accountor the required independence and mandate to inquire and 
render judgement, and whether these mechanisms have the capacity to enforce their decisions. 
As the thesis is concerned with the industry as a whole, the chapter also addresses the question 
of the overall coherence and compatibility of the various accountability structures.  
 
The focus of the chapter is on accountability as it applies to the regulation of upstream activities 
of Tanzania’s hydrocarbons. For reasons related to feasibility, the chapter is not concerned with 
accountability for the management of revenues. The chapter first explores the accountability 
relationship between the hydrocarbon resource owners (the people) and the trustee 
(government). It then moves on to examine accountability in the governance and regulation of 
upstream hydrocarbon activities. In this regard, the chapter analyses the various institutions 
responsible for regulating upstream activities and the way they may be held accountable. Also 
discussed is how hydrocarbon companies are held accountable.  
 
7.2  VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN TANZANIA’S UPSTREAM 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY
This section analyses vertical accountability relationships that obtain where there are formal 
obligations on the accountee to give an account to the accountor1 such obligations may arise 
from a hierarchical relationship or the law.2 First, to be discussed is hierarchical accountability 
between citizens and the government, and within the government. For purposes of this study, 
as explained in Chapter 3, the term ‘external vertical accountability’ refers to the means by 
which citizens demand accountability from the government, 3  while ‘internal vertical 
accountability’ refers to hierarchical accountability mechanisms within a regulatory 
institution.4    
 
                                               




Chapter 7:  
 
 
-146 -  
 
7.2.1  External Vertical Accountability: Citizens and the Government 
As pointed out in Chapter 6, the first important accountability relationship that the law 
establishes in the hydrocarbon industry is that of the resource owners (the people) and the 
government.5 The state as a democratically elected trustee of the people is accountable to the 
people for the manner in which it manages the resources.6 Citizens as the accountors have a 
constitutional right to demand an account from their government for the management and 
regulation of the hydrocarbon resources. This external vertical accountability relationship is 
clearly established in the legal framework that also provides for political and legal 
implementation mechanisms. This section investigates whether these accountability 
mechanisms have been given sufficient independence and mandate to hold the government 
accountable and the extent to which they have succeeded in doing so.  
 
7.2.1.1 Political Accountability Mechanisms 
Usually, citizens hold governments to account directly or indirectly through their elected 
representatives in the National Assembly.7 This traditional political accountability mechanism 
is used to hold the government vertically accountable to its people.8 In Tanzania, both direct 
and indirect political accountability are derived from the Constitution.9  
 
7.2.1.1.1 Elections 
Direct political accountability is primarily achieved through elections where citizens are 
expected to evaluate and render judgement on policies and their implementation by government 
through their votes. 10  In the hydrocarbon industry, citizens may hold the government 
accountable through elections only where issues of poor management of the resources are raised 
in an election season. In Tanzania, the issue of corruption in the management of energy, 
                                               
5 Sections 3 of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
6 Article 8 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
7 Section 2.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Preamble of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
10 Article 21 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.    
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minerals and other natural resources usually features as a prominent campaign talking point.11 
However, the effectiveness of elections as an accountability mechanism in Tanzania’s 
hydrocarbon industry faces two major challenges. The first has to do with the predominance of 
the one-party system and the second with access to information. 
 
For a long time, Tanzania has remained a one-party state although the country has a multi-party 
political system. 12  The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has historically dominated 
national politics and the opposition has been weak.13 Only in 2015 did the country experience 
competitive elections.14 Even then, the strength of the opposition parties was restricted to urban 
areas, not in rural Tanzania.15 Notwithstanding the improved performance of the opposition in 
2015, CCM continues to dominate national politics with over 72 percent of the total seats in 
parliament.16 The numbers have continued to change over the last two years with opposition 
members of parliament defecting to CCM. 17  The predominance of CCM undermines the 
effectiveness of elections as an accountability mechanism.  
                                               
11  A. Anyimadu, ‘Politics and Development in Tanzania: Shifting the Status Quo’, (2016) available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/2016-03-politics-development-tanzania-
anyimadu.pdf (accessed in September 2018).  
12 M. Nyirabu, ‘The Multiparty Reform Process In Tanzania: The Dominance Of The Ruling Party’, (2002) 7(2) 
African Journal of Political Science 99-112 at 108; B. Mohamed & R. Whitehead, ‘Nurturing Legacies of the 
Past’, in R. Doorenspleet & L. Nijzink, (eds) One-Party Dominance in African Democracies (Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2013) at 93. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Commonwealth, ‘Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group Tanzania General Elections 25 October 2015’, 
at iv, available at 
http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/inline/2015%20Tanzania%20COG%20FINAL%20REPORT_PRI
NT.PDF (accessed in September 2018). 
15 F. Kimboy, ‘2015 Elections have Redrawn Political Map’, The Citizen (November 11, 2015) available at 
http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/magazine/politicalreforms/2015-elections-have-redrawn-political-map/1843776-
2951940-dorvd8/index.html (accessed in September 2018). 
16 Parliament, ‘Members of Parliament Composition’ available at http://www.parliament.go.tz/pages/compositon 
(accessed in September  2018).  
17I.Yamola & J.Lyimo, ‘Wabunge Tisa wa Ukawa Watajwa Kuhamia CCM’, Mwananchi (December 6, 2017), 
available at http://www.mwananchi.co.tz/habari/Wabunge-tisa-wa-Ukawa-watajwa-kuhamia-CCM/1597578-
4216628-efm46o/index.html (accessed in September 2018); The Guardian, ‘CCM Picks Ex-Opposition MPs 
Candidates for Parliamentary By-Elections’ (7 January 2018), available at 
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Compounding the problem of one-party dominance is the lack of access to information.18 As 
shown in Chapter 6, Tanzanian law does not make adequate provision for transparency in 
government decision making, which in turn serves as an impediment for citizens to hold 
government accountable fully and effectively.  
 
7.2.1.1.2  The National Assembly 
Tanzanians indirectly hold the government accountable through their political representatives 
in the National Assembly. The National Assembly’s mandate is generally derived from the 
Constitution.19 For the case of non-renewable natural resources such as hydrocarbons, the 
mandate is also provided for in the natural resources legislation.20 Article 63(2) - (3) of the 
Constitution gives the National Assembly oversight mandate on all affairs of government. The 
National Assembly ‘may’ interrogate and demand reports or seek an explanation and 
justification in respect of all government activities.21 Article 53(2) of the Constitution provides 
for collective responsibility of government before the National Assembly. It provides that: ‘All 
Ministers under the leadership of the Prime Minister are collectively responsible to the National 
Assembly for the execution of the affairs of the government’.22  
 
The Sovereignty Act and the Unconscionable Terms Act complement the general oversight 
mandate of the National Assembly. Both these Acts give oversight mandate to the National 
Assembly over agreements and arrangements relating to natural wealth including 
hydrocarbons. The two have a common provision, which reads: ‘All arrangements or 
agreements entailing extraction, exploitation or acquisition and use of natural wealth and 
resources may be reviewed by the National Assembly’. 23  This provision means that the 
                                               
https://www.ippmedia.com/en/news/ccm-picks-ex-opposition-mps-candidates-parliamentary-elections (accessed 
in September 2018).  
18 See Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
19 Article 63(2) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
20 The Natural Wealth and Resources Contracts (Review and Re-negotiation of Unconscionable Terms) Act No. 
6 of 2017 (Unconscionable Terms Act) & the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act No.5 
of 2017 (Permanent Sovereignty Act) 
21 Article 63(3) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
22 Article 53(2) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
23 Section 12 of the Permanent Sovereignty Act; section 4(1) of the Unconscionable Terms Act. 
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National Assembly can review hydrocarbon agreements whenever it deems fit. However, no 
procedures to govern such review have been promulgated. Not surprisingly, the National 
Assembly has not yet made any reviews of agreements relating to hydrocarbons.  
 
The National Assembly implements its oversight functions through its standing and ad hoc 
committees established by its Standing Orders. 24  National Assembly standing committees 
comprise sector committees including one on the energy and minerals sector and watchdog 
committees responsible for monitoring public accounts and investments.25 The committees 
have mandate to question and investigate all public institutions.26 The sector Committee on 
Energy and Minerals is responsible for reviewing all reports submitted to the National 
Assembly by the Minister responsible for hydrocarbons.27 The reviewed reports include those 
on budgets, performance reports, and proposed bills.28 The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
and the Public Investments Committee (PIC) are responsible for monitoring all government 
accounts and investments respectively.29 The two watchdog committees have a crosscutting 
mandate that extends to government accounts and investments in the hydrocarbon industry.30 
They review financial and investment reports tabled before the National Assembly.  
 
Upon completing their reviews, the committees table their reports before the National 
Assembly for deliberation and resolution. The reports of the committees are reviewed alongside 
the original reports tabled before the Assembly by the respective ministers. 31  The 
implementation of the National Assembly oversight mandate is dependent on its ability to 
withhold support for government policies and decisions or to censure the government. 
  
During presidency of Jakaya Kiwete (2008–2015), the National Assembly played a remarkably 
effective role in holding the executive accountable. National Assembly committees tackled 
                                               
24 Article 96 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
25 Kanuni ya 116 & 118. Kanuni Za Kudumu Za Bunge Toleo La Januari, 2016. (Parliament Regulations 2016). 
26 118. Kanuni Za Kudumu Za Bunge Toleo La Januari, 2016. (Parliament Regulations 2016). 
27Niongeza ya kanuni shemu ya pili no. (7)(1), Kanuni Za Kudumu Za Bunge Toleo La Januari, 2016. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Niongeza ya kanuni shemu ya nne no.(13,  Kanuni Za Kudumu Za Bunge Toleo La Januari, 2016 
30 Ibidi. 
31 Kanuni ya 37, Kanuni Za Kudumu Za Bunge Toleo La Januari, 2016. (Parliament Regulations 2016) 
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notorious scandals including some in the then Ministry of Energy and Minerals.32 For instance, 
in March 2014, PAC launched an investigation into suspicious withdrawals from an ‘escrow’ 
account co-owned by Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO), the national electricity 
supplier, and Independent Power Tanzania Limited (IPTL), a company contracted to provide 
emergency electricity during power shortages.33 PAC’s inquiry led to the resignation of the 
Energy Minister and the Attorney-General.34 The same inquiry resulted in the dismissal of the 
Minister for Land and a number of senior state officials.35 In 2008, the then Prime Minister was 
forced to resign due to allegations of irregular awarding of a contract to a USA-based energy 
company Richmond Development in 2006.36 With the exception of these and a few other 
notable examples, the National Assembly has generally failed to exercise its oversight functions 
over the executive and the government.  
  
Several factors prevent the National Assembly in Tanzania from fulfilling its role in practice.37 
The first has to do with the composition of the National Assembly; the second, with the manner 
in which members of Parliament are elected; the third, with the history of party supremacy;38 
and the fourth, with constitutional limitations. The Constitution expressly requires that all 
Member of Parliament (MP) belong to a political party.39 The nomination of all MPs for 
                                               
32 The Ministry in currently divided into two: The Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Minerals. 
33 Athuman Mtulya, ‘Tegeta Escrow Will Go down in History as a Major Scandal’, The Citizen (January 1, 2015) 
available at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/national/-Tegeta-escrow-will-go-down-in-history-as-a-major-
scandal-/1840392-2575094-oumj96z/index.html accessed in September 2018. Also see J.E. Nyang’ro, ESCROW: 
Politics and Energy in Tanzania (Nigeria, African World Press 2016).  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 The BBC, ‘Tanzania's Prime Minister Edward Lowassa has tendered His Resignation after being implicated in 
an Energy Deal Corruption Scandal’, Thursday 7 February 2008 available at 
http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7232141.stm accessed in August 
2018. 
37  See generallyNyirabu, supra note 13 at 107-09; A. Lawson and L. Rakner, ‘Understanding Patterns Of 
Accountability in Tanzania’,  Final Synthesis Report commissioned by the Governance Working Group of the 
Development Partners to Tanzania, Chr. Michelsen Institute (2005) at 34; G. Hyden, ‘Political Accountability in 
Africa: Is the Glass Half-full or Half-empty?’, Working Paper Series (6), Africa Power and Politics Programme 
(2010) at 10. 
38 See subsections 4 and 5 of Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
39 Article 67(1) b of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
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election is done through the respective political party structures.40 In the National Assembly, 
the political parties tend to put party interests before the peoples’ interests. This is particularly 
so with the ruling party in Tanzania that exercises considerable influence on the conduct of its 
MPs.41  
 
By practice, the ruling CCM, which has ruled the country since independence, designates the 
President of the country as the chairperson of the party. The President as chairperson of the 
party exerts great control and influence on party decisions, making it difficult for MPs to go 
against party decisions in the National Assembly. The extent to which the National Assembly 
fulfils its oversight function is thus dependent on the influence the party leader wields on his 
or her party. For example, under the presidency and party leadership of Jakaya Kikwete, who 
was considered liberal, the National Assembly was praised for its enthusiastic oversight 
function as evident above.42 On the contrary, the leadership of President Benjamin Mkapa saw 
weaker National Assembly oversight.43 Arguably, the current government of President John 
Magufuli has been subjected to the weakest National Assembly oversight. President Magufuli’s 
influence and control over the National Assembly has been a matter of public concern.44 MPs 
of his own political party have publicly complained of being threatened and coerced by 
intelligence officers for taking a different stance from that of the party.45  
 
                                               
40 Article 77 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
41 A. Lawson & L. Rakner, supra note 42 at 29. 
42S. Mwombela, ‘Tanzanian Citizens Assess the Performance of Parliament and Consider Its Responsibility for 
Legislation and Oversight’, Afro barometer Briefing Paper No. 133 (2014)  at 6-8  
43 V. Wang, ‘The Accountability Function of Parliament In New Democracies: Tanzanian Perspectives’, Chr. 
Michelsen Institute (CMI) Working Papers (2005) at 13; K. Hirschler & R Hofrueier, ‘Tanzania’, in A. Mehler et 
al, (ed) Africa Yearbook Volume 10: Politics, Economy and Society South of the Sahara In 2013 (BRILL: Boston, 
2014) 400-401. 
44 P. Nyanje, ‘Tanzania: Is Magufuli Plotting to Have Absolute Control?’ The Citizen, 17 February 2016; D. Page, 
‘Tanzania's Anti-Corruption Crusader Cracks Down on Opponents’, CNN News, November 7 2017, available at 
https://edition.cnn.com/2017/11/07/africa/magufuli-crackdown/index.html (accessed in September  2018); E. 
Kabendera, ‘Magufuli Dares CCM MPs to Impeach PM’, The East African, 20 March 2017, available at 
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Magufuli-riot-act-mps-impeach-prime-minister-Kassim-
Majaliwa/4552908-3857020-gskdprz/index.html (accessed in September 2018). 
45  See video clips of CCM MP Mohamad Bashe and Nape Nauye, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3-RVKDwNMQc (accessed in September 2018).   
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Executive dominance of the National Assembly is partly attributable to the Constitution. The 
National Assembly is composed of the elected constituent members; female members 
nominated by the political parties represented in the National Assembly based on proportional 
representation;46 five members elected by the Zanzibar House of Representatives from among 
its members; the Attorney-General; and not more than ten members appointed by the 
President.47 Consequently, apart from the party members, the President has control over the 
appointment of ten MPs.  
 
Article 46 A of the Constitution permits the National Assembly to impeach the President if of 
the position that he has ‘committed acts which generally violate the Constitution’. Such 
impeachable acts could include failure by the President to ensure that ‘the national   wealth   
and   heritage   are   harnessed, preserved and applied for the common good’.48 However, the 
President has the power under Article 90(2) (a) of the Constitution to dissolve the National 
Assembly. Additionally, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly if it refuses to 
‘approve’ government’s budget or declines to pass a motion that is of ‘fundamental importance 
to government policies’. 49  These provisions mean that impeachment of the President in 
Tanzania may not happen in practice.  
 
The upshot of this discussion is that while the law establishes an accountability relationship 
between the people and their government and puts in place political accountability mechanisms 
such as elections and the National Assembly, these mechanisms are limited by the one-party 
dominant political system, weak National Assembly oversight over the executive, the absence 
of strong opposition political parties, and lack access to information by citizens.  
 
7.2.1.2 Accountability through Legal Proceedings 
Accountability for the governance of hydrocarbon resources can be enforced via legal 
proceedings especially if constitutional and other legal rights have been violated or threatened. 
The Constitution guarantees citizens as beneficiaries of natural resources the right be informed 
                                               
46 Pursuant to Article 78 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
47 Article 62(2) and 66 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977.  
48 Article 9(c) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
49 Article 90(2) (b) & (d) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
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of the manner in which natural resources are managed.50 It also enshrines the ‘right and freedom 
to participate fully  in  the  process  leading  to  the  decision  on  matters  affecting their well-
being or the nation.51 Other relevant constitutional and legal rights recognized in Tanzania 
include the right to work,52 the right to property,53 and the right to a clean environment.54 
Article 30 (3) of the Constitution provides for enforceability of rights: it states that any person 
whose right is being violated to ‘institute proceedings for redress in the High Court’.  
 
The High Court has held that an action under Article 30(3) lies where a person’s right ‘has 
been, is being, or is likely to be contravened.’55 A petition under Article 30(3) need not show 
that one’s right has already been infringed. Citizens could therefore hold government 
accountable for hydrocarbon industry policy or laws that are likely to infringe their personal 
rights and those of the society collectively.  
 
While the courts in Tanzania have opened the possibility for public interest litigation, no such 
litigation has taken place in relation to legal issues arising from the hydrocarbon industry. 
Neither has there been public interest litigation to challenge the confidentiality of the 
agreements on the exploration of hydrocarbons. One possible explanation lies in the limitation 
that the Constitution places on the adjudication of disputes relating to the management and 
administration of natural resources.  Article 9(1) (c) enjoins the Government to ensure that 
‘national wealth and heritage are harnessed, preserved, and applied for the common good’.  
However, this article falls under a part of the Constitution that is not justiciable. Article 7(2) of 
the Constitution reads: ‘The provisions of this Part of this chapter are not enforceable by any 
court. No court shall be competent to determine the question whether or not any action or 
omission by any person or any court, or any law or judgement complies with the provisions of 
this Part of this chapter.’ It would appear therefore that Article 7 excludes the possibility of 
using public interest litigation to ensure that the government is held legally accountable for 
poor management of natural resources.  
                                               
50 Article 18(d) the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
51 Article 21(2) of the Constitution. 
52 Article 22 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
53 Article 24 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
54 Section 4 of the Environmental Management Act, Act No. 20 of 2004. 
55 Ibid. 
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This does not mean that there are no other legal means of holding the government and 
government officials accountable through the courts and other mechanisms. As noted earlier, 
where a decision of the government adversely affects the rights of an individual or group of 
them, recourse under the bill of rights is open in the courts. This possibility also exists via the 
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance as will be shown below. Individual 
government officials may also be held accountable for mismanagement of hydrocarbons 
through the criminal law including through prosecutions conducted by the Anti-Corruption 
Bureau.56 
 
7.2.1.2.1 Accountability through procedures of the Commission for Human 
Rights and Good Governance 
Citizens may also seek redress in court through CHRAGG57 in holding government and other 
stakeholders undertaking hydrocarbon activities accountable. CHRAGG has the mandate to 
receive allegations and complaints in the violation of human rights and to investigate matters 
involving the violation of principles of good governance.58 This mandate of CHRAGG is far-
reaching and commendably covers governance principles of transparency, participation, 
responsiveness among others. An aggrieved person or persons acting on their own behalf or on 
behalf of collective interests of a group or class of persons may lodge allegations or complaints 
before CHRAGG.59 CHRAGG has no mandate to pass any binding decision upon conducting 
its inquiry. It may, however, report the complaint and its findings to ‘the appropriate authority 
having control over’ the investigated matter.60 CHRAGG may also make recommendations to 
such authority of measures to be taken that would provide an effective settlement, remedy, or 
                                               
 
57 CHRAGG has had no commissioners since 2017 when the last Commissioners under Chairperson Bahame Tom 
Nyanduga completed its term. There is only a head-less Secretariat because the last Secretary to The Commission 
(Ms. Mary Massay) has also retired. 
58 This mandate of CHRAGG is stipulated under Article 130(1) b, c and f of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977 &. 
section 6(1) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act No. 7 of 2001. 
59 Section 15(1) (a) – (b) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act. 
60 Section 15(2) (b) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act. 
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redress. 61  It may also institute proceedings before the High Court and seek any remedy 
available in court.62  
 
Powers of CHRAGG are however not without limitations. Firstly, CHRAGG may not conduct 
any investigations or inquiry on the President.63 Secondly, pursuant to Article 130(3) of the 
Constitution, the President may give directive or orders to CHRAGG. CHRAGG is compelled 
to comply with presidential directives if ‘the President is satisfied that in respect of any matter 
or any state of affair, public interest and national security so requires’.64 The latter provision 
may easily lead to abuse and prejudice on the powers of CHRAGG. Being the custodian of 
Tanzania’s hydrocarbons the President’s directives may affect the impartiality and 
independence of CHRAGG as an accountor, particularly once complaints are against his 
government on matters he may wish to conceal from the public. Furthermore, the fact that the 
President appoints the commissioners of CHRAGG, CHRAGG’s independence required to 
conduct enquiries and hold government accountable may be impaired.65  
 
Although there is no reported presidential interference with the powers of CHRAGG, 
CHRAGG has failed to ensure that it receives corporation and compliance from government 
authorities.66  CHRAGG has also remained silent and looked on while the Executive has 
violated fundamental human rights. The Government of President Magufuli has been accused 
of conducting unprecedented human rights violation, disregard of the rule of law and the 
Constitution. 67  CHRAGG has made no inquiry or conducted an investigation or make 
                                               
61 Section 15(2) (c) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act. 
62 Section 15(3) of the Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance Act. 
63 Article 130(6) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977 CHRAGG may only exercise its powers on the President 
in accordance with the provisions of article 46 of the Constitution on impeachment.  
64 Article 130(3) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977and section 16 (4) of the Commission for Human Rights and 
Good Governance Act. 
65 See Article 129 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
66 E. T. Mallya, ‘Promoting the Effectiveness of Democracy Protection Institutions in Southern Africa: Tanzania's 
Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance’, EISA research Report No 40 (2009) at 18. 
67 A. France-Presse, ‘Tanzania Civil Society Decries “Unprecedented” Violations’ The East African, 22 February 
2018); H. Onyango, ‘Tanzania: Bishops Warn President Magufuli against Human Rights Violations’, 13 February 
2018, available at http://cisanewsafrica.com/tanzania-bishops-warn-President-magufuli-violation-human-rights/ 
(accessed in March 2018). K. Lutatinisibwa, ‘JPM Violated Katiba in Nominations’ the Citizen, 20 January, 2017. 
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declarations on the ongoing violations by the government. Furthermore, CHRAGG’s decisions 
on human rights violations and findings of their inquiries are not binding. They are mere 
recommendations to the responsible authorities unless taken to court.68  
 
While CHRAGG is a possible accountability implementation forum for citizens, its 
effectiveness has been called into question. CHRAGG may have the required mandate to 
inquire and   render judgement but its decisions are dependent on other enforcement bodies 
who do not enforce CHRAAG’s recommendations. Its independence is impaired by the control 
the President exercises over it via presidential directivities and appointment of members of 
CHRAGG. 
  
7.2.2  Internal Vertical Accountability within Government Institutions in 
the Upstream Hydrocarbon Management 
This section evaluates hierarchal accountability mechanisms within the hydrocarbon regulatory 
institutions. It maps out the institutions responsible for governing upstream hydrocarbon 
activities and the manner in which they hold each other accountable. It is noteworthy that the 
line between internal vertical accountability and horizontal accountability as shall be discussed 
below in subsection 3 is quite thin. There are times where in holding each other accountable, 
government institutions play both vertical and horizontal accountability roles. 69  To avoid 
repetition, the discussion on internal vertical accountability will be brief. The focus here will 
                                               
68Article 130(1) (e) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977 and Section 15(3) of the Commission for Human Rights 
and Good Governance Act, Act No. 7 of 2001. The Nyamuma case fortifies this position. In 2001, Nyamuma 
residents were evicted from their homes by the government following the government’s intention to extend a game 
reserve into the area the Nyamuma Village occupied. The Government did not compensate the villagers for their 
expropriated land. Consequently, 135 of the evicted villagers took their case to CHRAGG. In 2004, CHRGG 
recommended that the government compensate and resettle the villagers. The government rejected CHRGG’s 
recommendations. 
In 2006 a local NGO Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC) filed a petition against the government in the High 
Court (Land Division) in an effort to have the court enforce CHRAGG’s recommendations. The High Court (Land 
Division) found that it did not have the authority to enforce the CHRAGG’s recommendations. This finding was 
appealed by the LHRC to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. On 11 October 2008, The Court of Appeal of Tanzania 
held that the CHRAGG could enforce its recommendations by bringing an action before a court of competent 
jurisdiction. See the case of LHRC v Thomas Ole Sabaya and 4 Others, Civil Appeal No. 88 of 2006 (Court of 
Appeal at Dar es Salaam) 11 October 2008 (unreported).  
69 Chapter 3 subsection 4.1. 
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be only on hierarchical accountability of the principal industry regulatory institutions. A 
broader discussion on the accountability of upstream regulatory institutions will take place in 
the context of horizontal accountability. 
 
7.2.2.1 Hydrocarbon Upstream Governance Institutions 
There are four institutions and one advisory body responsible for governing Tanzania’s 
upstream hydrocarbon activities. Two of these are supervisory while the other two are 
responsible for the day-to-day governance and regulation of upstream industry activities. The 
supervisory institutions are the Office of the President and Cabinet while the governance and 
regulatory institutions are the Minister responsible for hydrocarbons and the Petroleum 
Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA). The advisory body is the Oil and Gas Advisory 
Bureau instituted in the Office of the President. The regulatory authorities do not work in 
isolation: other crosscutting sector regulatory authorities support them.70    
 
7.2.2.1.1 Supervisory and Advisory Institutions 
i) The President  
At the top of Tanzania’s hydrocarbon, governance pyramid is the President. Section 5 of the 
Natural Resources Sovereignty Act declares that the President holds all natural resources as a 
trustee for people.71 The Act amends Section 4 of the Petroleum Act, which vested hydrocarbon 
resources in the United Republic. This amendment places an onerous responsibility on the 
President to oversee the governance and management of natural resources including 
hydrocarbons. The Act does not provide guidance on how the President should exercise his or 
her oversight functions. This is likely going to present significant accountability challenges in 
practice as explained further below.72  
 
ii) The Cabinet 
The second institution is the Cabinet of the United Republic. The Petroleum Act states that 
Cabinet has the responsibility for ensuring ‘strategic oversight and directions over the 
hydrocarbon economy’.73 The Petroleum Act gives Cabinet both policy and administrative 
                                               
70 See section 8 of Chapter Five and sections 3 below. 
71 The Permanent Sovereignty Act, No.5 of 2017 
72 Subsection 2.2.2 of this Chapter. 
73 Section 4(3) of the Petroleum Act. 
Chapter 7:  
 
 
-158 -  
 
functions. The Cabinet is responsible for approving all major sector decisions including the 
opening up of areas for hydrocarbon activities and for approving all sector agreements and 
licenses as presented by the Minister.74 Section 47(2) of the Petroleum Act provides that ‘the 
Minister on behalf of the Government shall not enter into an agreement without prior approval 
of the Cabinet’. The Cabinet is composed of the President, the Vice President, the President of 
Zanzibar and all Ministers plus the Attorney General who has no voting rights.75  
 
iii) OIL and Gas Advisory Bureau 
The OIL and Gas Advisory Bureau is the main advisory body of the sector.76 The Bureau is 
supposed to advise the Cabinet on matters pertaining to the sector, particularly on ‘strategic 
matters relating to the economy’. 77 The Bureau is expected to be constituted within the office 
of the President.78 At the time of writing, the Advisory Bureau had not been formed. Although 
the Bureau’s role is advisory and plays no accountability function, it is necessary to discuss 
how it might influence decision-making and therefore its potential impact on accountability. 
 
7.2.2.1.2 Governance and Regulatory Institutions 
i) Ministry responsible for Hydrocarbons 
As noted above, two institutions are responsible for the day-to-day management of the upstream 
hydrocarbon sector: namely, the Minister and PURA. The Minster is the custodian of the 
hydrocarbon sector. 79  As custodian the Minister is responsible for developing and 
implementing sector policies, plans, and strategic decisions including the issuing of licenses 
and entering agreements upon the advice of PURA and subject to the approval of Cabinet.80 
The Minister carries out the daily supervisory activities of the industry and reports to the 
Cabinet.  
 
However, there is some uncertainty regarding the Minister’s responsibility to seek guidance 
and directives of the Cabinet. Section 5(3) (a) of the Petroleum Act provides that ‘the Minister 
                                               
74 Section 5(3), 47(2) - (3), 48(3), 68(3) and 75(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
75 Article 54 of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
76 Section 7 of the Petroleum Act. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Section 5 of the Petroleum Act. 
80 Section 5(1), 5(3), 47(1) & (2) of the Petroleum Act. 
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shall, in respect of any strategic decisions on strategic petroleum investments, seek guidance 
and directives of the Cabinet’. Furthermore, the Act explicitly requires the Minister to seek the 
approval of Cabinet on matters pertaining to agreements, licences and opening up areas for 
hydrocarbon activities.81 However, with respect to other matters such as the reservation of 
blocks, the award of blocks to the National Company (TPDC) and the amendment of the second 
schedule on royalty, the Minister is empowered to make decisions on his own initiative or upon 
advice from PURA.82 A decision on reservation of blocks or the direct award of contracts to 
TPDC may be considered strategic yet no explicit requirement is made as compared to the other 
provisions on licensing.  
 
ii) The Petroleum Upstream Regulatory Authority (PURA) 
As already noted in Chapter 5, PURA is responsible for regulating and monitoring the upstream 
activities of the hydrocarbon sector.83 PURA is the main advisory body to the Minister on all 
upstream hydrocarbon activities84 including on all technical issues of the upstream industry.85 
PURA is a body corporate that has a Board that supervises its functions.86 The daily operations 
of PURA are done under the supervision of the Director General who is the secretary of the 
Board, who reports to, and receives directions from the Board.87 The Board is responsible for 
providing guidance to the Director General and all employees of PURA.88 Polices and decisions 
of PURA are thus made by the Board of PURA. 
 
7.2.2.2 Assessment of Internal Vertical Accountability 
For internal vertical accountability to be effective, the superior institution in the governance 
hierarchy must have clearly defined mandate and be able to enforce its decisions. 89  The 
hierarchy of institutions discussed above is multifaceted. It provides for both horizontal and 
                                               
81 See sections 33(1) & (10), 47(1) & (2), 48(3), 68(3) and 75(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
82 See sections 50(1), 50(4), 113(4) of the Petroleum Act. 
83 Section 11(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
84 Section 12(1) (a) of the Petroleum Act. 
85 Section 12(1) (b) of the Petroleum Act. 
86 Section 17(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
87 Section 23(1), 24(1) and (2) of the Petroleum Act. 
88 Section 18(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
89 Subsection 2.2 and 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
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vertical accountability within internal vertical accountability at the top structure of hydrocarbon 
governance.    
 
The Petroleum Act vests the control of the hydrocarbon sector under the command and 
leadership of Cabinet.90 Cabinet is given both policy and administrative functions. This gives 
Cabinet the mandate to hold the Minister as the supervisory regulator accountable. To the extent 
that the Minister must seek guidance and approval from Cabinet, the Minister is accountable to 
Cabinet. However, the Cabinet has no mandate to take any corrective action against the 
Minister. This mandate rests with the President. The Minister is in that sense horizontally 
accountable to Cabinet and vertically accountable to the President who is the appointing 
authority. In the implementation of his/her functions, the Minister is accountable to the 
President as the supervisory body of the sector and head of executive authority. The Cabinet is 
in turn accountable to the President as the supervisory body of the sector. PURA as the industry 
regulator is accountable to the Minister as the supervisory regulator of the daily operations of 
the industry. The effectiveness of this structure depends on the extent to which the various roles 
of the actors are able to distinguish between their policy-making functions from policy 
implementation functions.    
 
To the extent that the President and Cabinet are primarily responsible for policymaking, the 
constitutional principle of collectively accountability to parliament91 applies. As argued earlier, 
the effectiveness of the National Assembly as an accountability institution has varied from time 
to time, but overall, National Assembly oversight over the executive has been weak.  
 
The major weakness in the Tanzanian legal framework lies in the fact that the implementation 
functions of the hydrocarbon legislation and policy. Unlike in Ghana, for example, where they 
have placed the President as the supervisory organ of the sector responsible for approving sector 
decisions such as granting of licences subject to Parliament’s approval,92 under Tanzania’s 
Petroleum Act, Cabinet is responsible for approving key industry decisions at the same time 
the President who is also the Chair of Cabinet is given the overall supervisory power of the 
                                               
90 Section 4 of the Petroleum Act. 
91 Article 52 (3), Article 53(1) - (2) the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
92 Article 268 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992 read together with The Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act 2016 Act No.919 of Ghana. 
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sector. Naturally, the President’s overbearing mandate in the Tanzanian constitutional and 
political context undermines the role of Cabinet envisioned by the law as an implementation 
body. 
 
In Tanzania, the Minister responsible for hydrocarbons exercises oversight over PURA.93 As a 
law implementation body, PURA is established as an independent authority under the 
Petroleum Act. This independence is undermined by the power given to the Minister to 
supervise the petroleum industry and to develop and implement sector policies.94 In exercising 
this mandate, the Minister may seek justification from PURA for the manner in which it fulfils 
its legal obligations. The Minister may also institute inquiries into PURA and take necessary 
action such as removing the board members of PURA from office.95  
 
7.3  HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
This section discusses the oversight institutions that may enforce horizontal accountability in 
the hydrocarbon industry. Of particular interest is whether these institutions have the required 
independence and mandate to hold governance institutions and actors of the sector to account.  
 
7.3.1  Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) 
Committee 
The Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Committee (the 
Transparency Committee) was established to promote and enhance transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industry.96 It was established as an independent government 
entity with the responsibility of ensuring that benefits of the extractive industry are ‘verified, 
duly accounted for, and prudently utilised for the benefit of the citizens of Tanzania’.97 The 
Transparency Committee is composed of five government officials and ten representatives 
                                               
93 Section 14 of the Petroleum Act. 
 
95 See section 5(1) (m) of the Petroleum Act which mandates the minister to take any other functions related to 
petroleum production activities infilling functions assigned to him by the Act. . 
96 Section 4 of Tanzania Extractive Industries (Transparency and Accountability) Act No.23 of 2015.(hereinafter 
TEITA ACT)  
97 Section 10(1) of  the TEITA Act No.23 of 2015. 
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from companies and civil society organizations (CSOs) with equal representation. 98  The 
mandate of the Committee is limited to revenue disclosure by hydrocarbon companies and does 
not cover other key upstream regulation including licensing. 99  The oversight role of this 
Committee has already been discussed in Chapter 6.100 The focus here is on whether the 
Committee has sufficient mandate and independence to hold extractive industry regulators to 
account. The provisions of the Act suggest so.101 The noted provisions provide for horizontal 
accountability and have the potential of providing the much-needed check and balance in the 
governance of the extractive industry. Reports from the Transparency Committee as 
highlighted in Chapter 6102  could trigger political and judicial accountability enforcement 
measures. Political accountability would be through the National Assembly once its reports are 
tabled. Subsequent judicial accountability would take place where there is a possibility of 
criminal allegation. These would trigger an investigation from the Prevention and Combating 
of Corruption Bureau (the Bureau) or the Public Prosecutor. Since the institutionalization in 
2015 of the Transparency Committee, it has not tabled any reports before the National 
Assembly. The first chairperson of the Transparency Committee was appointed as recent as 
June 20, 2018.103 How well the Committee will function as an accountability body remains a 
question of future assessment. Nonetheless, institutionalised Extractive Industry Initiatives in 
countries like Nigeria, Mongolia, Liberia, and Kazakhstan have proven to be efficient 
accountability forums and have triggered substantive change in the management of their 
nation’s extractive resource governance.104  
 
7.3.2  The National Audit Office 
The National Audit Office of Tanzania headed by the Controller and Auditor General (CAG) 
is another significant oversight institution in the governance of hydrocarbons in Tanzania. 
                                               
98 Section 5 of the TEITA Act No.23 of 2015. 
99 Section 10(1) and (2) of the TEITA Act No.23 of 2015. 
100 Chapter subsection3.1.3. 
101 S.4 (2), 5, 6 & 7 of the TEITA Act No.23 of 2015. 
102 Section 3 of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
103 Ikulu, Taarifa Kwa Vyombo Vya Habari ya Juni 20 2018.  
104  See, Jonathan Ernst, ‘Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Results Profile’, (2013) World Bank 
available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/15/extractive-industries-transparency-initiative-
results-profile accessed in September 2018.   
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Section 28 of the Public Audit Act105 authorises the CAG to carry out performance audits for 
purposes of establishing the efficiency of any expenditure or use of resources in ministries, 
public authorities and other bodies owned by government. This is in addition to the financial 
audit mandate that the CAG has as stipulated under Article 143 of the Constitution. The CAG 
may investigate any public institution, interrogate its officers and review documents or take 
any measures necessary for conducting its functions.106 The CAG therefore has the capacity to 
hold all public institutions responsible for the governance and regulation of hydrocarbons to 
account.  
 
Upon conducting an audit, the CAG is supposed to submit its report to the National Assembly 
through the President. Pursuant to article 143(4) of the Constitution, the CAG submits the audit 
report to the President who shall table the same within seven days of the first sitting from the 
date of which he received the report to the National Assembly. Where the President does not 
table the report before the National Assembly, the CAG is required to submit the report to the 
Speaker of the National Assembly.107 In the exercise of his duty, the CAG is enjoined not to 
receive directions from any public office including the President.108 The CAG must conduct 
his/her affairs in accordance with the Constitution. The High Court is the only authority capable 
of giving directives to the CAG where it establishes that the CAG has not complied with the 
provisions of the Constitution.109  
 
Unlike other oversight bodies, the CAG is an independent body with its mandate duly protected 
by the Constitution. Although the President appoints the CAG,110 the President may not give 
any directives to the CAG or dismiss the CAG on his own accord. The CAG may vacate office 
upon attaining the retirement age.111 He may only be removed from office for inability to 
perform the functions of his office, misbehavior or for violating the ethics of the Public 
Leaders’ Code.112 Where the CAG is discharged from office for any of the latter reasons, the 
                                               
105 No. 11 of 2008. 
106 Article 143(3) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977; Section 11(1) of the Public Audit Act. 
107 Article 143(4) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
108 Article 143(6) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
109 Article 143(6) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
110 Section 4 of the Public Audit Act No.11 of 2008. 
111 Article 144(1) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
112 Article 144(2) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
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President appoints a special tribunal to investigate the CAG and make a decision on whether or 
not he is to be discharged.113 The Chairman and half of the Tribunal members ‘must be persons 
who are or have been Judges of the High Court or Court of Appeal in Tanzania or any 
Commonwealth Country’.114  
 
Therefore, consistent with the required elements of accountability, the CAG has both the 
mandate and the needed independence to check all government actors. The CAG provides 
horizontal accountability in the governance system that is important for the much-needed 
checks and balances in public governance. The oversight function of the CAG is however a 
means to an end and has been referred to in Chapter 3 as redundant accountability. CAG reports 
subject the actors to political systems of accountability through the National Assembly or where 
offences have been committed; it acts as a trigger mechanism for other oversight institutions 
such as the anti-corruption bureau or the office of the prosecutor. The reports may also trigger 
internal vertical accountability within government institutions. Accordingly, the CAG is only 
effective when the enforcement organs duly carry out their functions. 
  
7.3.3  The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau 
The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (Bureau) is established by the Prevention 
and Combating of Corruption Act as the main anti-corruption body.115 The Bureau is composed 
of a Director General and a Deputy Director General, who are both presidential appointees,116 
and employees.117 The Bureau reports directly to the President and submits annual reports.118 
The National Assembly is responsible for appropriating the funds to the Bureau for its 
functions.119 The President has the power to appoint and fire the Directors of the Bureau as he 
thinks fit. The Act is silent about the tenure as well as dismissal of the Directors. The Bureau 
is a needed and important institution in ensuring accountability by checking corrupt practice 
and rent seeking behaviour in governance of hydrocarbon resources.  
                                               
113 Article 144(3) (b) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
114 Article 144(3) (a) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
115 Chapter 329 of the Laws of Tanzania (Revised Edition 2002). 
116 Section 6(2) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act (Revised Edition 2002). 
117 Section 6(2) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
118 Section 14 of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
119 Section 48(4) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
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The Bureau plays an important oversight role over public institutions including ministries and 
public corporations such as PURA and TPDC.120 The Bureau has the power to investigate and 
subject to the directions of public prosecution, prosecute offences involving corruption under 
the Corruption Act and any other written law.121 The Bureau may also investigate the conduct 
of any public official connected to corrupt allegations.122 The Corruption Act criminalizes a 
number of corrupt practices including the giving and receiving brides as provided for under 
section 15(1) (a) and (b). Officers of PURA, TPDC, and the Ministry including the Minister 
could thus be investigated and prosecuted over corrupt practices in the hydrocarbon sector. 
 
The Petroleum Act also combats corrupt practices by criminalizing the participating of public 
servant’s in hydrocarbon activities. It is an offence for officers involved in hydrocarbon 
governance ‘to acquire any form of interest or in any way participate in economic activities’ 
associated with the hydrocarbon industry.123 Similar provisions are provided for under the 
Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act124, which makes it a crime for public actors to ‘use public 
office for personal gains’ as well as misappropriating public funds.125 Public servants in the 
hydrocarbon sector including the Minister can thus be investigated and held accountable for 
various corrupt practices in the governance of hydrocarbons. Additionally, the newly 
introduced Corruption and Economic Crimes Division of the High Court is responsible for 
disposing of grand corruption cases.126 The division covers a number of offences including 
hydrocarbon sector offences as provided for in the First Schedule to the Economic and 
Organised Crime Control Act.127  
 
                                               
120 Section 7 of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
121 Section 7(e) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act. 
122 Section 7(f) (iii) of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act . 
123 Section 249 of the Petroleum Act. 
124 Chapter 398 of the Laws of Tanzania (Revised Edition 2002). 
125 Section 6(f)-(j) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act (Cap 398). 
126 Section 3 of the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, (Cap. 200) as amended by s 6 of the Written 
Laws (Miscellaneous Amendment) Act, No.6 of 2016. 
127 The First Schedule to the Economic and Organised Crime Control Act, as read together with Sections 239 and 
240 of the Petroleum Act and section 23 & 24 of the TEITA Act.  
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The Bureau thus provides for horizontal accountability in the governance of hydrocarbons and 
has sufficient powers to hold the Minister and other Pubic officers in the sector to account 
through legal accountability systems. However, contrary to best practice, the Bureau is not an 
independent body as its mandate could be interfered by an authoritarian and corrupt President 
with full control over the bureau as noted above and is the chief decision maker of the 
hydrocarbon industry.128 The law should provide for an independent anticorruption bureau that 
does not report to the executive to guarantee actual accountability. Tanzania could learn from 
comparative practice such as that of Kenya. Particularly on the manner in which Kenya’s Ethics 
and Anti-Corruption Commission is constituted. According to the Kenyan Constitution and the 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, the President selects a Selection Panel from a list 
of multi -stakeholder categories stipulated in the Act that includes religious leaders.129 The 
Selection Panel then conducts interviews of competent applicants and nominates qualifying 
applicants for appointment by the President subject to parliamentary approval. 130  Such a 
process guarantees the required independence to hold the executive members including the 
President accountable. 
 
7.3.4  Public Leaders’ Ethics Secretariat 
The Public Leaders’ Ethics Secretariat is another oversight body capable of checking the abuse 
of power in the governance of hydrocarbon resources. The Secretariat is instituted within the 
office of the President as an independent department pursuant to Article 132 of the Constitution. 
The role of the Ethics Secretariat is to inquire into the behaviour and conduct of any public 
leader for ensuring that the provisions of the law concerning the ethics of public leaders are 
complied with.131 The President appoints the Secretariat staff and the Ethics Commissioner 
who is equally a presidential appointee heads it. 132  The President may remove the 
                                               
128 See Subsection 2.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
129 Article 253 of the Kenyan Constitution and Section 6 of the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act No. 
22 of 2011 of the Kenyan Laws. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Article 132(1) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977. 
132 Section 18 of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
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Commissioner from office ‘for good cause’.133 The Commissioner to the President who tables 
the same before the National Assembly submits reports of the Secretariat’s affairs.134   
 
The Secretariat has the duty to receive and inquire into allegations and notifications of breach 
of the Ethics Code from members of the public.135 Members of the public may make written 
allegations to the Ethics Secretariat. 136  The Secretariat has the power to entertain such 
allegations in respect of any public leader.137 It has the power to initiate and to conduct any 
investigation in respect of breach of ethics prescribed under the Public Leadership Code of 
Ethics Act.138 The Act requires Public Leaders to fulfil their official duties and responsibilities 
by making decisions in accordance with law and in the public interest.139 They are to adhere to 
the code of ethics as stipulated under section 5-7 of the Act. Inquiries of the Ethics secretariat 
are addressed by the Ethics tribunal, which is established under section 7 of the Public 
Leadership Code of ethics Act as amended by section 26 of 2015 Act.140 
 
While thus far, there no matters reported to the tribunal directly relating to the hydrocarbons 
industry, the tribunal has entertained various matters relating to public corruption and miss use 
of office by senior government officials.141 This includes cases on the famous Tegeta Escrow 
saga cited above.142  The Secretariat has the ability of holding hydrocarbon sector regulators 
accountable over decisions that contravene the provisions of the Petroleum Act or any other 
written law regulating hydrocarbons. Unfortunately, the Secretariat’s mandate is likely to be 
effectively exercised over lower ranking officials other than the main decision makers in the 
Industry. The President appoints members of both the secretariat and tribunal and has the power 
to dismiss them as he thinks fit. Such powers leave the tribunal and the secretariat vulnerable 
                                               
133 Section 19 (2) (c) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
134 Section 22(8) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
135 Section 22(1) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
136 Section 22(1) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
137 Section 22(1) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
138 Section 22(2) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
139 Section 6(a) of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act No.5 of 2001. 
140 Section 26 of the Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act Cap 398 of 2015. 
141 The United Republic of Tanzania, President’s Office, Ethics Secretariat Strategic Plan 2013/14 to 2017/18 at 
6.   
142 Subsection 2 of this Chapter. 
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to presidential control. The Secretariat hence provides horizontal accountability in the 
governance of hydrocarbon resources but lacks required element of independence to provide 
sufficient accountability.  
 
The provisions of the law should provide for an Ethics Secretariat whose mandate would be 
independent from any influence of the executive members. Tanzania could learn from South 
Africa in the regard where its Public Service Commission is an independent body and ‘no 
person or organ of state may interfere with [its] functions’. 143  The Commission is also 
accountable to the National Assembly. 144Its members are appointed by the President but 
approved by the National Assembly and from persons nominated by the Premier of the 
Provinces.145   
 
7.3.5  The Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance 
(CHRAGG) 
CHRAGG is another institution that may enforce horizontal accountability in the hydrocarbons 
sector. The mandate and oversight functions of CHRAGG have been extensively discussed 
above. As with most of the oversight bodies discussed above, CHRAGG has the mandate to 
enforce horizontal accountability, but may lack required independence to enforce 
accountability sufficiently as discussed in subsection 2.1.2.1 above. 
  
From the above discussion on the various oversight institutions, it is apparent that most of the 
institutions do have the mandate to hold hydrocarbon industry regulatory actors to account but 
lack the sufficient independence to enforce their mandate impartially. This is contrary to 
international and regional policy recommendation as discussed in subsection 2.3 of Chapter 4. 
States are called upon to ensure that oversight organs are at liberty to carry out their functions 
effectively and without any undue influence.146 Horizontal accountability as discussed above 
triggers other accountability enforcement systems and depends on them to hold the governance 
authorities accountable. Such systems are through indirect political accountability by the 
                                               
143 Section 196(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No.108 of 1996. 
144 Section 196 (5) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No.108 of 1996. 
145Section 196 (7) & (8) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa No.108 of 1996. 
146 Subsection 2.3 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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National Assembly, judicial accountability through laws enforcement actors and internal 
vertical accountability through administrative action with the government authorities.  
 
7.3.6  Horizontal Accountability by Line Ministers and Related Regulatory 
Authorities 
Besides oversight institutions, line ministries such as the Ministry of Environment, Health, 
Natural Resources and Tourism and the Finance and Planning, play a horizontal accountability 
role in the governance of hydrocarbons. In regulating hydrocarbon activities, the Minister 
responsible for hydrocarbon affairs is required to ‘consult other relevant sectoral Ministries if 
a duty to be discharged is related to or potentially affect the functions of such other 
ministries’. 147  Such consultation provides room for horizontal accountability where other 
sectoral Ministers may ask the Minister for hydrocarbons to account for actions that he ought 
to have duly consulted them. This provides a check and balance system among the different 
sectoral ministries.  
 
Similarly, other regulatory authorities do play the same horizontal accountability role over 
crosscutting matters such as environmental matters, health, land compensation, and revenue 
collection. The Petroleum Act gives PURA the duty of ‘coordinating and cooperating with 
other government institutions, including other regulatory authorities responsible for 
monitoring, evaluation, and review of petroleum operations’. 148 This duty on PURA provides 
for horizontal accountability by other regulatory authorities who may question PURA’s actions 
in the event of lack of cooperation or due consultation.  
 
Despite giving PURA the duty to coordinate and cooperate with other regulatory authorities, 
there are some provisions of the Petroleum Act that give PURA extensive mandate on matters 
that fall within the responsibility of other authorities. For instance, the Petroleum Act gives 
PURA the responsibility to ensure that upstream hydrocarbon actors comply with 
environmental principles enshrined in the Environmental Act and any other written law.149 
Some provisions in the Act give PURA the power to approve requirements on the conservation 
                                               
147 Section 5(3) (b) of the Petroleum Act. 
148 Section 12(2) (g) of the Petroleum Act. 
149  Sections 65, 67,190, referring to PURA. Part VII (a) covers Compliance of Environmental Principles in 
Upstream Petroleum operations: the Petroleum Act. 
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and protection of the environment. For example, section 191 (c) reads; ‘…make provision, to 
the satisfaction of PURA, for the conservation and protection of the environment and natural 
resources in that area’. Although PURA is tasked with the duty to ensure coordination with 
other sectors, such mandate on environmental aspects creates duplicity in enforcing 
environmental accountability in the sector.  
 
The Minister responsible for environment is the main authority for environmental aspects.150 
The Environmental Management Act calls for the establishment of a Sector Environment 
Section (SES) in each sectoral Ministry.151 A designated sector environment coordinator heads 
the SES. 152  The Coordinator must be a person who possesses adequate knowledge in 
environmental management.153 The SES is responsible for ensuring the implementation of 
environmental principles and laws as per the Environmental Act and any other written laws.154 
It is the ‘coordination unit’ between the respective sector and the Ministry of Environment and 
all authorities responsible for environmental regulation.155 The SES office is responsible for 
submitting sectoral environmental reports to the Minister of Environment.156 By vesting any 
environmental enforcement or oversight obligation on PURA, the Act creates overlapping 
mandate between the SES office in the Ministry of Energy and PURA. For purposes of effective 
accountability, the Petroleum Act ought to have left the supervision of environmental aspects 
to the SES within the Ministry responsible for hydrocarbon Affairs. This would ensure 
coordination in environmental accountability of the hydrocarbon actors.  
 
Other provisions giving PURA extensive mandate include section 203, which provides for the 
requirement of safety zones in every hydrocarbon facility. This section gives PURA the 
mandate to make exceptions for the requirement of safety zones in hydrocarbon facilities. 
PURA also enjoys broad powers over land compensation matters.157 Furthermore,  section 
80(1) (c) of  the petroleum Act,  gives PURA the power to give consent for carrying out of 
                                               
150 Section 13 of the Environmental Management Act No. 20 2004. 
151 Section 30 of the Environmental Management Act. 
152 Section 33 of the Environmental Management Act. 
153 Section33 (3) of the Environmental Management Act. 
154 Section31 of the Environmental Management Act. 
155 Section30(c) of the Environmental Management Act. 
156 Section 32 of the Environmental Management Act. 
157 Section 111, 242(1) (c) of the Petroleum Act. 
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hydrocarbon activities in National Parks, forests, and game reserves. The regulations have to 
provide guidelines on when and how PURA is to coordinate with other regulatory authorities, 
on which matters it should make consultation, and when it is to consider advice. Such a 
provision in the regulations will avoid the problem of having overlapping or poorly coordinated 
mandates form multiple institutions. This would thus enhance accountability by clearly 
stipulating who is to be held accountable and for what.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, multiple accountability networks by various state actors are a 
necessity in our pluralistic governance systems.158 However, to check problems associated with 
multiple accountability including enabling the accountee room to manoeuvre and hence avoid 
being effectively put to account, there has to be sufficient coordination among governance 
authorities. 159  As discussed above, the Petroleum Act recognizes the importance of such 
coordination and provides for it. Promulgated regulations could further provide for a more 
detailed manner of coordination and cooperation to avoid challenges caused by multiple 
accountability.160  
 
7.4  ACCOUNTABILITY AND HYDROCARBON COMPANIES 
This section focuses on the accountability relationship between government and hydrocarbon 
companies. The accountability relationship between oil companies and the government in most 
cases may be categorized as contractual. Government and companies may both hold each other 
accountable within the confines of contractual agreements such as the Product Sharing 
Agreements (PSA) used in Tanzania.161  However, as it pertains to sector regulations, the 
regulatory authorities may also hold hydrocarbon companies accountable for noncompliance 
as provided for under the law. In that regard, this section interrogates how companies are to be 
held accountable and by who as per the regulatory compliance provisions of the law and the 
PSA. As discuss in Chapter 5, Tanzania’s hydrocarbons are explored by the National Oil 
Company TPDC and private or multinational hydrocarbon companies. The analysis first 
considers the regulatory bodies responsible for holding companies accountable, and then 
                                               
158 Subsection 3.1.2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Ibid. 
161 See Chapter 2 subsection 5.1 on government and contractual agreements with hydrocarbon companies.   
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focuses on accountability in relation to the National Oil Company separately and later it 
critiques how other hydrocarbon companies are held accountable.  
 
7.4.1  Hydrocarbon Companies Accountors 
Two organs are mainly responsible for holding hydrocarbon companies accountable for 
upstream activities on behalf of government and the people. These are the regulatory 
institutions, which are the Minister and the regulatory authority PURA. As explained above, 
the Minister is given the mandate  to implement sector policies, plans, and make strategic 
decisions including the issuing of licences and entering agreements upon the advice of PURA 
and subject to the approval of Cabinet.162 Alongside such mandate is the responsibility to ensure 
that industry actors act according to the law, industry policies and in accordance with their 
contractual agreements. Therefore, the Minister may hold hydrocarbon companies accountable 
through government orders as would be prescribed by the law or through the judicial system of 
accountability enforcement or through arbitration as may be agreed upon under the PSA 
agreement. Further discussion on the Minister’s accountor mandate over the companies is 
carried out in the companies’ analysis below. Apart from having the mandate to hold 
hydrocarbon companies accountable, the Minister equally has sufficient independence required 
to implement such mandate as provided for under section 5(1) (m) and (2) of the Petroleum 
Act.163 
 
PURA as the upstream regulatory authority equally has sufficient powers to hold hydrocarbon 
companies to account for compliance with the industry regulations, standards, laws and 
international best practice.164 Section 16 of the Petroleum Act gives PURA the mandate to make 
compliance orders for implementing the provisions of ‘the Act or any other law’ regulating 
hydrocarbons. Any person against whom a compliance order is made ‘shall comply with the 
order’.165 A compliance order by PURA is made in writing specifying the grounds of its making 
and is enforceable as an injunction of the High Court.166 Hence, PURA has the mandate and is 
                                               
162 Section 5(1), 5(3), 47(1) & (2) of the Petroleum Act. 
163 ‘In the discharge of functions under subsection (1), the Minister shall have powers to intervene and take 
immediate or prompt reparation actions in any regulated activity or petroleum operations…’ Section 5(2) of the 
Petroleum Act. 
164 Section 12(2) (k) of the Petroleum Act. 
165 Section 16(2) of the Petroleum Act.  
166 Section 16(4) of the Petroleum Act. 
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able to ensure enforcement when holding oil companies to account. The question remains 
whether PURA has sufficient independence to carry out its accountor function objectively.  
 
As discussed in chapter 3, independence of the accountor is important in the implementation of 
accountability.167 For PURA to be an independent body capable of holding industry actors to 
account and regulate industry activities by the law, its supervisory body from the onset has to 
be autonomous. The Petroleum Act guards PURA’s independence by requiring the board of 
PURA, which is the supervisory body to be selected from members nominated by the 
Nomination Committee.168 However, the composition of the Nomination Committee seems to 
defeat the intended objective of achieving independence of the board and checking appointment 
powers of the Minister and the President. Section 27 of the Petroleum Act provides for the 
composition of the Nomination Committee as follows: 
 
…the Minister shall establish a Nomination Committee composed of - 
(a) the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry responsible for petroleum affairs, who shall be a Chairman; 
(b) one representative from the Ministry responsible for public service; 
(c) one representative from the Ministry responsible for environment; 
(d) one representative from the Ministry responsible for occupational, safety. 
(2) The representatives from institutions referred to under subsection (1) (a) to (d) shall be of the rank of 
assistant director or above. 
 
The Nomination Committee comprises of members who are subordinate to and report to 
members of the Cabinet responsible for making the hydrocarbon sector decisions. The 
Permanent Secretary as chair is a presidential appointee. The Civil Service Committee whose 
appointment is equally done by the President appoints the other members who are Directors of 
the respective ministries.169 The proposed PURA Nomination Committee is thus susceptible to 
influence by the Minister, the Cabinet, and the President. Bearing in mind the control of the 
President as discussed above, it is possible for an authoritarian President to bulldoze over the 
decisions of the committee and even the appointing mandate of the Minister.  
 
From the practice, so far it is difficult to tell whether the Nomination Committee has been 
independent or not. The Nomination Committee advertised for candidates to apply for the 
                                               
167 Chapter 3 subsection 3 of the thesis. 
168 Section 27 of the Petroleum Act. 
169 Section 9 of the Public Service Act, Act No. 8 of 2002. 
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nomination to the board on April 6 2016.170 The information on consideration of applications 
and nominations is not public record. On April 19 2017, the President selected the Chairman 
of the Board of PURA who was initially the head of St. Augustine University Tanzania (SAUT) 
Arusha campus. 171  Give the renowned trend of the President selecting academicians to 
governmental posts it is difficult to tell whether the selected Chairman was nominated by the 
Committee or by the President on his own accord.172 On February 1, 2018, the President 
selected the Chairman of the Board of PURA to be the Attorney-General of the republic. So 
far, the Attorney-General is still the Chairman of the Board and it has not been revealed as 
whether he will be replaced. If the Attorney-General remains the chairperson of the board, as 
it has been a common practice for government officials to be board members of government 
entities, it might rise accountability challenges. The Attorney-General is a member of Cabinet 
meant to supervise the hydrocarbon industry; he also is the legal representative of government 
and its agencies including PURA. The Attorney-General being chair of PURA’s supervisory 
body is therefore conflicting. 
 
PURA has the mandate to hold industry actors to account and sufficiently enforce its decisions 
but may not be entirely free from possible external influence from the top. Such external 
influence on regulatory authorities are what hinder true accountability and foster corrupt or rent 
seeking habits which are the main causes of poor natural resource governance as discussed in 
Chapter 1, 2 and 4. How PURA carries out its mandate and level of its independence in carrying 
out such mandate is subject to practical experience in time. So far, PURA is still in formulation 
                                               
170 Ministry of Energy and Minerals, ‘Appointment to Board of Directors of the Petroleum Upstream Regulatory 
Authority (Pura)’ (April 6th 2016) available at http://www.tanzaniatoday.co.tz/news/appointment-to-board-of-
directors-of-the-petroleum-upstream-regulatory-authority-pura accessed in 2017. 
171 L. A. Lugalila, ‘Rais Magufuli Ateua Kamishna WA Madini Na Bosi WA PURA’ available at 
https://hotnewsintz.blogspot.com/2017/04/rais-magufuli-ateua-kamishna-wa-madini.html?view=classic accessed 
in September 2018. 
172 The President has appointed a substantial number of academicians to political and governmental pots that has 
caused alarm and concern of who will remain to impart knowledge in the academic institutions. See, Jukwaa la 
Elimu (Education Forum), ‘Wahadhiri Kuteuliwa, Vyuoni Atabaki Nani’ available at 
https://www.jamiiforums.com/threads/wahadhiri-kuteuliwa-vyuoni-atabaki-nani.1450827/ accessed in 
September 2018. Owden Kyambile, ‘Serekali Ipongezwe Kuwathamini Wasomi’, Nipashe Jumapili (24 July 
2016) available at https://www.ippmedia.com/sw/safu/serikali-ipongezwe-kuwathamini-wasomi accessed in 
September 2018. 
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and yet to be fully operational and any such analysis is mere speculation. 173  Subsequent 
subsections explore the provisions of the law in relation to hydrocarbon companies’ 
accountability obligations. Analysis is first made in relation to accountability of the National 
Oil Company and later other hydrocarbon companies.  
 
7.4.2  The National Oil Company TPDC (TPDC) 
The Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (“TPDC”) is the National Oil Company.174 
TPDC is charged with the responsibility of undertaking commercial aspects of Tanzania’s 
hydrocarbons including participating interests of the Government in all hydrocarbon 
agreements.175 TPDC is a state owned entity and the government is to ensure ownership of ‘not 
less than 51% of the shares’.176 Pursuant to the Public Corporations Act, a board of directors 
whose members are appointed by the Minister governs TPDC and the President upon advice 
by the Minister appoints the Chairperson.177 The Board of Directors of TPDC is responsible for 
the management and overall supervision of TPDC.178 However, in accordance with section 6 
of the Public Corporations Act, where the state is the sole owner of a corporation, the ‘Minister 
may in writing give the Board of Directors directions of a general or specific character as to the 
performance of its functions’. Section 10 of the Petroleum Act makes the same provision 
omitting the requirement of directives being written.179 It, however, refers to policy directives 
as compared to Section 6 of the Public Corporations Act that refers to general directives. Under 
the Petroleum Act, the directions are given regardless of TPDC being solely owned by the state 
or not. 
 
                                               
173 The ministry of energy just advertised for various posts of PURA including that of the First director of PURA 
whose closing application date was May 18, 2018. See Vacancy adverts on the Ministry of energy at 
https://www.nishati.go.tz/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/DG-ADVERT-_PURA-17_05_2018.pdf accessed in 
September 2018. 
174 Section 8(1) of the Petroleum Act. 
175 Section 9 of the Petroleum Act. 
176 Section 8(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
177 Section 9(1) and (2) of the Public Corporations Act, No.2 1992 
178 Section 8 of the Public Corporations Act, No.2 1992. 
179 Section .10: ‘The Minister may issue policy directions to the National Oil Company in respect of performance 
of its functions under this Act.’ of the Petroleum Act. 
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In light of the above, TPDC as a government entity is accountable to the people, and may be 
held accountable by all government oversight institutions as discussed above in subsection 2 
and 3. As an oil company, the Minister and PURA also hold TPDC accountable as main 
regulatory authorities for compliance with the industry laws and standards. To be able to be 
held accountable in such capacity, TPDC has to be an independent institution capable of making 
decisions and being held accountable for them.  
 
In consideration of the above provisions, TPDC is not an entirely independent corporation 
capable of making uninfluenced decisions. The provisions of section 10 of the Petroleum Act 
as discussed above make TPDC prone to being treated as an extended department of the 
Ministry. Ministerial directivities to TPDC may interfere with its ability to be held accountable 
for the functions it is responsible for under the law. The Minister will thus be excising internal 
vertical accountability over TPDC as a subordinate institution for failure to implement 
ministerial directivities. As discussed in Chapter 4, the latter is not peculiar to Tanzania; it is a 
common accountability challenge in most developing countries oil companies operated as an 
extension of government.180  
 
At the time of writing, TPDC is still at a transitional stage where it has not taken up its new 
functions fully as purely the NOC. TPDC was previously both the NOC and the regulatory 
authority and was operated as an extended arm of government.181 Since PURA is still in the 
formation process, it is too early to tell how well the two organs will carry out their mandate 
and whether TPDC will be independent from ministerial intervention.   
  
How well TPDC may be held to account will depend on how well it will be independent and 
detached from government influence, principally by the Minister. This would be particularly 
true in the case where TPDC solely undertakes hydrocarbon activities. So far, TPDC as the 
                                               
180 Subsection 3.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
181 Whereas the regulatory functions where to be done by the Commissioner for Petroleum affairs (Part II 1980 
Act), in practice, TPDC operated as the regulatory authority and Oil Company with exclusive rights. Contrary to 
the provisions of the 1980 Act. Section 13 of the 1980 Act granted licenses to any individual, company or body 
corporate provided the individual is a Tanzanian citizen and the company or body corporate are registered or 
incorporated under laws in force in Tanzania. See M. S. Maajar and T.Maro, ‘Tanzania’ in B. Palmer & C. 
McKenna, (eds)Oil-Regulation in 33 Jurisdictions Worldwide (London; Law Business Research Ltd, 2014) 221. 
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national company has not taken up any hydrocarbon exploration or production activities on its 
own. Any analysis on accountability in that regard would be mere speculation. However, 
experience from the State Mining Cooperation (STAMICO), which was also re-established in 
2015, and the mining laws amended in 2017 show that the corporation was always treated as 
part of government and thus mainly became internally vertically accountable to the responsible 
Minister and horizontally accountable to oversight bodies. 182  Therefore, there is need for 
national commercial entities to be given the required independence as recommended by 
international policy to allow them to conduct their functions so that they may be accountable 
in that regard and not as executive governance bodies.183  
 
7.4.3  Other Hydrocarbon Companies Operating in Tanzania 
As noted above, hydrocarbon companies are held accountable by the regulatory institutions for 
compliance of the industry’s law and regulation and for breach of contractual obligations as 
entered into under the PSA. Concerning compliance, the law makes comprehensive company 
obligations and accountability provisions as explained below. 
 
7.4.3.1 Regulatory compliance 
Hydrocarbon companies may operate in Tanzania in partnership with TPDC if they are 
‘registered under the Companies Act or any other written law’.184 Foreign companies operating 
in Tanzania are registered in Tanzania in accordance with section 435 of the Companies Act.185 
Accordingly, the companies are bound by Tanzanian laws in the conduct of their operations. 
Sub-part V of the Petroleum Act sets out the obligations of hydrocarbon companies in conduct 
of operations. Other obligations are provided for under section 222 on corporate social 
                                               
182 P.Mihyo, Non-Market Controls and the Accountability of Public Enterprises in Tanzania (Hampshire: the 
McMillan Press LTD, 1994) 79. Generally see P.Mihiyo on lack of sufficient accountability by public enterprises 
that are always treated as the extended arm of government. See Z. Kabwe, ‘Public Enterprises in Tanzania: 
Challenges and Prospects’, paper presented at CEOs Roundtable Dinner, 11 th October 2011 available at 
http://www.ceo-roundtable.co.tz/docs/Public_Finance_Management_Talk-Zitto%20Kabwe(1).pdf accessed in 
September 2018 on presidential appointees and interference of government in Public agenesis and enterprises pg. 
7-9.    
183 Subsection 3.1 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
184 Section 45(a) of the Petroleum Act; sections 433 to 437 of the Companies Act No.12 of 2002 provides for the 
registration of foreign companies operating in Tanzania.  
185 Act No.12 of 2002. 
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responsibility and sections 219,220 and 221 on local content. Section 100 stipulates work 
practices for licence holders while section 102 makes a breach of the stipulated work practice 
under section 100 an offence. The Act gives PURA the obligation of guaranteeing compliance 
of the laws and work practice principles by licence holders.186 PURA is given the right to 
inspect hydrocarbon operations plus access to all companies’ facilities and documents subject 
to the provisions of the law.187 As noted above, the law gives PURA sufficient mandate in 
holding licence holders accountable for the manner in which they conduct hydrocarbon 
operations. In as far as, hydrocarbon operations are concerned, the law clearly stipulates how 
and to whom the licence holders are accountable to.   
 
The Petroleum Act requires hydrocarbon companies to make an integrity pledge pursuant to 
section 223. Accordingly, companies pledge to conduct their activities with integrity and desist 
from engagements that undermine or prejudice the country’s finances and revenue systems. 
They pledge to ensure that their activities are consistent with the country’s economic objectives, 
policies, and strategies as well as safeguard Tanzania’s national security among other 
requirements under section 223(2). Non-compliance of the integrity pledge amounts to a breach 
of the conditions of a licence.188 Consequently, the licence is deemed withdrawn or cancelled 
and the government exercises the right to take over under the Act.189  Section 223 enables 
PURA to hold companies accountable and equally provides for the consequences to be faced 
upon non-compliance and manner of implementation.190  Upon implementation of the Act, 
hydrocarbon companies may therefore sufficiently be held accountable.  
 
7.4.3.2 Accountability on Breach of PSA 
With regard to contractual obligations, both the hydrocarbon company and the government may 
hold each other accountable as equal parties to a contract. This may be done through arbitration 
as provided for under the Model PSA. The Model PSA under Article 28(c) requires any dispute 
that may not be amicably resolved by the parties to be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
                                               
186 Section 12(2) of the Petroleum Act. 
187 Section 109 of the Petroleum Act. 
188 Section 223(4) of the Petroleum Act.  
189 Section 223(4) of the Petroleum Act,  section 195 of the Act provides for expropriation in the hydrocarbon 
Sector.  
190 See chapter three subsection 3.2 on elements regarding the discussion on consequences. 
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the provisions of Article 28(d). Article 28 (d) states that; ‘disputes shall be resolved in 
accordance with the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and 
Arbitration’, subject to the specific provisions under the respective Article. The Article names 
Dar es Salaam as the place of arbitration and the applicable law as the law of the United 
Republic of Tanzania. This 2013 Model PSA is however reviewed in light of recent 
developments in the law.  
 
The recent changes brought about by the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent 
Sovereignty) Act 191 require all disputes arising from the exploitation of natural resources to be 
adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established in the United Republic and in 
accordance with laws of the Republic.192 Furthermore, all natural resource agreements must 
acknowledge and incorporate judicial bodies or other bodies established in Tanzania as organs 
responsible for dispute settlement.193 The aim of this provision is to avoid having disputes over 
the countries resources settled by a foreign court.  
 
While these changes seek to guarantee accountability by hydrocarbon companies, Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) entered by Tanzania with a number of countries raise concern on 
effective implementation of the Acts.194 The treaties guarantee investors in Tanzania various 
rights, including expropriation only upon satisfactory and acceptable compensation195  and 
access to international dispute resolution mechanisms.196 Tanzania is bond by the bilateral 
treaties, which are enforced through international tribunals.197 Tanzania is a member of various 
international investment tribunals and it has signed and rectified its instruments. Theses 
                                               
191 Act No.5 of 2017. 
192 Section 11 of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act. 
193 Section 11(3) of the Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act. 
194 Tanzania has bilateral investment treaties with the UK, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Mauritius, Canada, China, Korea, and Zimbabwe among others. See. The treaties may be 
accessed at the UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/222.  
195 See Article 10 of the BIT with Canada, Article 6(d) of the BIT with China, Article 5 of the BIT with the United 
Kingdom. Similar provisions exist in all other BIT Agreements. 
196 See Articles on Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and the host government in all BIT entered by 
Tanzania. 
197 See Articles on Settlement of Disputes between an Investor and the host government in all BIT entered by 
Tanzania providing for various international tribunals including ICSID.  
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tribunals include the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Implementation of the above 
provisions could thus render Tanzania susceptible to a breach of international law and 
consequently to both political and legally binding consequences. Tanzania should hence ensure 
that the implementation of the Petroleum Act and the Natural Resources Act are in line with 
the provisions of the international agreements by ensuring fair and equitable treatment of 
hydrocarbon companies in the domestic dispute settlement tribunals and courts.  
 
7.4.4  Accountability between the people and hydrocarbon Companies 
The people in most cases would hold hydrocarbon companies accountable through the 
government they put in place for the governance of their resources. However, as discussed 
under the subsection on accountability through legal proceeding by the people, the people may 
hold companies directly accountable where their fundamental rights have been breached during 
the course of hydrocarbon exploitation. Such rights include land rights breached without fair 
compensation, the right to a clean environment as provided for under the environmental laws198, 
right to personal security and freedom. One may also hold a hydrocarbon company accountable 
for any damages caused on property such as crops, trees, buildings, stock, or works where the 
company will be liable to pay fair and reasonable compensation.199  
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The Tanzanian legal framework makes it clear that the people have the right to hold the 
government accountable for the management of natural resources including hydrocarbons. It 
also clearly establishes various government institutions for purposes of ensuring that there is 
both hierarchical and horizontal accountability for the governance of the hydrocarbon sector. 
There are also clear provisions on the accountability of hydrocarbon companies to the state and 
the people for upstream hydrocarbon activities. The main challenge in the legal framework lies 
in ensuring that this legal framework is workable and implemented in practice.  
 
This chapter has shown that although the law establishes various accountability mechanisms, 
in most cases this is done without providing these mechanisms with sufficient independence 
and mandate. For instance, while the legal framework gives the National Assembly the mandate 
                                               
198 Section 4 of the Environmental Management Act. 
199 Section 111 of the Petroleum Act. 
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to interrogate and call government to account, it also limits the exercise of such mandate by 
giving the President the power to appoint some of the MPs and the power to dissolve the 
National Assembly.  
 
One of the familiar challenges to ensuring that there is accountability within the hydrocarbon 
sector lies in the state of the rule of law, democracy, and constitutionalism in a country. In 
Tanzania, the challenges to democracy, the rule of law and constitutionalism are inseparable 
from the challenges to accountability in the hydrocarbon sector. As this chapter has shown, 
political accountability mechanisms can play a vital role in ensuring that government 
institutions and authorities are held accountable for the management of hydrocarbon resources. 
However, these political accountability mechanisms do not function optimally due largely to 
the one-party dominance system and a skewed political system with a strong executive and 
week legislature. 
 
Accountability via the courts is possible in Tanzania especially when individual rights have 
been violated. However, public interest litigation in the area of hydrocarbon resources has not 
been used despite the fact that such litigation is allowed by the courts. One of the possible 
explanations is the constitutional provision, which renders matters relating to the governance 
and management of natural resources non-justiciable.  
 
An important means of ensuring the accountability of individual governmental officials for the 
management and governance of hydrocarbon resources is anti-corruption law. However, the 
degree to which the Anti-Corruption Bureau can successfully prosecute corruption-related 
offences depends on how independent it is and the absence of political interference. 
Independence is a challenge not only for the Anti-Corruption Bureau but also for many other 
institutions as has been shown in this chapter.  Officials appointed by the President Head most 
of the horizontal accountability institutions and, in some cases; these officials report to or 
receive directives from the President or the responsible Minister.  
  
Other horizontal accountability institutions, such as the CAG, TEITA and CHRAGG, lack their 
own enforcement mechanisms. These institutions merely produce reports whose 
implementation depends on the National Assembly or the judiciary.  
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The legal framework sufficiently provides for the accountability of hydrocarbon companies and 
other stakeholders for upstream activities. The responsible Minister and PURA are empowered 
to hold companies accountable for compliance with the industry regulations, standards, laws, 
and international best practice. Companies and the government also hold each other 
accountable through the medium of the law of contract. Initially, such accountability was 
enforced by arbitration as provided for in article 28(c) of the Model PSA of 2013. However, 
recent changes brought about by the Permanent Sovereignty Act require all disputes arising 
from the exploitation of natural resources to be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs 
established by law. While such provisions are commendable, the bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) concluded by Tanzania with several countries could adversely affect the implementation 
of this new Act.  
 
Given the multiplicity of the accountability mechanisms, it should be expected that there would 
be instances of duplication and overlapping mandate. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Tanzanian legal framework recognises the importance of coordination among the various 
accountability mechanisms by requiring the Minister and PURA to ensure that coordination 
among cross cutting ministries and regulatory authorities. However, there remain instances 
where the Petroleum Act gives PURA extensive mandate on matters that lie within the domain 
of other authorities.    
 
In view of the foregoing, it can be concluded that while Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal 
framework recognizes the significance of accountability and makes an effort to establish 
various mechanisms for the hydrocarbon sector, challenges remain. Noteworthy among these 
are the lack of independence and sufficient mandate of the various mechanisms, and the broader 
problems of democratization and constitutionalism in the country. 
CHAPTER 8 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 OVERVIEW
This thesis set out to conduct an appraisal of the legal and institutional framework governing 
the upstream hydrocarbon industry in Tanzania. The primary objective was to establish the 
extent to which the governance aspects of transparency and accountability are incorporated in 
the legal framework to ensure their effective implementation in practice.  
 
As shown in Chapters 2 and 4, recent years have seen the emergence of a global consensus in 
championing increased transparency and accountability in the management of natural 
resources. 1  In particular, there has been heightened global demand for transparency and 
accountability in the extractive industry. Notwithstanding the recognition of fundamental 
governance principles of transparency and accountability in resource governance, achieving 
transparency and accountability remains a real challenge for many nations especially 
developing countries like Tanzania. 2  It is the premise of this thesis that sufficient 
implementation of these governance principles is only possible if at the very least key aspects 
of these principles are incorporated into the legal framework. By investigating whether and 
how these aspects are incorporated in a legal framework, the thesis sought to  identify the 
accountability and transparency challenges arising from the regulatory framework and find 
solutions to those challenges. 
 
More specifically, for there to be effective governance, the law must sufficiently incorporate 
the key elements of these concepts, define the accountability and transparency relationships, 
and establish appropriate mechanisms of implementing these concepts. In particular, the thesis 
has established that such relationships must address the questions on who are the actors 
involved in the accountability relationships, who is to be called to account, who is entitled to 
hold other actors accountable and for what is accountability owed. In the case of transparency, 
the relationships must address the questions of information disclosure, who is obligated to 
disclose information, who can have access to such information, and how can such access be 
                                               
1Subsection 4.4.2 of Chapter 2 of this thesis and Subsection 4 of Chapter 4 of this thesis.  
2 Ibid. 
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facilitated. It is also critical that accountability mechanisms are sufficiently independent, have 
adequate mandate to inquire and render judgement, and have the capacity to enforce their 
decisions. Usually, accountability and transparency mechanisms operate in a pluralistic 
governance context. The thesis argues that this calls for coordination and cooperation as well 
as checks and balances to ensure that accountability actors are themselves accountable. 
 
International and regional policies and practices corroborate the importance of incorporating 
these elements of transparency and accountability into legal frameworks. Specific 
accountability structures are needed to ensure that actors given authority to govern and exploit 
hydrocarbons are able to answer and face vigorous scrutiny and verification processes by 
accountors. Indeed, the various policy recommendations discussed in Chapter 4 call for states 
to ensure that there are sufficient legal and regulatory frameworks that establish clear 
transparency and accountability relationships and their implementation mechanisms.3  
 
What is apparent in the study is that, although international and regional recommendations set 
a trend of ideal transparency and accountability aspects to be incorporated in national laws, the 
fragmentation of the regulations that govern the hydrocarbon resource remains a major 
challenge. Notwithstanding the transnational nature of hydrocarbon resources, their 
governance, and regulation is dependent on national regulatory frameworks of respective oil 
producing countries.4 Additionally, transparency and accountability are governance questions 
that are affected by a nation’s customs, political orientation and socioeconomic factors. 5 
Therefore, the extent to which states uphold transparency and accountability principles in 
legislation and practice is informed by a respective national governance culture.  
 
8.2  TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN TANZANIA’S 
HYDROCARBON INDUSTRY 
The thesis has established that Tanzania’s hydrocarbon industry is still at its early stages of 
development. For that reason, the laws governing the industry are also very new, some having 
been enacted in the last three years.6 Nonetheless, Tanzania has discovered its commercially 
                                               
3 Subsection 2 of Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
4 Subsection 4.1 of Chapter 2 of thesis 
5 Subsection 2 of Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
6 Subsection 7 of Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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viable hydrocarbons and made its laws at a time when the hydrocarbon industry worldwide is 
seeking to institutionalize the principles of transparency and accountability in the industry. As 
a new comer to the industry, Tanzania has made notable efforts to codify these principles in its 
legal framework. However, Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis proved that not all aspects of 
transparency and accountability have been so recognized and legislated.  
 
8.2.1  Findings on Transparency in Tanzania’s Hydrocarbon Legal 
Framework 
Chapter 6 established that Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal framework recognizes the value of 
transparency in the governance of the industry. This is traced from the recognition of the 
constitutional right of the people to seek information and be informed. The Petroleum Act 
makes it mandatory for the regulatory authorities, the NOC, and the Minister to conduct all 
industry activities in a transparent manner. The Hydrocarbons Revenue Act, TEITA Act, and 
the Natural Resources Act have similar provisions.  
 
The study found that Tanzania’s hydrocarbon legal framework sets out commendable 
provisions promoting transparency between the government and hydrocarbon companies. 
Hydrocarbon companies are compelled to disclose proactively all information pertaining to 
their upstream activities: conversely, the government is obliged to make government plans, 
policies and strategies on the industry available to the hydrocarbon companies. 7  The law 
safeguards the government’s right to demand access to reliable and clear information from any 
person or body in a timely manner for the governance of the upstream activities.8  
 
The thesis observed that the law also makes commendable efforts towards achieving 
transparency between the government and the public. It explicitly requires hydrocarbon 
agreements to be entered into after a transparent and competitive public tendering process has 
been completed.9 The law also requires hydrocarbon revenues and expenditure to be published 
simultaneously by the Minister in the Gazette and on the websites of the government and of the 
Ministry of Finance.10 
                                               
7 Section 4 of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Section 3 of Chapter 6 of thesis. 
10 Ibid. 
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Creditable steps have been taken under the law to enforce transparency between the public and 
the hydrocarbon companies in as far as environmental issues and corporate social responsibility 
are concerned. Legislation on local government authorities encourages local participation in 
and access to information concerning development projects. All information regarding 
environmental impact assessment is considered public information.   
 
Most notable perhaps is the establishment of a specific oversight committee for purposes of 
safeguarding transparency and accountability in extractive industries. This is a step to the right 
direction and signifies Tanzania’s commitment towards enabling and implementing transparent 
and accountable governance of its natural resources.  
 
Despite these commendable steps, the Tanzanian legal framework falls short of the required 
elements to facilitate transparency in the industry. Firstly, Tanzania’s legislative provisions on 
access to information fail to fully guarantee the right of access to information. Contrary to best 
practice, the Tanzanian Access to Information Act does not supersede over legislation on 
information disclosure in the event of a conflict. This means that the confidentiality provisions 
of the Petroleum Act prevail over the provisions of the Access to Information Act. Furthermore, 
where access to information is denied or the fees charged are too high, the procedures for appeal 
present no viable remedy to the information applicant. Contrary to best practice, Tanzania’s 
Access to Information Act does not provide for an independent body to entertain access to 
information matters and does not permit applicants to seek judicial remedies. By denying access 
to ordinary courts via judicial review, the law falls short of fully guaranteeing access to 
information. It remains to be seen whether the courts will declare that such denial of judicial 
redress is unconstitutional. 
 
Secondly, instead of empowering public officials to disclose public information, the 
information Act and the Petroleum prescribe severe penalties on public officials for disclosure 
of confidential or exempted information. Best practice dictates that Tanzania should rather 
criminalize the denial of requested information.  
 
Thirdly, the Petroleum Act and the Access to Information Act leave the question of access to 
hydrocarbon information within the discretion of the Minister. As discussed in Chapter 6, in 
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the event that the Minister denies access to information, his or her decision may not be 
challenged in court of law. Consequently, the Petroleum Act does not make hydrocarbon 
industry information easily accessible, thereby failing to fulfil an important requirement for 
transparency. 
 
Fourthly, transparency not only entails access to information but also timeous access to 
information. Tanzania’s provisions on the transfer of request by one information holder to 
another impede transparency by delaying access to information. The transfer provisions under 
the Information Act create an unreasonably long period for accessing information. Institutions 
may avoid information disclosure by passing on requests among themselves. This is mainly 
because time of the response period of the application is calculated from the date of transfer. 
Best practice is that in the event of such a transfer, the response period is calculated from the 
day in which the information request was originally received.11 
   
Fifthly, while section 91 of the Petroleum Act directs the regulatory authority to make public 
all information pertaining to industry activities and players upon approval of the Minister and 
payment of prescribed fees, the same information is considered confidential in subsequent 
provisions of the Act. While section 93(2) (I) make an exception that such information may be 
disclosed as ‘the requirement to ensure transparency and accountability under the relevant law’, 
it is unclear whether hydrocarbon industry information is public information.  
 
Lastly, both the Petroleum Act and the TEITA Act do not compel the hydrocarbon companies 
to publish relevant information to the public. Even where the companies are required to furnish 
information to the Transparency Committee, the latter is not by law compelled to publish such 
information except where it deems fit. The Committee is also not compelled to publish its 
reports.  
 
In these respects, the Tanzanian legislative framework does not fully guarantee transparency in 
the hydrocarbon sector. 
 
 
                                               
11 See Section 3 of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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8.2.2  Findings on Accountability in Tanzania’s Hydrocarbon Legal 
Framework 
The legal framework in Tanzanian guarantees the right of the people to hold the government 
accountable for the management of the natural resources including hydrocarbons. Various 
government institutions have been established for this purpose. On close study, however, the 
law fails to guarantee sufficient mandate and independence to accountability mechanisms. 
First, political accountability mechanisms do not function ideally owing to challenges relating 
to the rule of law, democratization and constitutionalism. For example, Weakness in the 
National Assembly as an accountor is mostly because it is dominated by one party and 
controlled by the President.  
 
Second, accountability institutions are influenced by either the president or the Minister; hence 
lack the independence in implementing their functions. For instance, some accountability 
institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Bureau need to be guaranteed independent for them to 
operate freely and optimally. With the exception of the CAG, most accountability institutions 
lack independence. The officials leading the institutions are presidential appointees and in some 
cases are obliged by law to implement directives from the President or the responsible Minister.  
 
Third, accountability institutions such as the CAG, TEITA and CHRAGG lack their own 
enforcement mechanisms. The later institutions merely produce reports whose implementation 
depends on the National Assembly or the judiciary. How well actors are held accountable 
therefore depends on the strength of political, judicial, and administrative systems of 
accountability. 
 
Judicial accountability is possible within the legal framework in as far as individual rights are 
concerned. However, constitutional provisions declaring such issues non-justiciable undercut 
the scope of public interest litigation in respect of issues arising from the management of natural 
resources.   
 
In as far as, hydrocarbon companies are concerned, the legal framework sufficiently provides 
for accountability .Government through the Minister and PURA are authorized to ensure 
companies are accountable for compliance with the industry regulations, standards, laws, and 
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international best practice. The Minister has sufficient mandate and required independence and 
implementation mechanisms to carry out his accountor functions. PURA is also equipped with 
sufficient mandate and implementation mechanisms.  
 
As parties to a contract, government and hydrocarbon companies hold each other accountable 
within the confines of contractual agreements. Previously, such accountability was enforced by 
way of arbitration as provided for in Article 28(c) of the Model PSA of 2013. Recent changes 
brought about by the 2017 Permanent Sovereignty Act requires all disputes arising from the 
exploitation of natural resources to be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established 
in the United Republic and in accordance with laws of the Republic. All natural resource 
agreements must acknowledge and incorporate judicial bodies or other bodies established in 
Tanzania as organs responsible for dispute settlement.   
 
While these changes seek to guarantee accountability by hydrocarbon companies, bilateral 
investment treaties (BITs) entered by Tanzania with a number of countries raise concern on 
effective implementation of the law. The treaties guarantee investors in Tanzania various rights, 
including expropriation only upon satisfactory and acceptable compensation and access to 
international dispute resolution mechanisms. The BITs could thus adversely affect the 
implementation of the Sovereignty Act. 
 
Given the multiplicity of the accountability mechanisms, instances of duplicity and overlapping 
mandates are to be expected. The Tanzanian legal framework recognizes the importance of 
coordination among the various accountability mechanisms by requiring the Minister and 
PURA to ensure that there is coordination among cross cutting ministries and regulatory 
authorities. However, there remain instances where the Petroleum Act gives PURA extensive 
mandate on matters that lie within the domain of other authorities.   Such provisions create 
duplicity of mandates and problems associated with multiple accountability including enabling 
the accountee room to manoeuvre and hence avoid being effectively put to account.  
 
From the above-mentioned, it is the conclusion of this thesis that, while Tanzania’s 
hydrocarbon legal framework recognizes the significance of accountability and makes an effort 
to establish various mechanisms for the hydrocarbon sector, challenges remain. Notable among 
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the challenges are the lack of independence and sufficient mandate of the various mechanisms, 
and the broader problems of democratization and constitutionalism in the country.  
 
8.4  GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
To address the shortcoming related to transparency, Tanzanian needs to consider amending the 
Access to Information Act to establish the supremacy of this Act over other Acts. Secondly, 
Tanzania should address the absence of an independent commission to adjudicate disputes 
arising from requests and decisions on access to information. Thirdly, the law should allow for 
access to judicial redress for information applicants. Fourthly, the law should promote access 
to information by criminalizing the failure to disclose public information rather than 
criminalizing disclose of such information. In addition, the grounds upon which information 
should be treated confidential need to be limited.   
 
Tanzania should also adopt international policy recommendations on proactively disclosed 
information. As elaborated in Chapter 4 and 6, the recommendations call for states to publish 
information proactively. Not only should such information be published, the government 
should promote access to such information to all.  Consistent with best practice, Tanzania could 
start by establishing an independent body responsible for enforcing the Access to Information 
Act.    
 
As regards accountability, much turns on giving the various accountability institutions 
sufficient mandate and independence, and limiting political influence on accountability 
institutions. An effective approach would be to first check the problem of presidential influence. 
Tanzania should consider reducing the powers of the President and strengthening the National 
Assembly. This recommendation is in line with the views presented by the Constitution Review 
Commission (CRC) during the 2014 constitutional review processes. 12  For a long time 
Tanzanians have raised the excessive powers of the President in the current Constitution as one 
                                               




sw.pdf accessed in September 2018 at 53-54. 
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of the burning issues in need of reform.13 Moving forward, Tanzania should implement the 
constitutional reforms recommended by the CRC on presidential powers. Additionally, the law 
should safeguard members of parliament from adverse party control. This could be done by 
ensuring that the president of the country is prohibited from being the chairperson of his/her 
political party. This would check and balance executive decisions as has been vivid in countries 
with such practice such as South Africa, where the ruling party successfully recalled its 
president.   
 
Second, in line with best practice, 14  accountability institutions should report to and be 
constituted by the legislature other than the executive as highlighted in Chapter 7. This will 
guarantee effective implementation by an independent accountor from its accountee the 
executive. Additionally, accountability institutions such as the TEITA and CHRAG should be 
given powers to implement its decisions other than merely producing reports. Such powers 
could involve charging accountees fines or revoking certain privileges or permits. Such powers 
would be in line with international recommendations, which require states to establish 
accountability implementation mechanisms that are sufficiently independent and have adequate 
mandate to carry out their accountability function as shown in Chapter 4. 
 
Third, to avoid redundancy and its associated problems, the Petroleum Act ought to be amended 
so as to ensure that PURA’s extensive mandate dose not adversely affect matters that lie within 
the domain of other authorities.  PURA’s Extensive mandate as discussed in Chapter 7 creates 
duplicity of mandates and problems associated with multiple accountability including enabling 
the accountee room to manoeuvre and hence avoid being effectively put to account. 
 
Lastly, Tanzania should ensure implementation of the commendable provisions of  the 
Permanent Sovereignty Act that require all disputes arising from the exploitation of natural 
resources to be adjudicated by judicial bodies or other organs established by law in Tanzania. 
To do so, Tanzania needs to promulgate regulations that are in line with the provisions of the 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) concluded by Tanzania with several countries that could 
adversely affect the implementation of sovereignty Act. The Regulations ought to ensure that 
                                               
13 Ibid. 
14 See section 3 of Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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fair and equitable treatment is afforded to hydrocarbon companies in the domestic dispute 
settlement tribunals and courts.    
 
8.5  QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research was conducted at a time when the hydrocarbon legal framework in Tanzania was 
being promulgated. Regulations for implementation of the legal framework either are in the 
process of being promulgated or are yet to undergo such a process. Institutions created by the 
legal framework are still being established and some are yet to start functioning. While this 
study considered the question, whether the law incorporates the aspects of transparency, and 
accountability, further research is needed to gather empirical evidence on how these institutions 
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